The Yemeni landscape has recently experienced a sequence of political and field developments that appeared to jeopardise the ongoing military ceasefire, which has endured for more than a year. This ceasefire has entailed the internationally recognised Yemeni government on one side and the Houthi group on the other.

In recent months, the Houthis have threatened to resume armed hostilities within Yemen's internal fronts, escalating their activities across various fronts. Furthermore, from a media standpoint, the Houthis have adopted an increasingly provocative rhetoric, suggesting the possibility of targeting Saudi territory and Yemeni maritime routes in the Red Sea.

In August 2023, Houthi statements reached a pinnacle, with the group's leader issuing threats to target the Saudi "NEOM" project if their negotiation demands were not met. This came after the group's leaders announced a halt in their talks with Riyadh, primarily over salary-related issues.

Simultaneously, the Yemeni crisis has witnessed a resurgence of diplomatic efforts aimed at averting potential escalation and formulating a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. This was evident through Oman's diplomatic initiatives between Riyadh and Sanaa, as well as the diplomatic efforts of the UN envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, and the US special envoy to Yemen, Tim Lenderking, who embarked on a tour that included Yemen and several Gulf capitals.

In this context, this paper aims to track the key developments occurring in the Yemeni landscape and analyse their implications, particularly in light of the prevailing uncertainty surrounding the crisis.

Escalation and Its Consequences:

The current month of August has witnessed a gradual escalation by the Houthi group, both on the ground and in the media sphere. In a televised address on Al-Masirah TV, the group's leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, warned the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia. He threatened to target the "NEOM" project unless there were positive developments in the mediation efforts facilitated by the Sultanate of Oman between the Houthi group and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Al-Houthi also emphasised the continuous enhancement of his militia's deterrent capabilities.

Furthermore, the group's spokesman, Muhammad Abdul-Salam, made statements wherein he expressed that "the prospects for extending the ceasefire may be limited unless an agreement is reached on a mechanism for disbursing salaries to employees in the areas under the group's control and the removal of restrictions on outlets within its jurisdiction."

The group's media has escalated the tone of hostile rhetoric directed against the government and Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis have launched several mobilisation programs within the ranks of their militias and combat formations to raise combat readiness.

Their defence minister, Major General Al-Atifi, announced on August 14 that “there are occupied lands in our territorial waters in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the territorial waters adjacent to the Indian Ocean, and Yemeni islands, but we will liberate them.” He also pledged to introduce new weapons into the battle. (1)

Simultaneously with the heightened rhetoric from Houthi leaders, the Houthi forces escalated their activities on the ground by employing a "slow-bite" strategy. This strategy involved a significant increase in their military operations, targeting troops aligned with the internationally recognised government across various governorates, including Taiz, Hodeidah, Lahj, Al-Dhalea, Shabwa, and Maarib.

The "slow-bite" strategy aims to achieve three primary objectives:

Firstly, it aims to wear down government forces, hindering their ability to enhance their combat capabilities. Secondly, it allows the Houthi forces to maintain the element of initiative, enabling them to choose the battleground and timing of engagements, while government forces are primarily reactive. Thirdly, it involves continued attacks on strategically significant locations, gradually accumulating achievements to achieve a breakthrough on one of the main fronts.

Reports indicate that the Houthi forces have amassed a significant stockpile of missiles and drones in regions adjacent to Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea coast, and Al-Jawf areas along the Saudi Arabian border. The Houthis intend to exert pressure to pursue economic and political advantages by employing tactics aimed at de-escalation. This type of bargaining has been a consistent practice during previous stages of negotiations and agreements.

