Three senior U.S. military officials disclosed to Fox News that on Feb. 19, 2025, the Houthis in Yemen launched surface-to-air missiles at a U.S. F-16 fighter jet operating off the Yemeni coast over the Red Sea. Notably, this operation coincided with a simultaneous Houthi escalation against Yemeni army forces in Ma’rib and Al-Jawf governorates. This convergence of actions raises critical questions about the underlying motives and broader strategic implications of the Houthi escalation—both domestically and regionally—as well as the potential repercussions of this heightened posture.

First: Reading the Indicators of Houthi Escalation

The aforementioned developments underscore the Houthi movement's adoption of multifaceted escalation strategies in its approach towards the United States and within the internal Yemeni front. The indicators of this evolving posture are evident in the following:

1. Targeting the US “F-16” Fighter Jet: The Houthis initiated a significant and unprecedented escalation against the US by launching surface-to-air missiles at a US “F-16” fighter jet, marking the first instance of such an attack by the group. Additionally, the Houthis targeted a US “MQ-9 Reaper” drone operating over Yemeni airspace beyond the areas under their control.

The significance of this operation is tied to several critical considerations. First, it marked the first time the group had attacked an “F-16,” a highly valued asset of the US Air Force and one of the most prominent fighter jets in the US. Second, the operation was the second of its kind within a month. On Jan. 15, 2025, the Houthis had previously announced targeting the US aircraft carrier “USS Harry Truman” and its naval units in the northern Red Sea. (1) Third, these Houthi operations unfolded amid ongoing, albeit reduced, reciprocal attacks between the two sides. This occurred alongside the maintained ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, effectively signalling the separation of the Houthi front from the Gaza front.

2. Threatening Escalation over Gaza Displacement: The timing of this Houthi attack is particularly significant, coinciding with heightened reactions to the proposed displacement of the Palestinian people, following US President Donald Trump and the Israeli far right's plans. On Feb. 13, 2025, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi issued stark warnings against displacing the Palestinian population, stating that “the organisation will resume its attacks if President Donald Trump implements plans to displace the Palestinians.” He further noted that “missiles, drones, and ships will be deployed if the US administration imposes a plan to expel Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.”(2)

These statements highlight the Houthi movement's pragmatic approach to the Palestinian issue on multiple fronts. First, the group reinforces its position as part of a broader front of support and solidarity with the Palestinian cause, seeking to bolster its image regionally. Second, the Houthis appear to be employing a “policy of escaping forward,” using external narratives to deflect attention from their internal crises and maintain cohesion within their ranks. Third, the movement is wagering on solidifying its role as a pivotal player within the Iranian axis in the region, particularly in light of the weakened state of other Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.

3. Attacking Yemeni Army Forces: The Houthi escalation was not limited to external provocations but extended to a qualitative surge within Yemen. The Yemeni army reported repelling coordinated Houthi assaults on multiple combat fronts, including Ma'rib, Al-Jawf, and Taiz. (3) The organisation also attempted infiltration into Ma'rib Governorate.

The emphasis on Ma'rib stems from several strategic calculations. First, the Houthis have maintained a near-siege on the city for years, aiming to erode the strength of government forces. Second, gaining control over Ma'rib would enable the Houthis to exert near-total control over northern Yemen. Third, Ma'rib's geopolitical significance is unparalleled. It lies on the most accessible route from the north to Shabwa Governorate in the south (a coastal region with direct access to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea) and to Hadhramaut Governorate, where coalition forces are stationed. Additionally, Ma'rib's proximity to Sana'a from the north makes it a critical buffer zone; securing it would effectively safeguard the capital for the Houthis by neutralising government forces from Ma'rib.

Fourth, the organisation perceives that capturing Ma'rib would enhance its political leverage as a de facto authority and strengthen its negotiating position in future settlement discussions.

Fifth, Marib Governorate stands as one of Yemen's most oil-rich regions, making its control a strategic asset for securing substantial funding and financial backing for the organisation. The governorate is home to Yemen's most critical economic resources, and according to various estimates, it hosts the largest oil fields in the country. Marib is also the sole governorate producing natural gas, with a strategic natural gas pipeline running from Marib to the Balhaf port on the Arabian Sea in Shabwa Governorate. An oil pipeline extends from Marib to the Ras Issa port near Hodeidah in the west. The governorate boasts the largest power station in Yemen, and revenues from crude oil exports in Marib account for 25% of the nation's gross domestic product. Should the Houthis gain control over Marib, they would likely secure revenues estimated between $1.3 and $5.5 million per day, a shift poised to alter the balance of power in the country. The government, in turn, would face significant losses, potentially amounting to no less than $19.5 million per month from crude oil exports.

Second - Implications of the Houthi Escalation

The recent Houthi escalation on both the internal front and the Red Sea level reflects a set of significant implications, which can be outlined as follows:

1. Demonstrating Military Capabilities: Through the recent targeting of the US “F-16” aircraft, the Houthi organisation aimed to showcase its military prowess. On a tactical level, the group leveraged surface-to-air missiles to target the American destroyer. These long-range missiles, known for their launch flexibility from mobile platforms and advanced jamming capabilities, underscored the organisation's tactical sophistication. Moreover, it appears that the group used anti-aircraft radars to track the American fighter’s trajectory and movements, complementing this with radar and GPS systems integral to the surface-to-air missile operations.

