Periodically, the Islamic State group (IS) in Yemen, also known as the "Yemen Province," resurfaces, conveying a persistent existence despite its failure to expand and the erosion of its once-potent striking force since its inception in late 2014. At its outset, it insinuated that it would wield a significant influence in the Yemeni landscape, a prediction that ultimately proved unfounded.

After the central IS group announced in August 2023 the demise of the former caliph, Abu Hussein al-Husseini, and the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as his successor, the Amaq News Agency, the organisation's media arm, disseminated images of its Yemeni fighters pledging allegiance to the new caliph. This pattern mirrored prior occurrences when al-Husseini assumed the caliphate in late November 2022, and Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi did so in March 2022. (1)

Apart from these three occurrences, each spaced several months apart, IS in Yemen has demonstrated minimal activity. A notable incident occurred in July 2022 when the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack executed by one of its foreign fighters, identified as a "migrant." This attack targeted a convoy of Houthi leaders in the Afar area of the Malajim district, located in the al-Bayda governorate to the southeast of Sanaa. This limited involvement underscores the bleak state of IS in Yemen, characterised by a substantial decline verging on near dissolution in recent years. (2)

While the organisation has garnered substantial media attention since its inception, it has remained relatively unexplored in academic research circles. Several factors contribute to this research gap, including the scarcity of reliable primary information sources, the proliferation of rumours and misinformation, and the predominant focus on its traditional rival, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, self-identified as "Ansar al-Sharia." Additionally, analytical bias has persisted in certain research circles examining the IS phenomenon. These circles have tended to interpret data through the lens of their preexisting convictions based on the study of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, often overlooking the nuances and distinctions between the two groups.

Due to these and various other factors, these research circles and international organisations have presented an incomplete depiction of IS's situation in Yemen and have, at times, inadvertently propagated erroneous information. An illustrative case in point is the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (IS and Al-Qaeda) within the United Nations Security Council, which, in its February 2023 report, incorrectly identified Nasir Awad al-Ghidani as the current head of the organisation's legal affairs, despite his demise in a US airstrike in October 2017 (3).

This particular error is not isolated but rather part of a broader pattern of inaccuracies and misinformation that have led to assessments either overestimating or underestimating the capabilities of ISIS in Yemen.

Revisiting the Evolution of IS in Yemen

Understanding IS's current state in Yemen necessitates returning to its origins and early actions. The organisation's inception coincided with the expansion of IS in Iraq and Syria, following its notable separation from Al-Qaeda leadership in the Khorasan region. Essentially, it emerged as a secessionist and rebellious entity against the Al-Qaeda leadership in Yemen, which had aligned itself with Al-Qaeda in the Khorasan after unsuccessful mediation attempts to reconcile the ideological differences between IS and Al-Qaeda (4).

As per correspondence from the organisation's archives, the central leadership of IS designated Muhammad Kanaan al-Sayari, known as Abu Osama Al-Muhajir or Abu Sulayman Al-Muhajir, as the emir of the Yemeni branch in 2014. His mission was to establish an IS province and assembling the "Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan." This force carried significant symbolic weight within the broader jihadist ideology, rooted in interpretations provided by jihadists of historical texts (5).

In a subsequent phase, the organisation's leadership dispatched three experienced members, namely Abdul Wahid al-Iraqi, Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi (a Saudi national), and Abu Saleh al-Jazrawi, to assist "Al-Muhajir" in fortifying the organisation's presence in Yemen. Over four years, these individuals assumed various leadership roles—Abdul Wahid al-Iraqi served as a security and medical officer, Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi (Saudi) as a military officer, and Abu Saleh al-Jazrawi as an intelligence officer. All three also held positions within the Shura Council of IS in Yemen (6).

The organisation saw an influx of foreign fighters and commanders, including Abu Muhammad al-Kanani (Egyptian), who assumed a leadership role as one of the emirs within "IS Yemen." He took charge of the grievance committee (7). Concurrently, the central leadership allocated substantial financial resources, amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars, to support the burgeoning branch.

Abu Osama al-Muhajir played a pivotal role in recruiting numerous adherents in late 2014, including individuals like Abu Waqqas al-Adani, an imam at mosques in Aden. Abu Waqqas formed a coalition of popular resistance groups of approximately 200 fighters actively engaged in combat against the Houthi forces during that period. These fighters became part of IS and significantly contributed to the organisation's early establishment in its temporary capital. Furthermore, they provided IS with a cache of anti-tank mines, originally pilfered from Yemeni military depots. They were repurposed for use in car bombings and the fabrication of explosive devices for nearly four years thereafter. (8)

IS in Yemen established several self-proclaimed states, including Aden and al-Bayda, mirroring the central organization's actions in Syria and Iraq. It carried out a series of terrorist attacks, most notably the bombings of the Badr and al-Hashoush mosques in the capital, Sanaa, in March 2015 (9). Furthermore, it targeted the headquarters of the interim government and UAE forces in Aden in October of the same year (10).

