Since November 19, 2023, the Houthis initiated a series of assaults on vessels in the Red Sea, comprising over 30 attacks on commercial ships alongside thwarted attacks. Responding to these incidents, the US and the UK declared their commencement of operations against the Houthis on the Yemeni mainland, commencing on January 12, 2024, following multiple threats and warning messages.
The Houthis assert their commitment to persist in their actions until “the cessation of “Israel's crimes in Gaza and allowing food, medicine and fuel supplies to the besieged residents”. Rather than leveraging the Houthis' rationale as a means for the US to pressure an end to the war in the Gaza Strip, Washington and London maintain that the Houthi attacks are unrelated to Gaza, dismissing any correlation.
Hence, President Joe Biden's administration opted to counter the situation by employing a “fire with fire” strategy, inadvertently providing the Iranian-backed armed group with a golden opportunity to advance its objectives. This approach allows them to sidestep internal crises and refurbish their reputation in the Arab world, given a history of a decade marked by failed governance and numerous transgressions against the Yemeni populace. From January 20 onward, the US launched seven rounds of strikes on purported Houthi sites, escalating anger among Yemenis and Arabs toward US policies. This inadvertently bolstered the Houthis' propaganda both domestically and internationally, framing them as a “resistance force” bravely opposing a superpower.
To what extent may the US-British strikes impact the Houthis, what reactions might unfold as the attacks continue in Yemen, what are their consequences internally, and how could they affect the national security of the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea?
 
US Strikes Strategy and Purpose
Weeks preceding the commencement of US strikes targeting the Houthis on the Yemeni mainland, the US and its allies persistently warned the Houthis to cease targeting commercial ships; otherwise, it would face repercussions. In an effort to compel the Houthis to withdraw, Washington, alongside other Western capitals and Manama, formed a multinational coalition to confront them. Notably, this alliance did not include any countries bordering the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden. Spain, Italy, and France later refrained from joining this coalition, and representation from other countries was confined to dispatching military commanders to Manama for participation in the operations, except for Britain, which contributed two warships to the coalition. Interestingly, other countries deploying warships clarified that they were not formally part of this coalition.
On December 26, 2023, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi issued a threat to target the US Navy in the event of an attack on his forces, which materialised in the following days. Responding to the threat, the Houthis launched a substantial attack on January 9, 2023. Two days later, the US and UK declared the commencement of attacks on the Houthis, with a provision that the naval assaults by the Houthis cease to bring an end to the strikes in which US destroyers and UK and US fighters were actively involved.
Initiating attacks on any country necessitates a resolution from the UN Security Council, and this was the foundation upon which the United States, Britain, and their backers built their case(1). The day preceding the attacks, a Security Council resolution was issued, denouncing the Houthi assaults and acknowledging the right of member states to safeguard shipping. However, the resolution did not include an all-encompassing mandate endorsing the use of force. China and Russia, who opted to abstain from voting, subsequently asserted that the attacks contradicted the Security Council resolution. The Russian Foreign Minister remarked, “The United States and its allies trampled on all conceivable rules of international law by attacking Yemen” (2).
To align the strikes with the criteria of the Security Council resolution, the US and UK downplayed their significance. The White House asserted that “the attacks were not intended to provoke escalation”(3), and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak characterised them as “limited and not escalatory”(4). Such statements seem peculiar given the context of bombing another country's territory. The declarations from the US and British authorities conveyed a message of weakness rather than a stern warning to the Houthis and their Iranian allies. The Houthis swiftly absorbed the attacks, and within days, they retaliated by launching assaults on US ships in the Gulf of Aden(5). In a separate development, Iran attempted to send advanced naval weapons to Yemen, but the shipment was intercepted and confiscated by the US Navy(6).
Analysing the timeline of the Houthi-US conflict reveals that Washington's strategy to halt Houthi attacks relies on two key mechanisms. Firstly, utilising air strikes to dismantle and destroy Houthi capabilities systematically, a tactic expected to intensify in response to ongoing Houthi attacks. Secondly, aiming to disrupt Iranian weapon supplies to the armed group, although this goal is challenging, with the Revolutionary Guard actively working on establishing new routes and covers for smuggling weapons to the Houthis.
The confrontation between the US and the UK against the Houthis is considered unequal in terms of capacity and structure. Although the Houthis possess limited capabilities compared to their Western adversaries, technological advancements favour the Houthis. Their weaponry is smaller, more precise, mobile, easier to conceal, and can be deployed without dependence on complex infrastructure. Consequently, the Western military strategy aims to navigate the conflict with the Houthis by employing minimal force necessary to accomplish specific military objectives. This approach is embedded within a broader strategy to “restore US deterrence” in the region and globally(7).
As a result, Washington and London declare that the objective of the strikes is not to obliterate the Houthis' capabilities but to compel the armed group to cease attacks on cargo ships. The Houthis contend that their targets are ships associated with Israel. In pursuing this course, the United States endeavours to conceptually isolate strikes in Yemen from other fronts in the broader regional conflict, encompassing Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.
However, achieving this separation proves challenging, with numerous countries opposing the Yemeni strikes asserting their connection to the US support for the Israeli war in Gaza. This sentiment is echoed by both European and Arab allies of the United States, who are reluctant to be implicated in perceived atrocities in the region. Consequently, the European Union opted for a distinct mission separate from the US-led “Operation Prosperity Guardian”(8), a decision publicly announced on December 20, 2023.