The organisation seemed intent on delivering pre-emptive messages across multiple dimensions. Firstly, it aimed to assert its military readiness to carry out high-impact strikes against American destroyers and drones, demonstrating both offensive and surveillance capabilities. Secondly, the group sought to convey a warning by escalating the potential cost of any strike against it, particularly amid increasing speculation about possible targeted actions by the United States or Israel. Thirdly, the Houthis aimed to hold onto the Red Sea card as a strategic leverage point.

2. Houthi Preparations for Qualitative Strikes: Amid a shifting regional and international landscape—marked by mounting speculation over potential qualitative strikes by the United States, Britain, or Israel—the Houthi organisation appears to be maneuvering to establish a deterrence dynamic by raising the costs of escalation. Several indicators suggest these preparations are underway. According to reports, (4) over the past two months, the Houthis have declared a state of maximum alert among their fighters, ramping up field visits to their armed formations and tribal mobilisation zones. The group also intensified recruitment efforts, particularly in Ibb, Sana’a, and Taiz governorates. Furthermore, the organisation adopted heightened security measures, including altering meeting venues, relocating command and control centres, and imposing stringent restrictions on the movements of key figures, especially those associated with the military wing known as the “Jihadi Office.”

3. The "Deterrence and Intimidation" Strategy Towards Citizens: Amid the escalating economic and social crises in Houthi-controlled areas, coupled with the increasing frequency of organisational violations and subsequent protests, particularly at the tribal level, the Houthis aims to instil fear and uncertainty among Yemeni citizens, serving as a pre-emptive tactic to head off any potential protest movements or local opposition against the organisation.

Recent months have witnessed numerous grassroots protests against the deteriorating living conditions in Houthi-controlled areas. Demonstrations erupted across various regions, including protests by the people of Haraz, the Al-Hada and Khawlan tribes, and the sons of Wasab in the Dhamar Governorate. Even the capital, Sana’a, saw multiple demonstrations. (5)

4. Preparing for a New Military Battle in Yemen: It appears that the Houthi mobilisation and the military escalation across many areas fall within the framework of the organisation's preparation for a new battle in Yemen with the legitimacy camp. Indicators of this preparation have been building up recently, driven by a set of main factors. The first factor is the growing discourse within the legitimacy camp about the necessity of reaching a military resolution with the Houthis. The second factor is the recent calls by many tribes to a state of alert against the organisation. The third factor is the increasing confrontations between the Houthis and the legitimacy forces at specific points. This scenario suggests the organisation may seek to deliver the first blow in this battle.

5. Dealing with Current Pressures: Through this multi-dimensional escalation, the Houthis aim to secure a set of significant gains. First, by ramping up tensions in the Red Sea and raising the cost of confrontation with Washington, they seek to put pressure on the US administration regarding their classification on terrorism lists and the ensuing repercussions. Second, the organisation aims to build up more military influence and expand on the ground to boost its negotiating leverage. Third, the organisation's long-standing strategy has revolved around escalating tensions to extract a price for de-escalation, such as being recognised as a legitimate party in any settlement talks and achieving other strategic benefits. These include sharing oil revenues with the legitimacy camp, advancing efforts to rehabilitate Red Sea ports, particularly the port of Hodeidah, enhancing air traffic at Sana’a airport, and securing numerous other advantages. Fourth, the organisation is working to position itself as one of Iran’s most pivotal proxies, particularly in light of the weakened state of Hezbollah, thereby ensuring continued military, economic, and logistical backing from Tehran.

Broadly speaking, the recent Houthi escalation—whether in the Red Sea or within Yemen—cannot be viewed solely as a reaction to ongoing U.S. and British strikes on the organisation and its areas of control or as a continuation of long-standing conflict dynamics with the legitimacy camp. Rather, it is primarily driven by the Houthis' pragmatic calculations to align with and adapt to evolving regional and internal realities. These realities are defined by growing rejection of the group and intensified pressure on multiple fronts. In response, the Houthis appear to be employing a strategy of “escaping forward,” opening multiple escalation fronts to consolidate their position and amass leverage that could be instrumental in future negotiations.

[1] الحوثيون: استهدفنا حاملة طائرات وقطعاً بحرية أميركية في البحر الأحمر، العربي الجديد، 15 يناير 2025، متاح على:

https://2u.pw/5ct9tHFa

[2] Yemen’s Houthi leader accuses US of encouraging Israel to violate Gaza ceasefire deal, Anadolu Agency, February 13, 2025, available at:

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemen-s-houthi-leader-accuses-us-of-encouraging-israel-to-violate-gaza-ceasefire-deal/3481350

[3] الجيش اليمني يحبط هجمات للحوثيين على 3 جبهات، إرم نيوز، 23 فبراير 2025، متاح على:

https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/hqg3i24

[4] الحوثيون ينفذون أوسع عملية تجنيد لطلاب المدارس الثانوية، الشرق الأوسط، 18 ديسمبر 2024، متاح على:

https://2u.pw/XIgGuY43

[5] تصاعد الغضب القبلي عام 2024: مواجهات واحتجاجات ضد الحوثيين، خبر للأنباء، 1 يناير 2025، متاح على:

https://www.khbr.me/news224287.html