Despite the substantial support and resources provided to the Yemeni branch of IS, which surpassed assistance given to other branches such as IS in Libya, Sinai, and Afghanistan, IS Yemen's operational performance remained below par. Consequently, the organisation's central leadership expressed dissatisfaction and frustration with the leadership of the Yemeni branch. This dissatisfaction is documented in correspondence from the General Administration of IS Provinces, known then as the Administration of Remote Provinces (11).

IS in Yemen heavily relied on excessive violence as part of its "shock and awe" strategy, aiming to intimidate and psychologically defeat its adversaries as a precursor to military victory. However, the extreme brutality of its attacks had a detrimental effect, fostering widespread aversion to its actions. Even its jihadist rival, "Al-Qaeda in Yemen," distanced itself from the attacks on Sanaa mosques in 2015, criticising IS's excessive violence (12).

This brutality, coupled with other factors, prevented the organisation from establishing deep roots in Yemeni territory and gaining the support of Yemeni tribes. When it attempted to court confident tribal leaders in Qifa, located in the al-Bayda governorate, internal disputes erupted within its ranks. Some foreign leaders (migrants) opposed this approach, labelling the tribesmen as "apostates" and entering into conflicts with their Yemeni counterparts (supporters). (13)

It's worth highlighting that the rivalry between jihadist groups, IS and Al-Qaeda, in Yemen further eroded IS's credibility and compounded its already formidable challenges. This competition also prevented IS from garnering the loyalty of certain tribal members who initially supported jihadists. Al-Qaeda in Yemen actively sought to woo prominent jihadists who had initially backed the Yemeni branch of IS, such as Mamoun al-Hatem, a senior Al-Qaeda leader who initially supported IS in Yemen but later defected. Additionally, Al-Qaeda in Yemen infiltrated IS networks and gathered crucial intelligence on its activities and leadership. This infiltration reached the point where Al-Qaeda in Yemen disclosed some of this information through media releases from semi-official affiliated institutions on multiple occasions. (14)

Beyond Al-Qaeda, other entities successfully infiltrated the IS organisation and planted spies within its ranks. These undercover operatives acquired vital information about the organisation's leadership and critical locations, subsequently targeted by the Arab Coalition forces and the United States of America. (15)

Conversely, IS in Yemen grappled with the fragility of its senior leadership, a realisation that came somewhat belatedly to the organisation's central leadership. This realisation followed a deluge of correspondence and complaints decrying the branch's conditions, internal fragmentation, and discord. These issues, in turn, precipitated cases of foreign leaders sent by the central leadership to Yemen, like Abdul Wahed al-Iraqi, fleeing to neighbouring countries where they were apprehended. Furthermore, numerous schisms emerged within its ranks, including the divisions involving the security official Abu Sadiq al-Shabwani and the leader Abu Khaybar al-Somali. In contrast, the leadership's response to these challenges included the assassination of certain defectors, thereby exacerbating internal crises that arbitration attempts failed to resolve. (16)

Notably, the upper echelons of IS escalated the practice of assassinating individuals suspected of disloyalty, even if they had not defected from the organisation. Additionally, this included the assassination of women affiliated with the organisation. Notably, this extended to the wife of Nasir Awad al-Ghidani, the former legal official of the organisation and an individual using the pseudonym Abu Bilal al-Harbi, who was killed in 2017. The latter case occurred despite her knowledge of organisational matters, with no evidence of her leaking information or collaborating with external parties. (17)

In addition to defections, the organisation grappled with financial corruption and theft. One of the most notable cases involved Abu Muhammad al-Muhajir, the border official in IS Yemen, who absconded with hundreds of thousands of dollars before quietly leaving the organisation. The organisation carefully concealed this theft. (18) Furthermore, cases of moral corruption emerged, including illicit relationships between soldiers and leaders within the organisation (19), as well as incidents of harassment involving teenagers who had joined IS in Yemen, referred to as " beardless men."

These problems prompted the central leadership of ISIS to intervene, directing that the " beardless men" be stationed at critical checkpoints and placed under the command of a senior leader. They were also required to shave their heads, conceal their faces with masks, and eschew opulent appearances and attire (20).

