Recent developments in the Middle East have unfolded in ways that undermine the Houthi group in Yemen. These shifts include the setbacks suffered by factions within the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” the return of Donald Trump to the White House, and intensified calls from Israel’s political and security elite to confront the Houthis as part of a broader strategic battle—one in which a decisive victory must be achieved.

The Iranian axis is increasingly fractured, with its factions divided between those experiencing significant military decline and others seeking to avoid direct confrontation with Israel.

In Syria, the Assad regime has weakened substantially, with the interim authority controlling parts of the country, prioritising its internal survival over external conflicts, particularly against Israel. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has suffered severe losses, with much of its political and military leadership eliminated. The group now faces mounting internal pressures that could ultimately lead to its disarmament. Similarly, Hamas is under intense international scrutiny, classified as a terrorist organisation by both the United States and Europe, while regional actors in the Middle East advocate for the dismantling of its remaining military capabilities following its prolonged war with Israel and its potential removal from governance in Gaza.

In Iraq and Syria, Shiite armed groups that have historically engaged in limited confrontation with Israel now prioritise their survival, wary of antagonising the Iraqi government, which is invested in either neutralising or containing them. This strategic calculus appears to have borne results, as Iraq has effectively pressured these groups to halt their attacks against Israel since last October.

Iran, the leading force behind the so-called Axis of Resistance, is grappling with the fallout from two military strikes carried out by Israel over the past year. These attacks, coupled with Israeli and international reports indicating the destruction of Iran’s defense systems, have left Iranian territory vulnerable to air and missile strikes. Fearing further confrontation, Tehran finds itself constrained, particularly as it contends with deepening internal challenges. The Iranian economy has been in prolonged crisis, exacerbating social discontent and fueling the potential for widespread unrest. The worsening economic conditions have strained the regime’s domestic legitimacy and emboldened opposition groups, increasing their capacity to mobilise public opinion against the ruling establishment.

At the same time, the prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House has raised expectations that he will reinstate the “maximum pressure” policy he previously enforced against Iran and its regional proxies. This includes the Houthi movement, which was designated as a terrorist organisation under Trump in 2018, only to be removed from the list by the Biden administration during its first three years in office. However, escalating Houthi attacks on American and Israeli military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea—triggered by the broader war between Israel and Iran’s proxies in 2023—forced the Biden administration to reinstate the designation in January 2024.

In effect, the renewed maximum pressure campaign against the Houthis was swiftly reinforced under Trump, who, just two days after assuming office, signed an executive order reclassifying the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This designation, issued by the U.S. State Department, imposes harsher sanctions than those applied to entities listed under the U.S. Treasury’s separate designation for international terrorist organisations. The FTO listing carries broader diplomatic, financial, and legal consequences, further isolating the Houthis and tightening restrictions on their funding sources and external support.

Sanctions imposed on entities listed under the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) designation, established in 1997, entail a comprehensive economic embargo, including freezing assets, a ban on financial transactions, and severe penalties for foreign entities or institutions attempting to circumvent these restrictions. In contrast, the Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) list—created in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks—primarily enforces economic sanctions, such as asset freezes and financial transaction bans, falling under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Treasury Department. A key distinction between the two is their impact on humanitarian aid: while the FTO designation can disrupt aid flows to countries where these organisations operate, the SDGT framework allows for the continued passage of humanitarian assistance.

Although sanctions mechanisms have historically failed to exert decisive pressure on the Houthis or similar groups, Trump’s recent decision to reimpose the FTO designation is expected to intensify pressure on the movement. This move could prompt Washington to consider even stricter measures in the near future.

The Third Challenge: The Shift in Israeli Strategy: Israel, which had previously regarded the confrontation with the Houthis as a “secondary front” that could be addressed later, is now moving toward reclassifying it as a primary front requiring urgent resolution. This shift signals an impending increase in military pressure on the Houthi group, which will have to face this escalation largely on its own, given the collapse of other partners within the Iranian axis.

In recent weeks, Israeli government circles and research institutions have engaged in intensive discussions regarding the optimal strategy for neutralising the Houthi threat. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yisrael Katz have pledged to continue airstrikes—targeting Yemeni ports under Houthi control since last July—and to eliminate Houthi leaders as Israel has done with Hamas and Hezbollah figures, Israeli strategic experts have put forward a broader multi-front approach.

