For years, Iran has meticulously cultivated a network of aligned militias across the Middle East, united by a shared hostility toward Israel and the United States. This alliance, anchored in Tehran’s broader regional strategy, serves both to expand Iranian influence and to ensure the regime’s strategic depth. Since June 13, Israeli airstrikes have targeted key components of Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure and eliminated prominent figures instrumental in shaping Iran’s multi-layered national security doctrine, chiefly embodied in the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Within this network, the Houthi movement occupies a pivotal position, functioning as a defensive proxy designed to contain escalation and deflect conflict away from Iranian territory.

In the 12 days that followed, the Iran-Israel conflict witnessed a marked escalation. The Houthis publicly announced their readiness to resume attacks on U.S. naval assets should the United States initiate direct military action against Iran ⁽¹⁾. A day later, U.S. B-2 bombers carried out a significant strike, dropping 14 tons of ordnance on three major Iranian nuclear facilities. In retaliation, Iran launched a limited missile barrage at the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which was successfully intercepted. Despite earlier threats, the Houthis withheld a direct military response against American targets. On June 24, the United States unexpectedly announced a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Iran. The Houthis, however, were quick to clarify that this truce did not extend to their military operations against Israel—actions they frame as part of a broader campaign in support of the Palestinian population in Gaza.

This report examines the evolving role of the Houthi movement within the shifting geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, particularly in light of the escalating confrontation between Iran and Israel. It analyses the underlying drivers that have positioned the Houthis as both a formidable and strategically flexible actor within the “Axis of Resistance” since October 7, 2023, even as Iran’s operational capacity shows signs of strain. The analysis further explores how, despite ongoing ceasefire negotiations, the Houthis retain the capability and resolve to target Israeli interests and disrupt vital maritime trade routes, highlighting the complex interplay between regional alliances, asymmetric warfare, and geopolitical signalling.

The Houthis and the Axis in the Context of the Ongoing Israel-Iran Confrontation

The direct confrontation between Israel and Iran marks a pivotal turning point in their protracted rivalry, which has spanned 45 years. This enduring struggle for regional dominance has intensified over the past two decades, particularly following the strategic decline of Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. On June 13, Israel launched a series of successive and unexpected airstrikes on the Islamic Republic, coinciding with an active round of diplomatic negotiations between Iran and the United States aimed at reviving the nuclear agreement. These strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and ballistic missile programme, and included the assassination of senior security, military, and nuclear officials. In retaliation, Iran launched a barrage of ballistic and hypersonic missiles, along with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), against Israeli cities, inflicting levels of damage on Israeli territory not seen since the 1973 war.

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According to estimates, Iran has lost 35% of its ballistic missile stockpile and approximately half of its launch platforms⁽²⁾. However, the impact on its nuclear programme fell significantly short of Israeli expectations—until the United States launched its airstrikes on June 23. Nevertheless, preliminary intelligence assessments indicate that the programme has only been delayed, not dismantled. This outcome may prompt the Iranian regime to reconsider its nuclear doctrine, potentially shifting toward the pursuit of an actual nuclear weapon.

The U.S. involvement in the military strikes further complicates an already volatile strategic environment. The erratic and unpredictable nature of President Donald Trump’s administration contributes to growing regional uncertainty, especially as Tehran had warned that any U.S. intervention would provoke direct retaliation against American bases and assets in the region. These threats materialised solely in the form of an attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. In the absence of a ceasefire agreement, such an act could have marked the onset of a broader conflict through the mobilisation of Iran’s regional proxies—thereby triggering a chain reaction with far-reaching consequences for the stability and security of the Middle East.

The exchange of attacks indicates that the conflict between Israel and Iran has moved beyond the confines of the “grey zone” and into the realm of direct confrontation. This transition marks a new and significantly more perilous phase—one that may be characterised as an existential war for both Israel and the Iranian regime. For decades, their hostilities were confined to indirect engagements, with each side conducting calibrated strikes against the other’s interests while deliberately avoiding open warfare. However, Iran’s recent launch of long-range missiles from deep within its territory underscores the extent of the degradation now affecting its “forward defence” strategy, embodied in the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”

This axis consists of a loosely coordinated network of military and paramilitary groups that receive direct support from Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These actors are bound by a shared ideological hostility toward the West and Israel. The principal elements of this network include Hezbollah in Lebanon, various Iraqi Shiite militias, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the former Syrian regime, which fell in December 2024.