In terms of methodological differences, it can be observed that the organisation lacked a clear-cut ideology or methodology. Its leadership and fighters represented a blend of those who adhered to the traditional Salafi-jihadist approach and others who were influenced by the ideologies of various Islamic groups. To the extent that some leaders within the organisation, such as Abu Waqqas al-Adani, collaborated with parties that IS deemed as infidels under the pretext of coordinating efforts against the Houthi forces. This cooperation was met with objections from the central leadership of the organisation. (21)

Upon conducting a comprehensive analysis of the factors above, it becomes evident that IS in Yemen confronted intricate issues that its leadership struggled to address effectively. The organisation faced infiltration at its leadership level, resulting in the destabilisation of its organisational structure and the neutralisation of key figures. This included individuals like Abu Osama al-Muhajir, the founding figure of IS, and the organisation's financial officer, all of whom were apprehended by Saudi Special Forces during a mission conducted in June 2019. Additionally, the killing of other leaders, such as the second emir of the organisation, Abu al-Walid al-Adani, in al-Zaharah within the Qifa region in August 2020, coincided with the organisation's loss of its final strongholds in Yemeni Qifa. (22) These strongholds had been the site of ongoing clashes between IS and its traditional rival, "Al-Qaeda." Subsequently, the Houthi forces assumed control of the region, forcing the remaining fighters from both organisations to evacuate. (23)

Economic Experience Restructuring and Transformation:

Amid the organisational and operational setbacks faced by IS in Yemen, the central leadership initiated a reorganisation effort. The key focus was to reconstruct the organisation, shifting away from a multi-state structure to a singular security state referred to as the "Yemeni state," comprising several smaller administrative divisions. (24)

This restructuring occurred just prior to the apprehension of Abu Osama al-Muhajir, coinciding with the broader strategic transformation that IS underwent before and after the dissolution of its territorial caliphate in March 2019. During this period, the organisation shifted its approach towards attritional guerrilla warfare. Within this framework, the "Umm al-Qura" office was established, serving as the regional leadership for IS in the Arabian Peninsula and led by the emir of the Yemeni branch of IS. (25)

Due to its operational limitations, the Umm al-Qura office primarily assumed logistical responsibilities and played a role in facilitating financial transactions between various branches of the organisation. This coordination also extended to the Al Karrar office within the IS branch in Somalia, as corroborated by reports from the United Nations Security Council Analytical Support Team and other sources.

Despite the restructuring efforts, IS in Yemen has struggled to regroup and rebuild its organisational network effectively. This becomes evident when examining its limited operational activity over the past three years. This decline can be attributed to weakened operational capabilities and a decrease in the number of its fighters. According to recent reports from the Security Council, their current estimated strength stands at approximately 100 fighters. (26)

The remaining IS elements in Yemen primarily focus on survival and coexistence. Their primary activities involve engaging in looting, plundering, and kidnapping for ransom as a means of securing funds. An illustrative example of this is the case of Hadhrami businessman Abdullah Abu Bakr al-Adani al-Junaid, known as "al-Maher." His 15-year-old son was kidnapped by the organisation and released in March of the previous year following the ransom payment (27).

Notably, these operations are conducted under the guidance and approval of the central leadership of IS in Syria and Iraq. This central leadership has directed its followers across various regions to prioritise the "economic experience" initiative. This approach revolves around generating funds through the extortion of affluent individuals and utilising these resources to finance the activities of individual IS branches. Furthermore, a portion of these funds, amounting to 25% of monthly revenues, is channelled back to the central organisation. (28)

The General Administration of States has encouraged members of the organisation in Yemen and other countries to actively participate in the "economic experience" initiative by increasing the funds allocated to this endeavour to 2% of their total funds and providing them additional incentives. (29)

However, the Yemeni branch's intensified focus on the "economic experience" has exacerbated its operational decline and has transformed the organisation into a more conventional criminal group, albeit with a Salafi-jihadist ideology, owing to its connection to the broader ISIS global network.

In summary, The Islami State (IS) in Yemen, self-styled as the "Yemeni State," emerged as a splinter group from Al-Qaeda/Ansar al-Sharia. It aimed to establish a significant presence within the country and potentially assimilate its jihadist rival, "Al-Qaeda." However, these endeavours proved unsuccessful for various reasons:

Firstly, the organisation's ambitious push to swiftly establish territorial states bypassing critical phases of development hindered its progress. Secondly, the inadequacy of its senior leadership in terms of leadership and control resulted in internal disputes and factional divisions. Additionally, its security apparatus was weak, leading to infiltration by multiple external parties seeking to exploit the organisation for their interests. Lastly, IS in Yemen struggled to establish robust ties and relationships with the local tribal communities, hindering its ability to gain a foothold within the country.

As the organisation's ambitions to establish Yemeni states and create a "jihadi relief army" crumbled, it underwent a significant transformation into a conventional criminal group primarily focused on survival, coexistence, and revenue generation through looting, plundering, and illicit operations. This shift coincided with the broader collapse of the territorial caliphate, compelling IS to propagate the notion of the "economic experience" across its various branches. This was an attempt to secure financing for its activities after its primary income sources were depleted.

