Three senior U.S. military officials disclosed to Fox News that on Feb. 19, 2025, the Houthis in Yemen launched surface-to-air missiles at a U.S. F-16 fighter jet operating off the Yemeni coast over the Red Sea. Notably, this operation coincided with a simultaneous Houthi escalation against Yemeni army forces in Ma’rib and Al-Jawf governorates. This convergence of actions raises critical questions about the underlying motives and broader strategic implications of the Houthi escalation—both domestically and regionally—as well as the potential repercussions of this heightened posture.
First: Reading the Indicators of Houthi Escalation
The aforementioned developments underscore the Houthi movement's adoption of multifaceted escalation strategies in its approach towards the United States and within the internal Yemeni front. The indicators of this evolving posture are evident in the following:
The significance of this operation is tied to several critical considerations. First, it marked the first time the group had attacked an “F-16,” a highly valued asset of the US Air Force and one of the most prominent fighter jets in the US. Second, the operation was the second of its kind within a month. On Jan. 15, 2025, the Houthis had previously announced targeting the US aircraft carrier “USS Harry Truman” and its naval units in the northern Red Sea. (1) Third, these Houthi operations unfolded amid ongoing, albeit reduced, reciprocal attacks between the two sides. This occurred alongside the maintained ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, effectively signalling the separation of the Houthi front from the Gaza front.
These statements highlight the Houthi movement's pragmatic approach to the Palestinian issue on multiple fronts. First, the group reinforces its position as part of a broader front of support and solidarity with the Palestinian cause, seeking to bolster its image regionally. Second, the Houthis appear to be employing a “policy of escaping forward,” using external narratives to deflect attention from their internal crises and maintain cohesion within their ranks. Third, the movement is wagering on solidifying its role as a pivotal player within the Iranian axis in the region, particularly in light of the weakened state of other Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The emphasis on Ma'rib stems from several strategic calculations. First, the Houthis have maintained a near-siege on the city for years, aiming to erode the strength of government forces. Second, gaining control over Ma'rib would enable the Houthis to exert near-total control over northern Yemen. Third, Ma'rib's geopolitical significance is unparalleled. It lies on the most accessible route from the north to Shabwa Governorate in the south (a coastal region with direct access to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea) and to Hadhramaut Governorate, where coalition forces are stationed. Additionally, Ma'rib's proximity to Sana'a from the north makes it a critical buffer zone; securing it would effectively safeguard the capital for the Houthis by neutralising government forces from Ma'rib.
Fourth, the organisation perceives that capturing Ma'rib would enhance its political leverage as a de facto authority and strengthen its negotiating position in future settlement discussions.
Fifth, Marib Governorate stands as one of Yemen's most oil-rich regions, making its control a strategic asset for securing substantial funding and financial backing for the organisation. The governorate is home to Yemen's most critical economic resources, and according to various estimates, it hosts the largest oil fields in the country. Marib is also the sole governorate producing natural gas, with a strategic natural gas pipeline running from Marib to the Balhaf port on the Arabian Sea in Shabwa Governorate. An oil pipeline extends from Marib to the Ras Issa port near Hodeidah in the west. The governorate boasts the largest power station in Yemen, and revenues from crude oil exports in Marib account for 25% of the nation's gross domestic product. Should the Houthis gain control over Marib, they would likely secure revenues estimated between $1.3 and $5.5 million per day, a shift poised to alter the balance of power in the country. The government, in turn, would face significant losses, potentially amounting to no less than $19.5 million per month from crude oil exports.
Second - Implications of the Houthi Escalation
The recent Houthi escalation on both the internal front and the Red Sea level reflects a set of significant implications, which can be outlined as follows:
The organisation seemed intent on delivering pre-emptive messages across multiple dimensions. Firstly, it aimed to assert its military readiness to carry out high-impact strikes against American destroyers and drones, demonstrating both offensive and surveillance capabilities. Secondly, the group sought to convey a warning by escalating the potential cost of any strike against it, particularly amid increasing speculation about possible targeted actions by the United States or Israel. Thirdly, the Houthis aimed to hold onto the Red Sea card as a strategic leverage point.
Recent months have witnessed numerous grassroots protests against the deteriorating living conditions in Houthi-controlled areas. Demonstrations erupted across various regions, including protests by the people of Haraz, the Al-Hada and Khawlan tribes, and the sons of Wasab in the Dhamar Governorate. Even the capital, Sana’a, saw multiple demonstrations. (5)
Broadly speaking, the recent Houthi escalation—whether in the Red Sea or within Yemen—cannot be viewed solely as a reaction to ongoing U.S. and British strikes on the organisation and its areas of control or as a continuation of long-standing conflict dynamics with the legitimacy camp. Rather, it is primarily driven by the Houthis' pragmatic calculations to align with and adapt to evolving regional and internal realities. These realities are defined by growing rejection of the group and intensified pressure on multiple fronts. In response, the Houthis appear to be employing a strategy of “escaping forward,” opening multiple escalation fronts to consolidate their position and amass leverage that could be instrumental in future negotiations.
[1] الحوثيون: استهدفنا حاملة طائرات وقطعاً بحرية أميركية في البحر الأحمر، العربي الجديد، 15 يناير 2025، متاح على:
[2] Yemen’s Houthi leader accuses US of encouraging Israel to violate Gaza ceasefire deal, Anadolu Agency, February 13, 2025, available at:
[3] الجيش اليمني يحبط هجمات للحوثيين على 3 جبهات، إرم نيوز، 23 فبراير 2025، متاح على:
https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/hqg3i24
[4] الحوثيون ينفذون أوسع عملية تجنيد لطلاب المدارس الثانوية، الشرق الأوسط، 18 ديسمبر 2024، متاح على:
[5] تصاعد الغضب القبلي عام 2024: مواجهات واحتجاجات ضد الحوثيين، خبر للأنباء، 1 يناير 2025، متاح على:
https://www.khbr.me/news224287.html
The stated views express the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center or the work team.
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