The Iranian axis has sustained serious setbacks over the past year. Israel has succeeded in significantly weakening Hezbollah through the elimination of much of its first- and second-tier leadership. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has also severed Hezbollah’s vital weapons supply corridor from Iran. Simultaneously, U.S. airstrikes in Iraq over the past year have dealt heavy blows to Iran-aligned Shiite militias⁽³⁾, thereby eroding Iran’s strategic depth and diminishing its ability to exercise command and control over traditional proxy forces.

In parallel, the Houthis—previously regarded as the “most marginal” component within Iran’s regional alliance—have emerged as a surprisingly resilient and increasingly influential actor⁽⁴⁾. Unlike other Iran-aligned groups that have suffered operational attrition, the Houthis have preserved their military capabilities while maintaining active engagement against Israel and consistently disrupting international shipping through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. This continuity of action, even as other members of the axis face strategic deterioration, has elevated the Houthis’ importance and enhanced their standing within the network.

This evolution suggests that the Houthis now carry greater operational and symbolic weight. Their capacity to impose economic and security costs on regional adversaries and to shape maritime dynamics signals a strategic shift in the internal hierarchy of Iran’s proxies. As a result, the Houthis have become a central pillar in regional confrontational strategies, capable of amplifying instability and applying asymmetric pressure in ways that extend beyond Yemen. Their enhanced position may afford them greater leverage within the axis, while simultaneously influencing Tehran’s broader calculations regarding support and coordination, particularly in the event of renewed U.S. intervention or further escalation of the Israel–Iran conflict.

The Houthi Position and Their Readiness to Intervene

The escalating Iranian–Israeli conflict places the Houthis in a precarious position, with implications for both their current military posture and future strategic choices. In the immediate aftermath of the Israeli strikes on Iran, the Houthis demonstrated considerable disorientation, mainly in response to the assassinations of senior commanders within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Army, and amid direct Israeli threats targeting the group’s leadership.

Initially, the Houthis adopted a cautious approach, opting to wait and observe the rapidly unfolding war's trajectory. This decision was shaped by two principal factors that, while seemingly contradictory, are in fact closely interlinked.

The first factor pertains to the nature of the Houthis’ relationship with Iran. The group frequently describes its ties with the Iranian regime as a “partnership,” rather than a subordinate or hierarchical arrangement, as is more common among other members of the axis. This perception does not diminish the group’s aspirations to position itself as a leading force within the “Axis of Resistance” at the regional level. Nonetheless, the Houthis fully recognise that the cohesion and operational functionality of the axis are dependent on the survival of Iran’s theocratic regime. The group continues to rely heavily on the sustained flow of weaponry, ballistic missile technology, and drones from Tehran. In light of Iran’s growing military vulnerabilities—particularly the degradation of its missile capabilities due to Israeli airstrikes—there is mounting uncertainty over its ability to continue supplying the Houthis with critical military resources. This raises serious doubts regarding the reliability of future shipments.

The second factor relates to the Houthis’ inherently pragmatic character. The group is widely recognised as a strategically adaptive actor that seeks to hedge against Iran’s declining capabilities, while maintaining rhetorical alignment through continued threats and limited strikes on Israeli territory. The Houthis’ approach to the current crisis is not defined by abstention from conflict, but by the pursuit of a carefully calibrated strategy designed to achieve multiple objectives concurrently. The first is to project themselves as a credible regional power aligned with Iran, particularly given the persistent ambiguity surrounding Iran’s ultimate fate in the conflict. The second is to avoid direct entanglement in a broader war and to preserve the ceasefire agreement with the United States, which followed several weeks of sustained U.S. airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure between March and May.

