The primary justification employed by the Houthi Group for its attacks in the Red Sea region, as well as its strikes against various targets in Israel from November 2023 to the present, has been framed around the concept of “unity of arenas” and expressed solidarity with Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip. However, following the announcement on January 15, 2025, by mediators that a multi-phase ceasefire agreement had been reached between Hamas, Palestinian factions, and Israel, the implications of this agreement for the Yemeni front became a focal point of strategic discourse. In particular, questions arose regarding the potential repercussions of the Houthi-Israeli escalation. This paper seeks to explore the outcomes of this escalation within the context of the ceasefire agreement, particularly focusing on the Houthis’ reaction to it, as well as the broader shifts prompted by the recent U.S. decision under President Donald Trump’s administration to reclassify the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organisation.

First: The Houthis’ Response to the Gaza Ceasefire Agreement

The Houthis’ response to the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip was shaped by several key elements, which can be analysed through the following points:

1. Support for the Ceasefire Agreement: Immediately following the ceasefire announcement in Gaza, Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam expressed the organisation’s endorsement of the agreement. He stated that the organisation “salutes the legendary steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the face of Israeli aggression and all the sacrifices they have made.” He further praised the support fronts, notably the Islamic Resistance Front in Lebanon and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Abdulsalam emphasised that the Houthi organisation in Yemen had taken responsibility from the outset of the war, providing ongoing support to Gaza;(1)

2. Caution against Violations of the Ceasefire: On January 17, 2025, the Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, issued a stern warning, declaring that the organisation would resume attacks on Israel if the latter failed to adhere to the ceasefire agreement in Gaza. In his speech, al-Houthi stated, “We will continue to monitor the stages of implementing the agreement, and should Israel retreat or commit massacres and impose a siege, we will be prepared to offer immediate military support to the Palestinian people.” He concluded, “Our stance on the Gaza situation is inherently linked to the position of the Palestinian factions, and we will stand with them throughout the stages of the agreement’s implementation.” (2) It appears that al-Houthi was intent on signalling that the trajectory of the Yemeni front will remain contingent upon Israel’s commitment to the ceasefire agreement in Gaza; and

3. Release of the “Galaxy Leader” Cargo Ship: On January 22, 2025, the Houthis announced the release of the crew of the “Galaxy Leader” ship, a vessel that had been detained for over a year. The crew, consisting of 25 individuals, was released after coordination with the Hamas movement, with mediation by the Sultanate of Oman. The Houthis emphasised that the crew was handed over “to People in the Sultanate of Oman in coordination with the Hamas movement as part of the ceasefire arrangements.” The Houthi Supreme Political Council further stated that the release was part of their broader efforts to support Gaza and align with the ceasefire agreement.(3)Recently, a high-level Omani delegation visited Sana’a to mediate with the Houthi leadership regarding the crew’s release. The Galaxy Leader, owned by Israeli businessman Abraham Rami Ungar, had been a focal point in the tensions. This step by al-Houthi seems to serve as a significant repercussion of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, signalling their attempt to send a positive message of commitment to the agreement’s demands and consequences.

Second: Key Determinants Shaping the Escalation Trajectory on the Yemeni Front

Although the Houthis officially welcomed the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip and the subsequent developments, the trajectory of escalation on the Yemeni front will remain influenced by a series of key determinants, which can be analysed through the following factors:

1. The U.S. Reclassification of the Houthis as a Terrorist Organisation: On January 22, 2025, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order reclassifying the Houthi Group as a foreign terrorist organisation. This order mandates that the U.S. Secretary of State consult with relevant parties and submit a recommendation for reclassification within 30 days. Notably, this executive decision represents a more stringent stance than the classification imposed by the Biden administration, which had designated the Houthis as a “specially designated global terrorist organization.” (4) Within the context of this decision, two primary scenarios emerge. The first scenario suggests that the reclassification could intensify pressure on the Houthis, particularly on the economic front, thereby influencing their military operations. The second possibility posits that this move may catalyse further Houthi escalation, particularly in the Red Sea. This escalation could be driven by several factors, with one key consideration being the organisation’s potential response aimed at obstructing the passage of British or American ships through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait;