A key point of contention has been whether to focus on escalating direct military operations against the Houthis—potentially involving the Israeli Navy as a core component of the campaign—or to expand the confrontation with Iran, holding it directly accountable for the Houthis’ continued attacks against Israel. This debate reflects a strategic crossroads, as Israel weighs the risks and benefits of an expanded conflict versus a concentrated campaign to degrade the Houthis' capabilities.

These discussions ultimately ruled out the possibility that striking Iran or dismantling its nuclear program would serve as a deterrent to the Houthis. This conclusion was based on the prevailing assessment among experts that the Houthis operate with a degree of autonomy from Tehran. Their primary motivation for targeting Israel, they argue, is to bolster their internal legitimacy in Yemen, positioning themselves as a key political force capable of leveraging these attacks as a bargaining chip for international recognition in any future settlement of the Yemeni crisis.

The debate was decisively settled to separate the escalation against Iran from the necessity of an independent and intensified focus on the Houthi front. On December 29, Israeli analyst Eyal Zisser wrote in Israel Hayom: “It is clear today that the seventh front against us has turned into a central threat arena in which Israel must achieve decisiveness if it wants to restore its deterrence capability in the surrounding region and remove the sword of the Iranian threat hanging over its neck.” He further emphasised that Yemen has become a focal point—not only because Israel has successfully deterred or defeated its adversaries on other fronts, allowing it to shift its attention to the Houthis, but also because the group now poses an increasingly significant threat to Israeli civilians and regional stability.

On December 31, The Times quoted an Israeli security source stating that Israel is now fully engaged in a war with Ansar Allah (the Houthis). According to the same report, the security source confirmed that a strategy for escalatory measures against the Houthis is in place, and that Israel, alongside its international partners, is firmly committed to confronting the group comprehensively.

On January 1, Israeli researcher Danny Citrinowicz of the Institute for National Security Studies outlined a comprehensive strategic framework for confronting the Houthis. His proposed approach is structured around the following key pillars:

Continuity: Operations against the Yemeni militant organisation must be sustained and uninterrupted, regardless of whether the Houthis actively target Israel. The group must remain under constant pressure, forced into a defensive posture rather than initiating attacks. To achieve this, Israel should consider increasing its permanent presence in the Red Sea region and shifting from sporadic, limited-impact strikes to a continuous and systematic campaign within Yemen.

Coordination: A broad coalition should be formed among nations directly affected by Houthi activities. This coalition must adopt new operational patterns that leverage the geographic proximity of some member states to Yemen. Coordinated strikes from these regional partners could damage the Houthi regime significantly.

Diversification of Targets: Eliminating key Houthi leadership figures should be a priority. Senior members of the ruling clan—particularly Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and his brothers, who occupy top leadership positions—must perceive a direct and imminent threat to their lives.

Iran: While direct strikes on Iran are not advisable, efforts must focus on disrupting Tehran’s ability to supply military support to the Houthis. This includes targeting Iranian Quds Force operatives in Yemen, specifically Abdul-Reza Shahlai, a key figure in strengthening the Houthis’ military capabilities.

Intelligence: One of the most significant challenges in countering the Houthis is obtaining high-quality, real-time intelligence to target critical assets effectively. Enhancing intelligence capabilities and deepening strategic ties with Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are paramount. Even if these nations do not engage in direct military action against the Houthis, their extensive knowledge of the group can provide invaluable intelligence for Israeli operations.

In addition to the five recommendations outlined by Citrinowicz, other analysts have proposed additional strategic elements for Israel’s approach, including:

The ISIS Model: Drawing from the strategy used against ISIS, Israel and its allies should mobilise a local coalition comprising the 70% of Yemen’s population that opposes the Houthis to regain control of northern Yemen and dismantle their rule. In southern Yemen, a government already exists that views the Houthis as adversaries. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are poised to act against what they perceive as Iran’s proxy presence in their backyard. The United States, with Israel’s support, should take the lead in coordinating this regional and international effort—not merely to weaken the Houthis militarily but to remove them from power entirely.

While these proposals may not be officially adopted as Israel’s strategy for confronting the Houthis, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s repeated emphasis that neutralising the Houthi threat will not be Israel’s sole responsibility suggests that the most likely course of action aligns with many of the recommendations presented by Citrinowicz and other researchers. Collectively, these strategies form a comprehensive approach that addresses the persistent and escalating threat posed by the Houthis to regional and global security.