They have secured numerous concessions, the most recent being the opening of Sanaa Airport and Hodeidah Port, which they obtained without making any substantial concessions in return. According to government estimates, this move has contributed approximately 1.6 trillion riyals to their resources since the ceasefire announcement in April 2022. (2)

Simultaneously, there is growing concern that this escalation could lead to a renewed outbreak of hostilities, especially since Saudi Arabia appears to be treating these threats with seriousness. This may involve preparations to counter any unplanned aggressions targeting critical Saudi military and economic assets. There is also the possibility that Saudi Arabia and the Arab coalition may contemplate a pre-emptive operation to curtail the Houthis' capacity to inflict harm on the Kingdom, compelling them to re-engage in negotiations.

Triggers for Escalation:

During August, the Houthi group pursued an escalation strategy influenced by several factors, the most significant of which include:

A desire to restart negotiations with Saudi Arabia, which had come to a complete halt in July due to the Houthi's persistent demands and their intent to secure financial and economic gains without making corresponding political and security commitments related to the peace process. Private sources indicate that over the past month, the Houthis have sought mediation from various international and regional powers, including Britain (whose ambassador maintains direct contact with the Houthis) and the Sultanate of Oman, to prevent the negotiations between them and Riyadh from reaching an irreparable impasse.

Riyadh has provided substantial financial support to the internationally recognised Yemeni government, enabling it to cope with economic pressures, particularly after the cessation of Yemeni oil exports due to Houthi attacks last year. Simultaneously, the camp representing Yemeni legitimacy and the Arab coalition has witnessed reduced internal tensions and intra-conflicts between Riyadh and its allies on one side and Abu Dhabi and its allies on the other. In essence, financial support and political stability bolster the negotiating position of the anti-Houthi Yemeni camp, depriving the Houthi group of the time advantage it once had.

There is mounting internal pressure on the Houthis, particularly as their financial situation improved following the reopening of Hodeidah port, and their authorities avoided fulfilling financial obligations to citizens. Consequently, the Houthis are intensifying their media discourse, holding the Yemeni government and its regional allies accountable for salary issues while attempting to assert the group's autonomy from Tehran, which is currently pursuing a policy of good neighbourliness.

International Diplomatic Efforts:

The international envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, undertook extensive diplomatic missions, including visits to Riyadh, Oman, and Aden. During these visits, he engaged in high-level discussions with Saudi, Omani, Yemeni, and Houthi officials, including meetings with Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik and Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad Al-Alimi.

During a briefing at the special session on Yemen in the UN Security Council on August 16, the international envoy emphasised that his office continues to facilitate meetings and consultations with all relevant parties. He acknowledged that the parties are receptive to finding a resolution but stressed the need for further actions. In this context, he cautioned against escalation, which could reignite hostilities. (3)

Two days prior, the US State Department had disclosed Tim Lenderking's upcoming visits to three Gulf capitals – Riyadh, Muscat, and Abu Dhabi. These visits were intended to bolster the United Nations' initiatives to broaden the ceasefire's reach and initiate an inclusive peace process. Subsequently, Lenderking held meetings with Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic advisor to the President of the UAE, and Khalifa Bin Ali Al Harthy, the Undersecretary of the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During an interview with the Al-Arabiya channel, the American envoy called for supporting efforts to halt the war and initiate a Yemeni dialogue while urging the rejection of Houthi threats to resume military escalation and target neighbouring countries and their critical infrastructure, particularly Saudi Arabia. Additionally, he underscored the gravity of threats against US Navy forces. (4)

Richard Oppenheim, the British Ambassador to Yemen, stated in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper on August 13 that his country is prepared to fulfil its role within the UN Security Council to legitimise any new resolution endorsing a comprehensive political settlement agreed upon by Yemeni parties. The ambassador alluded to the Security Council's ability to adopt various measures to support peace efforts in Yemen, with lifting sanctions as one of the most significant potential steps.

This statement signals Britain's preparedness, as the leader of the negotiation process and the drafter of decisions in the Security Council, serving as the pen-holder for the Yemeni file, to assume a significant role in the negotiations.