A renewed escalation could jeopardise the group’s hold over the capital, Sanaa, and undermine its domestic position. This strategic posture reveals that the Houthis are operating through a calibrated synthesis of ideological commitment and realpolitik. By carefully managing their involvement in regional crises, they are tactically reinforcing both their internal authority and their broader regional stature within the axis.

The Houthis’ hedging strategy since June 13 offers critical insight into the group’s unique posture compared to other Iranian-aligned actors. Unlike Hezbollah or the Iraqi militias—who, at this stage of the confrontation with Israel (and potentially the United States), have broadly adopted a passive stance—the Houthis have actively positioned themselves as a vanguard force. This divergence was made clear when the group’s leader delivered a speech on June 15, framed by Houthi media outlets as an address to “the nation.” In his statement, he affirmed that the group would take all necessary measures in support of the Islamic Republic of Iran⁽⁵⁾. That same day, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree announced that the movement had conducted successful strikes on the “occupied Yafa area,” employing “hypersonic ballistic missiles” in coordination with the Iranian military⁽⁶⁾.

This announcement marked the first public acknowledgement of “direct coordination” between the Houthis and Tehran. While the group did not report further similar operations prior to the ceasefire agreement between Tel Aviv and Tehran, the official declaration of joint operational planning with Iran nonetheless constitutes a critical inflexion point. This development signals a maturation of the Houthi–Iran relationship, transitioning from traditional patron-client dynamics toward a more integrated strategic partnership. The open admission of joint operational planning and intelligence coordination reflects not only increased trust but also a convergence of military objectives and risk calculations. From the Houthi perspective, this elevation in ties represents a commitment to a shared destiny with Iran, especially in light of the potential threat posed by a large-scale U.S.–Israeli military campaign that could jeopardise the survival of the Iranian regime. For the Houthis, deepening alignment with Iran thus serves dual purposes: it reinforces their standing within the “Axis of Resistance”. It positions them as an indispensable actor in Tehran’s broader defence calculus amid mounting external threats.

Constraints on Houthi Participation

At present, with a ceasefire in effect and the possibility of renewed negotiations between Tehran and Washington over Iran’s nuclear program, the Houthis are expected to maintain the “hedging strategy” they have pursued since June 13. This approach allows them to remain aligned with Iran while avoiding direct escalation with the United States. However, should the conflict reignite—or if Washington determines that further strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would yield greater strategic advantage—the Houthis may be compelled to reconsider their posture. This reassessment would likely stem from mounting concerns within the group’s leadership that they could become the next primary target of Israeli–U.S. operations.

Several Houthi commanders reportedly believe that, following Iran, the joint Israeli–U.S. military campaign will shift focus toward Yemen, aiming to degrade what they view as the last remaining significant actor within the “Axis of Resistance.” This perception is compounded by growing suspicion within the group that the U.S. ceasefire agreement was a strategic ruse, intended to mislead both them and the Iranian leadership about the true intent and scope of Western strikes on Iran.

The Houthis received a stark warning from Israel on June 14, when an Israeli airstrike targeted an underground military operations room in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa. Israeli media in Hebrew claimed the strike resulted in the killing of Houthi Chief of Staff Muhammad al-Ghamari ⁽⁷⁾. While the strike and the location are confirmed, the identity of the individual killed remains unverified. Regardless of whether al-Ghamari was among the casualties, the incident marks a critical turning point. More consequential than the immediate physical damage is the operation’s revelation of Israel’s advanced intelligence penetration capabilities inside Yemen. This development has placed the Houthi leadership on heightened alert and prompted a comprehensive reassessment of the group’s internal security and counterintelligence protocols. As a result, should the Houthis perceive an existential threat stemming from a Western-led military campaign—or should the Iranian regime face imminent risk from U.S. strikes amid the resumption of nuclear negotiations—the movement may find itself compelled to intervene decisively. In such a scenario, the Houthis are likely to act in defence of Iran and what they consider a shared strategic destiny, deploying a range of calibrated military and political options, including the following:

• Closure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait: This potential move could align with a parallel Iranian effort to shut down the Strait of Hormuz in the Arabian Gulf—both maritime chokepoints being vital arteries in the global oil trade. The Houthis may unilaterally opt to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait to inflict deeper damage on international commerce, already severely disrupted. Global shipping traffic, particularly the movement of tankers and commercial vessels through the Red Sea, has yet to recover to pre-crisis levels. Despite the truce with the United States, maritime activity through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden remained approximately 70% lower in June than the average figures recorded in 2022 and 2023 ⁽⁸⁾. If Iran chooses to escalate further, it may enhance Houthi strike capabilities by supplying more advanced weaponry or offering direct strategic guidance, thereby amplifying both the lethality and operational complexity of their maritime attacks⁽⁹⁾. In such a case, the United States may be forced to re-engage militarily with the Houthis, despite internal policy disagreements. U.S. Central Command, which oversees operations in the region, reportedly supports continued military engagement. At the same time, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Trump administration believes that maintaining the campaign siphons resources away from U.S. strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific ⁽¹⁰⁾.
• Intensification of Strikes on Israel: Even absent direct coordination with Iran or a formal escalation plan, the Houthis are expected to increase the frequency and sophistication of their strikes against Israel. These operations will likely involve the deployment of ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) targeting Israeli territory, ports, or critical infrastructure. The strategic objective behind such attacks would be to signal the group’s continued ideological and operational commitment to the Axis of Resistance, reaffirming their relevance and resolve amid a shifting regional landscape.
• Targeting Gulf States: While a de facto truce is currently in place, the Houthis may opt to extend their offensive capabilities toward the Gulf states should regional tensions re-escalate. Historically, the group has employed strikes on vital infrastructure as a coercive tool to extract political concessions. In the event of renewed regional conflict—especially if Iran retaliates against U.S. strikes on its nuclear infrastructure—the Houthis may expand their operational scope to include targets in the Gulf, potentially in tacit coordination with Iranian efforts. However, Tehran currently maintains constructive relations with most Gulf states, which strongly condemned the recent Israeli attacks. Leveraging another actor within the axis allows Iran to maintain plausible deniability while indirectly exerting pressure on Gulf capitals. Should the Houthis launch attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, they risk reigniting the internal conflict in Yemen. This development would come at a high strategic cost, potentially threatening their hold on the capital, Sanaa.

For this reason, the Houthis may choose to avoid direct strikes on Gulf territories and instead restrict their actions to maritime threats. Such calibrated escalation leaves space for psychological and diplomatic leverage: the implied threat of renewed attacks could prompt Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to offer additional concessions in Yemen. These concessions would likely be structured to strengthen the Houthi position at the expense of the internationally recognised government, reinforcing their control in northern Yemen without triggering a broader military confrontation.

Potential Pathways

The trajectory of the Houthi movement, as well as the broader stability of Yemen, will be shaped by several decisive variables that influence both regional dynamics and the internal calculus of the group. These prospective pathways—and the key factors likely to determine them—can be outlined as follows:

De-escalation Pathways:

• The Houthis have consistently framed their attacks on maritime navigation as a response to the ongoing Israeli military campaign in the Gaza Strip. According to the group’s public narrative, any suspension of these operations is contingent upon the cessation of hostilities in Gaza. A potential shift in this narrative—particularly one that repositions their actions as expressions of solidarity with Iran rather than Gaza—could undermine the group’s domestic legitimacy. Such a reframing risks alienating their support base and communities in the territories under their control, who may increasingly perceive the Houthis as mere Iranian proxies. This is a label the group has resisted for over two decades. While the Houthis continue to receive strategic and material support from Tehran, their leadership has consistently characterised their relationship with Iran as one of “partnership” rather than subordination. This nuanced positioning provides the group with rhetorical and strategic flexibility. Given the Houthis’ pragmatic orientation, this framing could be leveraged to justify reduced involvement in Iran’s proxy-driven confrontation with the West, limiting their operational engagement to the Gaza theatre alone. Such a justification could be packaged both for internal consumption and as a diplomatic signal to Iran, particularly as Yemeni public sentiment tends to express deep sympathy for Palestinians but does not necessarily align as strongly with the broader Gaza conflict.
• The Houthis may also refrain from targeting U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf, particularly if guaranteed by Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other regional or international mediators. This pathway would align with the group’s evolving strategic priority of consolidating domestic political and territorial gains. A growing perception within the Houthi leadership that Iran is no longer capable of sustaining regular military support—due to the damage inflicted by Israeli and U.S. strikes—could reinforce the logic of de-escalation. Under such conditions, the Houthis may ultimately be compelled to disengage from regional military escalation and pivot toward securing a peace agreement in Yemen that satisfies their strategic ambitions. Such a settlement would likely institutionalise their authority over key territories, thereby fulfilling longstanding political objectives without further entanglement in broader regional conflicts.