While IS in Yemen sought to justify and legitimise its expansion of activities such as looting, kidnapping, and ransom under the guise of the economic experience, these transformations inadvertently tarnished its already damaged reputation. Consequently, the organisation found itself in a weakened, isolated state, far from achieving the expansion it had once envisioned when its initial presence was established within the country.

1  بيعة جنود الخلافة في اليمن لأمير المؤمنين أبي حفص الهاشمي القرشي، وكالة أعماق (الداعشية)، 6- 8- 2023.

٢  قتلى وجرحى من مليشيا "الحوثي" بهجوم استشهادي في البيضاء، وكالة أعماق، 10- 7- 2023.

٣ التقرير الثلاثون لفريق الدعم التحليلي بشأن تنظيم القاعدة وتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وما يرتبط بهما من كيانات، مجلس الأمن الدولي، فبراير/ شباط 2023، ص 17.

٤ عبد الرزاق الجمل، "داعش" في اليمن... قصة البداية والنهاية، صحيفة الأخبار، 14- 11- 2020، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://tinyurl.com/22dpfkhx.

٥  أحمد سلطان، خاص.. "المرجع" يكشف هوية قادة داعش المقبوض عليهم في اليمن (فيديو)، موقع المرجع، 25- 6- 2019، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://tinyurl.com/nhd32jsx.

٦ رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 91 إلى إدارة الولايات البعيدة بالدولة الإسلامية، 3- 10- 2017، وثيقة لدى الباحث.

٧  رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 48 إلى إدارة الولايات البعيدة بالدولة الإسلامية، 28- 12- 2015، وثيقة لدى الباحث.

٨  رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 91 إلى إدارة الولايات البعيدة، مصدر سبق ذكره.

٩  مجزرة دموية بصنعاء استهدفت مسجدين تخلف 137 قتيلاً و357 جريحاً، وكالة الأنباء الصينية " شينخوا"، 21- 3- 2015، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://tinyurl.com/22cnscwn.

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١١ رسالة إدارة الولايات البعيدة إلى أبو أسامة المهاجر، 20- 10- 2017، وثيقة لدى الباحث.

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١٣ رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 91 إلى إدارة الولايات البعيدة، مصدر سبق ذكره.

١٤ تغريدات الشيخ مأمون الحاتم عن بيعة اليمن لخليفة المسلمين، موقع جهاديكا، 12- 2014، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://tinyurl.com/bddfafks.

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١٦ رسالة عبد الواحد العراقي لأبي سليمان المهاجر، 28- 12- 2017، وثيقة لدى الباحث.  رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 91 إلى إدارة الولايات البعيدة، مصدر سبق ذكره.

١٧ رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر عن ملابسات تصفية زوجة أبو بلال الحربي، بلا تاريخ، وثيقة لدى الباحث.

١٨ رسالة أبو اسامة المهاجر إلى أبو عمر الفاروق وإدارة الولايات البعيدة عن أبو أسامة المهاجر عبد المجيد محمد الحربي، بلا تاريخ، وثيقة لدى الباحث.

١٩ رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 91 إلى إدارة الولايات البعيدة، مصدر سبق ذكره.

٢٠ رسالة إدارة الولايات البعيدة رقم 91 رداً على رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 86، 13- 5- 2017، وثيقة لدى الباحث.

٢١ رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 91 إلى إدارة الولايات البعيدة، مصدر سبق ذكره.

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٢٤ رسالة أبو أسامة المهاجر رقم 91 إلى إدارة الولايات البعيدة، مصدر سبق ذكره.

٢٥ التقرير الثلاثون لفريق الدعم التحليلي بشأن تنظيم القاعدة وتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وما يرتبط بهما من كيانات، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 5.

٢٦ التقرير الثاني والثلاثون لفريق الدعم التحليلي بشأن تنظيم القاعدة وتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وما يرتبط بهما من كيانات، مجلس الأمن الدولي، يوليو/ تموز 2023، ص 17.

٢٧ تنظيم اللصوص.. وثائق مسربة تكشف أسرار خلايا السلب والنهب الداعشية، أخبار الآن، 21- 4- 2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://akhb.ar/eR0SI.

٢٨ رسالة الإدارة العامة للولايات إلى والي اليمن رداً على الرسالة رقم 93 بشأن التجربة الاقتصادية، 16- 2- 2018، وثيقة لدى الباحث.

٢٩ رسالة الإدارة العامة للولايات إلى أمراء المكاتب بشأن التجربة الاقتصادية، 21- 1- 2021، وثيقة لدى الباحث.