Considerations from African Countries bordering the Red Sea
The Western-Houthi confrontation poses significant risks to the security of Red Sea countries, crucial for approximately 12% of global trade. While African countries have not taken unified positions on the Israel-Hamas war, the outbreak of hostilities in the Red Sea directly threatens the region. Speculation about the Houthis' readiness to target US bases in the Arab region adds to the concerns surrounding these potential dangers.
Several significant factors influence the stances of African countries regarding the Red Sea. One key variable is the Israeli influence that has expanded over the years in Africa, where Israel is recognised by 46 countries and maintains 17 embassies and 12 consulates. Conversely, the colonial history endured by African countries inclines them towards solidarity with the Palestinians. Additionally, demographic composition plays a role, particularly in countries experiencing social tensions due to a mix of Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

1. Egypt:
Egypt refrained from participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, with Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry emphasised that "there are already existing frameworks in the region" and the responsibility for securing the Red Sea lies with the countries bordering it. Several considerations can elucidate Cairo's cautious approach to the US-British strikes in Yemen:
Firstly, Egypt's endorsement of these strikes would imply support for Israel's position, contradicting Egypt's stance on the ongoing war.
Secondly, from an economic perspective, the Suez Canal generated approximately $10.25 billion in annual revenues in 2023. The Western-Houthi military confrontation in the Red Sea poses a threat to Egypt's third most crucial source of foreign exchange. The events in the Red Sea have compelled some ships to alter their routes, redirecting towards the Cape of Good Hope. Notably, traffic through the Suez Canal experienced a 30% decrease between January 1 and January 11 compared to the previous year, impacting the economy. Additionally, the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope entails longer transit times and higher costs, raising concerns about potential inflation, supply chain disruptions, and increased energy prices (1).
A chart illustrating the patterns of trade movement in the Red Sea.
  
Source: Reuters.

Thirdly, the shift of the conflict to the Red Sea introduces a new source of tension alongside the already strained borders with Israel and Gaza. Compounded by the existing crises in Sudan and the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, the Red Sea region is already marked by heightened conflicts. This exacerbates regional crises, coupled with internal pressures stemming from inflation and external debt. Consequently, Cairo has emphasised the imperative to halt escalation and avoid broadening the scope of the ongoing war, as articulated in Shoukry statements: "The escalation on the Lebanese border and the tension in the Red Sea indicate an expansion of the conflict and the region's entry into a vicious cycle of escalation."

2. Somalia:
Somalia aligns with Arab countries in supporting the Palestinians and advocating for a halt to the war, urging a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Facing challenging security conditions, President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud strives to garner international and regional support in his war against the Al-Shabaab terrorist movement. Therefore, Somalia's stance aligns with Egypt's position, emphasising the imperative to halt escalation in the Red Sea, guided by a set of Somali considerations:
Firstly, Somalia is actively engaged in a fierce war with terrorist organisations that have maintained control over large areas of the country for more than a decade. The celebration by Al-Shabaab of Hamas's execution of the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation raises concerns about the potential for terrorist attacks targeting Israeli and US interests in the Red Sea. This places considerable pressure on Somalia and places it at the forefront of potential confrontations.
Secondly, the signing of a memorandum of understanding by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi, allowing Ethiopia access to the Red Sea through the port of Berbera in exchange for Addis Ababa’s recognition of it as a separate state, threatened to violate Somalia’s sovereignty and stability. President Mahmoud promptly engaged with President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to garner support for Somalia's position. Additionally, he sought assistance from the Arab League to unite Arab countries against Ethiopia, implicitly aligning with the general stance of Red Sea-bordering countries in opposing the escalation between the United States and the Houthis.
Thirdly, Somalia acknowledges that engaging in a war with the Houthis would likely lead to another cycle of violence. Somalia had been a strategic location for launching strikes during the conflict between the Arab coalition and the Houthis, which ultimately resulted in a humanitarian disaster in Yemen (2).