The Strikes’ Impact on the Houthis
By authorising a limited US bombing operation, Biden has established a precedent and positioned himself in a precarious situation, potentially drawing the United States back into Middle East crises. The pressure on him to respond to each Houthi attack with additional air strikes during an election year is expected to intensify. The president, facing heightened criticism and perceptions of weakness(9), may seek to mitigate these sentiments by adopting a more assertive stance. Consequently, Biden has outlined the rules of engagement with the Houthis, indicating that each Houthi attack will prompt further strikes on the Yemeni mainland. However, this approach will not help in achieving Washington's campaign objectives.
Washington's “restoring deterrence” objective hinges on the adversary backing down. However, overlooked by the US is the Houthis' aspiration for “US deterrence”, seeking to position themselves as adversaries of a superpower they've purportedly been combating since their establishment in 2004. This implies that air strikes may not induce a retreat from the opponent but rather stimulate counter-retaliation, making them less susceptible to withdrawing to avert potential consequences associated with engaging in a confrontation with a superpower.
Since November 2023, the United States has employed diverse tactics, displaying a gradual and less cohesive strategy for deterrence. For several weeks(10), the US response focused on intercepting missiles and drones, showing restraint in direct engagement with the Houthis. The situation shifted after December 31 of the same year when three Houthi boats were sunk, prompting a retaliatory response from the group. Subsequently, on January 18, 2024, US forces began targeting missile and drone launch bases pre-emptively, prior to launches into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This suggests an expansion of the rules of engagement by the United States, mirroring the Houthis' widening targeting scope to include the Gulf of Aden(11).
Indeed, tactically, the strikes demonstrated success by destroying numerous targets, although their impact on the Houthis' military capabilities was only marginal. President Biden characterised the attacks as successful. The New York Times, citing US officials, claimed that between 20% and 30% of the Houthis' offensive capabilities were eradicated during the initial night of bombing(12). However, there is scepticism about the accuracy of this percentage, with some considering it to be an exaggeration.
From a strategic standpoint, the strikes did not achieve success as the intended objectives were not realised; the Houthis persisted in their attacks. Several factors contributed to this, including:

1. The incapacity of the United States and its allies to accurately gauge the force necessary to attain the objective of preventing Houthi naval attacks, assuming such a point is reachable.
2. The Houthis lack an extensive infrastructure for ballistic missiles and drones. Ballistic missiles can be discreetly transported between regions using commercial carriers or relief trucks with varying disguises, rendering their monitoring, even via satellite, challenging. This difficulty is compounded by the limited availability of intelligence information to guide US forces effectively. Moreover, these missiles can be launched from mobile platforms concealed in remote mountainous locations, making it arduous for air or sea raids to reach them. Additionally, they could be strategically placed on islands in the Red Sea under Houthi's control, further complicating detection and neutralisation efforts.
3. Strikes can target radars with locations detected by advanced monitoring devices on US and UK warships. Nevertheless, the Houthis seem to be depending on utilising Iranian warships situated in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to coordinate their attacks.
   In this context, the attack on November 19, 2023, resulting in the hijacking of the vessel “Galaxy Leader” associated with Israeli businessman Abraham Rami Ungar, as it passed near the ship “Behshad”, prompts speculation about the information potentially shared by the ship. The vessel, anchored in international waters near the Eritrean archipelago “Dahlak” since 2021, may have provided insights to the Houthis. Its relocation to the Gulf of Aden following the US-British strikes, alongside the Iranian destroyer “Alborz”, sparks additional speculation regarding the potential shift of Houthi attacks from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.
4. Drawing from the experiences of the nine-year war against government forces and the coalition supporting legitimacy, the Houthis have learned to conceal their forces, missiles, drones, and booby-trapped unmanned boats, making them challenging targets. Notably, they have focused on constructing more advanced and fortified weapons depots and laboratories, as well as assembly and manufacturing laboratories in mountainous or coastal areas over that period.
   Adopting a multifaceted perspective, the Houthis derive advantages from US strikes against them, irrespective of their intensity. Over the past decade, the group has found the battle against the internationally recognised government and its supporters to be comparatively easier than the challenges associated with governance. Issues such as disbursing salaries, delivering services to the Yemeni population in areas under their control, and effectively managing state affairs have proven to be intricate tasks for the Houthis.
   Hence, the Houthis, bolstered by the US strikes, perceived entry into the Gaza Strip war as a means to evade the “radical changes” promised by the group's leader in the weeks leading up to the war. It provided an opportunity to unify their leadership, which had experienced deep internal disagreements following a truce. The Houthi involvement in the Gaza war also served as a gateway for recruiting volunteers, swelling their ranks by tens of thousands during the war. In this way, the US attacks afforded the Houthis a reprieve from those responsibilities.
   Furthermore, the attacks present an opportunity for the Houthis to enhance their standing as a “resistance force”, solidifying their role within the Iranian resistance axis after they harboured concerns about potential abandonment by Tehran following the agreement to resume relations with Saudi Arabia under Chinese sponsorship. The Houthis have initiated diplomatic channels with numerous countries in the region, and their messages to various supporters of the Palestinian Cause have garnered attention. They position themselves as significant players on the high seas when communicating with Chinese and Russian entities. Additionally, other nations engage with them directly or through intermediaries, seeking secure passages for their ships. This dynamic makes the Houthis perceive themselves as liberated from imposed isolation and establishes them as an influential force in the region.

Consequences of Air Strikes
The impact of air strikes on the accounts and interests of different parties unfolds as follows:

1. The Houthis: US-British air strikes or international mobilisation in the Red Sea are unlikely to deter their attacks. Instead, the Houthis are likely to intensify their efforts, opting for larger and more widespread attacks to solidify the gains they've made and circumvent their responsibilities. The Houthis do not care about economic consequences, such as a deteriorating economy and rising prices due to increased ship insurance costs in a country heavily reliant on imports for 87% of its basic needs.
   While the Houthis are capitalising on the advantages of the US strikes both domestically and regionally, the internationally recognised government finds itself unable to secure significant military or political gains. Such gains could result in its isolation, particularly given the widespread consensus on the Palestinian Cause and the internal situation. The United States and its allies face challenges in relying on the Yemeni government or any supporting local factions for assistance in their operations in the Red Sea. This is due to the risk that aligning with the US could lead to perceived foreign support, a sensitive matter for Yemeni tribes, potentially resulting in the loss of support and facing rejection from Saudi Arabia and other regional allies involved in advanced peace negotiations with the Houthis. An exception to this dynamic may be the position of the United Arab Emirates, which supports the Southern Transitional Council. It feels that its interests were not adequately addressed in the peace agreement, which led the Council to adopt a ground operation backed by the United States(13).
2. The United States and its allies: It appears that the United States and its allies may encounter a crisis in securing support from regional or global allies for their operations in the Red Sea and airstrikes in Yemen, fearing the Houthi's potential retaliation, particularly through targeting commercial ships.
   By showcasing their capabilities in the Red Sea, the Houthis position themselves as a regional player whose considerations and interests warrant acknowledgement. The apprehensions of various nations regarding the potential escalation of the Gaza war to encompass the entire region, leading to the risk of prolonged navigation closures in the southern Red Sea, have prompted the Europeans to contemplate a potential naval mission in the area. Apart from contributing to “Operation Atalanta” aimed at countering piracy, other countries like India and Pakistan dispatched their own warships under their command, opting not to join the coalition led by Washington.
   Given the US policy toward the Israeli war in Gaza and the justifications provided by the Houthis for their attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the ongoing US-British strikes in Yemen are likely to be perceived as implicit support for the Israeli destruction in the Gaza Strip. Many around the world consider these actions as genocide(14). This perception diminishes the likelihood of cooperation from Arab countries in general or countries bordering the Red Sea with the US on other issues, including the shared objective of safeguarding navigation in the Red Sea(15).
3. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: There is no cohesive vision among GCC countries regarding the course of action following the US strikes. Nevertheless, there is consensus that the region cannot afford escalation leading to a regional war in close proximity to its borders. In this context, Saudi Arabia recognises the significance of leveraging the consequences of the Chinese-sponsored agreement to resume relations with Iran, which was signed on March 10, 2023.
   It seems unlikely that GCC countries will permit the United States and its allies to use military bases on their territories to target Houthi areas. Notably, the United Kingdom opted to use its base in Cyprus instead of accessing a military base (16) in the Sultanate of Oman, as it had done previously. As per current developments, GCC countries are anticipated to persist in their role as mediators and messengers between the Houthis and Iranians on one side and the United States and its allies on the other.
4. Countries bordering the Red Sea: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other countries along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are likely to adopt a cautious stance regarding the increasing international presence in the region. They may refrain from endorsing US military operations against the Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and Egypt may express interest in activating the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which was established in 2020. This council includes Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia on the African side of the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen on the Asian side.
5. Iran: Tehran has justifiable reasons to deem its investment in the Houthis successful, gaining the influence it sought over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Iran is likely to persist in viewing the Houthis as a “regional spearhead” against Israel rather than as its primary ally, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. This approach involves solidifying the armed group within the resistance axis, doubling the supply of weapons, and intensifying the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah experts. However, Iran will likely be cautious not to overextend itself beyond its capacity to deny involvement.
   Simultaneously, Iran is unlikely to take the risk of engaging in an international war to protect the Houthis. This rationale partly clarifies the withdrawal of the destroyer “Alborz£ and the warship “Behshad” from the Red Sea when the aircraft carrier “Eisenhower” and the US and British destroyers commenced bombing the Houthis.
6. China and Russia: China's measured response to the chaos in the Red Sea is influenced by an intricate interplay of economic factors, with 60% of China's exports to Europe traversing the international corridor and limited military capabilities. China currently possesses three warships, a military base in the Gulf of Aden, and geopolitical dynamics.
   Beijing refrained from responding, avoiding explicit condemnation or direct military intervention. The current costs do not appear to be sufficiently high for China to deem the risks of involvement worthwhile, thus favouring a non-intervention strategy.
   Similarly, Russia adopts a parallel stance with China, allowing the United States and its allies to contend with the Houthis. This approach contributes to fostering anti-Washington sentiment in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Moscow remains fighting in Ukraine. Consequently, both Beijing and Moscow have condemned the US strikes, characterising them as a breach of the UN Security Council resolution.
   Simultaneously, the US-British strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, based on the Security Council resolution, evoked concerns from Russia and China. This apprehension stems from an international precedent countries can employ on the high seas. Both countries view these strikes as a US message indicating the possibility of the same step to deal with similar developments in the South China Sea or the Arctic. The US has explicitly stated this possibility(17), emphasising the potential use of the same approach to enforce freedom of navigation across all global oceans, citing instances of the Chinese Navy's alleged harassment of ships from neighbouring countries in the South China Sea.