Pathways to Further Conflict

• A renewed round of Israeli strikes on Iran—coupled with direct U.S. military intervention aimed at toppling the regime in Tehran—could shift from possibility to reality should upcoming negotiations between Tehran and Washington fail. This scenario becomes particularly plausible if final intelligence assessments confirm that Iran has merely postponed, rather than suspended, its nuclear program. A delay of only a few additional months, absent concrete concessions, may be insufficient to avert military escalation. In such a case, Tehran could intensify its reliance on asymmetric responses by pressuring the Houthis to retaliate. Should the Houthi leadership perceive their fate as inextricably linked to that of the Iranian regime—a “shared destiny”—they may pursue broader escalation, even while cognizant of the steep strategic costs associated with abandoning their current truce agreement with the United States.

A strategic miscalculation or excessive expansion of Houthi operations in the Red Sea could provoke a more robust military response from the United States or a broader multinational coalition. Such an outcome could severely degrade the group’s capabilities and trigger a more extensive regional military confrontation, reversing many of the gains the movement has achieved over the past two years.

• Any escalation by the Houthis against Gulf states in the forthcoming phase would likely dismantle the current Saudi–Houthi truce and risk reigniting Yemen’s internal conflict, particularly in key flashpoint areas such as Ma’rib, Taiz, and Al-Hudaydah. Such an escalation would effectively terminate the fragile ceasefire that has been in place between the Houthis and government forces since 2022. The breakdown of this truce could prompt the internationally recognised Yemeni government and its allied factions to revert to a military option, potentially on a much broader scale.

In this scenario, renewed warfare could unfold under the auspices of expanded Western diplomatic and political support, particularly through the United Nations Security Council. Even if this stance contradicts the positions of Russia and China—both of which would see their strategic interests and regional influence undermined by a wider conflict—the momentum generated by a major security crisis in the Middle East may tilt international consensus toward renewed hostilities. Such an outcome would mark a dramatic shift in the trajectory of the Yemeni conflict, dragging it back into full-scale war with regional and global implications.

The Houthi threats in the Red Sea are deeply interwoven with broader regional tensions, particularly amid the sustained uncertainty surrounding the potential resurgence of the Israeli–Iranian war and the evolving dynamics of Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the United States. The fragile balance currently upheld by the Houthis through a calibrated “hedging strategy” may prove unsustainable if U.S.–Israeli military pressure on Iran intensifies. Under such circumstances, the Houthis could be drawn into a reactionary and uncalculated escalation. This scenario would not only pose a significant threat to international maritime navigation in one of the world’s most vital shipping corridors. However, it would also directly endanger the national security architecture of the Arabian Peninsula states—and potentially Yemen itself.

Alternatively, the Houthis may be compelled—either by direct Iranian pressure or through a deepening belief in a “shared destiny” with Tehran—to engage in broader and more hazardous escalations. Such actions would elevate the threat level across the region, potentially destabilising Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula as a whole. In response, the United States or a broader international coalition could be provoked into launching decisive military operations aimed at neutralising Houthi capabilities. This would risk not only a significant erosion of the movement’s military strength but also the ignition of a broader military confrontation within Yemen—one that could draw in regional and global powers and set the stage for a new and more volatile phase of conflict.

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