On the 17th of the same month, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian visited Riyadh, marking the first visit by a senior Iranian official since the announcement of the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries at the beginning of 2016. While the visit occurs in the context of Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, its timing indirectly contributes to the containment of the Houthis. It is unlikely that the Houthis will initiate hostilities or provoke conflicts without securing an Iranian green light.

One day later, an Omani delegation arrived in Sanaa, accompanied by the head of the negotiating delegation and the group's spokesperson, Muhammad Abdel Salam, in a fresh Omani endeavour to revive negotiations between the parties.

Late Response:

Despite the unilateral Houthi escalation towards the government and the Arab coalition countries, the government's role has remained nearly absent, except for statements from the Minister of Information, Moamar Al-Eryani. He condemned the Houthi's threat to return to the path of war and simultaneously called on the international community to fulfil its responsibilities. An emergency meeting of the Supreme Security Committee, chaired by Minister of Defence Lieutenant General Mohsen Al-Daari in Aden, addressed various pressing issues, including the Houthi escalation. In essence, while the Houthi escalation constitutes a security threat to the government, it does not appear to be their top priority.

During his meeting with the international envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, President of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad Al-Alimi, emphasised the government's commitment to the three references. In the Security Council session on August 16, the government hinted at the possibility of reevaluating the opening of Hodeidah port, suggesting a belated recognition of the situation, albeit primarily in words. However, the minimal response on the operational front remains the predominant characteristic.

In conclusion, it can be observed that the Houthi escalation follows two distinct trajectories.

The first pertains to a strategic path focused on enhancing military capabilities and maintaining a state of permanent readiness by deploying weapons and personnel to various battlefronts. This path is closely tied to the group's enduring aspirations to establish military dominance across Yemen. These aspirations are unlikely to wane even during a peace agreement.

The second trajectory is related to Houthi statements about triggering an all-out war in Yemen or expanding the conflict to regional countries while threatening international maritime security. Thus far, this path appears to be primarily a component of the group's negotiation tactics aimed at restarting talks with Riyadh, securing more significant economic advantages, and alleviating the tense local populace in the areas under its control.

The leaders of the Houthi group are likely aware of the potential risks associated with provoking armed confrontations. Such actions could lead to the consolidation of pro-legitimacy factions and expedite the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which might alter the balance of power on the ground.

Furthermore, the ongoing regional reconciliation efforts between Iran and certain GCC countries may deter the Houthis from engaging in any reckless military ventures, particularly those affecting regional security, despite any contrary assertions made by the group's leader in the media.

On the other hand, the diplomatic efforts in the Yemeni crisis might help maintain the current state of calm, with a very slim possibility that these initiatives will lead to an official ceasefire declaration under UN auspices and a return to diplomatic negotiations for a peace settlement. However, these diplomatic endeavours are unlikely to present a comprehensive political roadmap for a resolution, at least in the short to medium term.

1 صنعاء: قواتنا أعدّت العدة.. وأسلحة جديدة سيُعلَن عنها في الوقت الملائم، قناة الميادين، 14/8/2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://2u.pw/RC4X7iG.

2 الحكومة اليمنية: الحوثيون نهبوا تريليونا و600 مليار ريال عوائد ميناء الحديدة، قناة العربية، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2023/08/20.

³ إحاطة المبعوث الخاص هانس غروندبرغ أمام مجلس الأمن، ١٦ اب/أغسطس، un ، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://osesgy.unmissions.org/ar

4ليندر كينج يرفض تهديدات الحوثيين ويدعو لدعم حوار يمني، ١٦ اب/أغسطس، صحيفة الشرق الأوسط، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://aawsat.com.

5حكومة اليمن تهدد بإعادة النظر في تسهيلات تشغيل ميناء الحديدة، ١٧ اب/أغسطس، قناة العربية، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2023/08/17/رداً-على-تصعيد-الحوثيين-حكومة-اليمن-تهدد-باعادة-النظر-في-تسهيلات-تشغيل-ميناء-الحديد.