Long term tactic
While naval operations are not novel for the Houthis, the recent string of attacks poses the risk of solidifying them as a pivotal tactic going forward. Privately expressed concerns from US officials revolve around the potential for the Houthis to disrupt global shipping persistently in the long term. It becomes evident that Houthi aggression did not emerge suddenly last year; instead, they had been targeting ships for years. However, the US historically focused on pressuring the government and the coalition while disregarding these attacks. Presently, the US appears to be repeating the same mistakes, affording the Houthis a strategic advantage and neglecting the pleas from its allies and regional countries. This approach is perceived as an attempt to assert dominance in the Red Sea without due consideration for the interests of other countries. The motivation behind this stance is questioned, with some asserting it aligns more with supporting Israel and sending messages to competitors, particularly China and Russia, rather than serving the freedom of navigation.
The Houthis have consistently asserted that the Red Sea will remain under threat as long as the war in Gaza persists, emphasising their concern for what they perceive as genocide against Palestinians. While the practical feasibility of the Houthi approach encounters challenges, it does not undermine the fact that the US advocating for a ceasefire does not incur significant costs. Instead, the apprehension of triggering a regional war could be viewed as an opportunity to exert pressure on Israel to halt the war.
Regardless, the Houthis and Iranians might be inclined to cease naval attacks once the war in the Gaza Strip concludes. This could serve as an opportunity for them to claim domestic and international victory, declaring the defeat of the US and its allies. However, the potential for renewed confrontations at a later stage cannot be dismissed, particularly if a new crisis emerges that impacts the calculations and interests of the Houthis and their supporters. Such a development could lead to fresh US strikes in Yemen, triggering specific Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Consequently, the rules of engagement may shift, ushering in another war followed by international measures that contribute to further destruction and poverty, exacerbating the already severe humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

 [1] Security Council strongly condemns Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping 10/01/2024

Https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1145382

[2] روسيا تصر على التفاوض مع الحوثيين بدلاً من قصفهم، نشر في 20/01/2024 وشوهد يوم 21/01/2024 على الرابط:

Https://www.yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/104250

[3] U.S. Strikes at Houthis in Yemen for a Second Day 11/01/2024 See 21/01/2024

Https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/11/world/israel-hamas-houthi-yemen-news

[4] Houthis, Undeterred by Strikes, Target More Ships in Red Sea 15/01/2024 See 21/01/2024

Https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/15/world/middleeast/houthis-ships-red-sea.html

[5] Houthis Respond to US and British Strikes with More Attacks on Red Sea Shipping 17/01/2024 See 21/01/2024 https://www.stimson.org/2024/houthis-red-sea-shipping-us-uk/

[6] U.S. says it seized Iran missile parts bound for the Houthis after SEALs went overboard 16/01/2024 See 21/01/2024 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/navy-seals-found-iran-missile-parts-yemen-houthis-rcna134050

[7] McConnell welcomes US-led strikes on Houthis in Yemen 12/1/2024 See 20/01/2024 https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4404773-mcconnell-us-led-strikes-houthis-yemen/

[8] US announces naval coalition to defend Red Sea shipping from Houthi attacks 19/12/2023 See 20/01/2024 https://tinyurl.com/2x4tm8s5

[9] U.S. Bombings in Yemen Don't Solve the Houthi Problem 17/01/2024 See 19/01/2024

Https://tinyurl.com/2xbymyve

[10] الولايات المتحدة تغيّر تكتيكاتها في اليمن رداً على هجمات الحوثيين 20/01/2024 وشوهد في 21/01/2024

Https://www.yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/104247

[11] Houthi attacks continue as US cargo ship hit in defiance of strikes on Yemen 15/01/2024 See 20/01/2024 https://tinyurl.com/yq6f7drj

[12] After Red Sea Barrage by Houthis, U.S. and Allies Weigh Retaliation 13/01/2024 2024 See 20/01/2024  https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/10/world/middleeast/houthis-red-sea-us-response.html

[13] Airstrikes against Houthis are not enough, says Yemeni official 15/01/2024 See 20/01/2024

Https://tinyurl.com/yvet4dac

[14] South Africa tells the U.N. top court Israel is committing genocide in Gaza 11/01/2024

Https://www.npr.org/2024/01/11/1224126552/court-hearings-genocide-charges-israel

[15] US strikes on Yemen won't solve anything 15/01/2024

Https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-yemen-houthis-gaza/

[16] The UK’s participation in air strikes on Yemen exposes its diminished military strength 12/01/2024

Https://tinyurl.com/yvpzugaf

[17] Houthi aggression offers US a chance to vindicate freedom of navigation 18/01/2024 https://tinyurl.com/yvhs8nas