2. Israel’s Approach to Dealing with the Houthis: The recent U.S. decision, coupled with various other contextual factors, may propel Israel towards intensifying its efforts against the Houthi organisation. Notably, the ceasefire agreement in Gaza did not encompass regional dimensions. The recent U.S. reclassification of the Houthis is likely to serve as a political justification for Israel to escalate its military strikes against the Group. Israeli security circles have expressed a prevailing belief that previous strikes against the Houthis have failed to inflict significant damage or curtail their activities. Moreover, the recent surge in regional tensions has led to a growing conviction within Israel that the Houthis pose a threat comparable to other Iranian-aligned groups operating near its borders. As such, Israel’s strategy towards the Houthis will play a crucial role in determining the future trajectory of the Yemeni front;

3. Consequences of the Ceasefire Agreement in the Gaza Strip: The Houthi escalation, both in the Red Sea region and towards Israeli territory since November 2023, has been fundamentally linked to the Israeli war in Gaza. Consequently, the future dynamics of the Yemeni front will be heavily influenced by Israel’s adherence to the ceasefire agreement in Gaza. There are numerous indications suggesting a negative trajectory regarding Israel’s commitment to the ceasefire, particularly after statements from several Israeli government ministers, including Bezalel Smotrich, calling for a resumption of hostilities in Gaza. Furthermore, the escalation in the West Bank and the initiation of large-scale operations from the Jenin refugee camp (5) exacerbate the threat to the ceasefire agreement. Israel’s behaviour in Lebanon, where ceasefire violations have been frequent, raises concerns that similar patterns could emerge in Gaza. These developments are likely to have significant repercussions on Houthi actions and will ultimately shape the broader dynamics of the Yemeni front and

4. Qualitative Variables in the Red Sea: Recently, several significant developments have reshaped the security environment in the Red Sea region. Foremost among these are the “militarisation of interactions” in the Red Sea region,” exemplified by the formation of the “Guardian of Prosperity” coalition by the United States on December 19, 2023, and the establishment of the “Aspides” force by the European Union on February 19, 2024. Another crucial variable is the growing body of Western intelligence reports indicating increasing cooperation between the Houthi Group, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, and the Somali Al-Shabaab Movement. (6) These developments could precipitate heightened British-American escalation, particularly targeting the Houthis, thereby disrupting any progress towards stability on the Yemeni front. Moreover, the potential for Iranian-Houthi logistical support to facilitate the operations of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab organisations in the Red Sea escalates the risk of a more intense regional war.

Overall, it can be concluded that while the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip may contribute to a relative calm on the Yemeni Front, several other factors and considerations are likely to drive further escalation. Chief among these is the evolving Israeli perception of the Houthis, as the group has increasingly been viewed as a significant threat, prompting more aggressive targeting strategies. Additionally, the outcomes of the ceasefire agreement and the potential for Israel to breach it could provoke further escalation on the Yemeni Front. Compounding these risks is the recent American decision to reclassify the Houthis as a terrorist organisation.

 (1) المتحدث باسم الحوثيين يعلق على وقف إطلاق النار بغزة، روسيا اليوم، 15 يناير 2025، متاح على:
https://linksshortcut.com/rGVjh

 (2) الحوثي يعلق على اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار في غزة.. ويحذر إسرائيل، سكاي نيوز، 17 يناير 2025، متاح على:
https://linksshortcut.com/wJBVu

(3) الحوثيون يفرجون عن طاقم سفينة غلاكسي ليدر بوساطة عمانية، العربي الجديد، 22 يناير 2025، متاح على:
https://linksshortcut.com/yiuiB

 (4) Trump designates Yemen's Houthis as a 'foreign terrorist organization', Reuters, Jan, 23, 2025, available at:
https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-says-yemens-houthi-movement-designated-foreign-terrorist-2025-01-22/

  (5)Israel launches 'significant' military operation in West Bank, at least 9 Palestinians killed, Reuters, Jan, 21, 2025, available at:
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-begins-operation-west-bank-city-jenin-2025-01-21/

 (6) الحوثي تعاون مع القاعدة وقدراته تفاقمت، العربية، 27 سبتمبر 2024، متاح على:
https://linksshortcut.com/cZiZE