3. Sudan:
Sudan is currently grappling with challenging political, security, and humanitarian circumstances due to the ongoing war between the army forces led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Al-Burhan has taken a stance in support of the Palestinian people, calling for an immediate cessation of aggression and displacement. Notably, Sudan signed an agreement with Israel to establish diplomatic relations on October 23, 2020. Given this context, the war in the Gaza Strip and its repercussions extending to the Red Sea impact Sudan in light of several variables:
Firstly, the war in Gaza and the military confrontation in the Red Sea have positioned international and Arab public opinion as observers, diverting attention away from Sudan. This has resulted in a decline in efforts to reach a settlement in the ongoing conflict. Compounded by significant field losses faced by the army forces, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken the step of suspending collaboration with the IGAD organisation due to the lack of a satisfactory settlement.
Secondly, the shift of escalation to the Red Sea directly impacts Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's strategic calculations, especially following recent developments in Wad Madani, controlled by the Rapid Support Forces. Given that the army headquarters is situated in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, it aligns with the Western-Houthi escalation, further complicating the situation for Al-Burhan.

4. Eritrea:
Relations between Asmara and Tel Aviv have undergone strain in recent years, primarily due to Israel's notable presence in Eritrea. Israel maintained a marina in Dahlak Kebir, serving as a fuel station for its naval ships. However, a series of developments led to Israel closing its embassy in Asmara on July 10, 2022. Furthermore, Eritrea accused the Israeli Mossad of financing factional violence, particularly after violent clashes erupted between supporters of the Eritrean government and its opponents in September 2023. Asmara stands out as one of the staunchest opponents to Israel obtaining observer status in the African Union (3).
As a result of the sanctions imposed by several Western countries on the regime of Isaias Afwerki, the latter shifted its focus eastward, seeking to strengthen ties with Russia and Iran. Eritrea's geographical distance from Ethiopia, coupled with its proximity to Djibouti and Somalia, has enhanced its role. This dynamic justifies the efforts of certain countries to engage with Afwerki in an attempt to find solutions and formulate a unified position regarding the war in the Gaza Strip, the escalation in the Red Sea, and the broader situation in the Horn of Africa.

5. Djibouti:
Despite hosting "Camp Lemmoné," the only permanent US military base in Africa, Djibouti declined to participate in Operation Prosperity Guardian. Surprisingly, Djibouti expressed support for Houthi strikes, as confirmed by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, who stated on December 19, 2023, that the country does not condemn the attacks launched from Sana’a in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. Djibouti considers these attacks “legitimate relief for the Palestinians,” a stance that garnered appreciation from the Hamas movement (4).
Djibouti's position is grounded in its diplomatic ties with Israel and the Palestinians, as well as its restored relations with Iran in September 2023. The demographic factor, given Djibouti's Muslim-majority population, also significantly influences its stance. President Ismail Guelleh, in the past, had refused to normalise relations with Israel until a resolution was reached in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Certainly, Djibouti's hosting of six foreign military bases creates pressure, especially if it supports Western strikes against the Houthi militia. This support could potentially lead to retaliatory attacks against those bases.

6. Kenya:
Despite not bordering the Red Sea, Kenya has shown early interest in the repercussions of the escalating situation. Initially aligning with Ghana, Rwanda, and Tanzania in supporting Israel's position against Hamas, Kenya adopted a cautious stance as attacks intensified in the Red Sea. The Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for an end to the escalation and emphasised the necessity of achieving a political agreement through the two-state solution. Two primary determinants influence Kenya's perspective on regional events:

Firstly, Kenya maintains a longstanding alliance with the United States, receiving military support in the fight against terrorist groups. Simultaneously, Kenya and Israel have had relations dating back to 1963, characterised by economic and historical ties. Recent agreements between the two countries include plans to elevate Kenyan exports to Israel, along with a joint declaration of intent to enhance cooperation in tourism and environmental protection.
Secondly, from Nairobi's perspective, the escalation of confrontations in the Red Sea presents an opportunity for terrorist organisations to reinvigorate their activities. This is particularly concerning due to the withdrawal of the African Union mission from Somalia and the announced support for Hamas by the Somali "Al-Shabaab" movement. By aligning its rhetoric with Hamas's goals, the movement aims to attract more sympathisers, posing a threat to countries supporting Israel and increasing the likelihood of exposure to terrorist operations. Kenya, having experienced past terrorist attacks linked to developments related to Israel, including the 2019 attack on a hotel complex in Nairobi, remains vigilant. It was not surprising when, on October 11, 2023, Kenyan counter-terrorism police warned of the potential for “Al-Shabaab launching attacks in solidarity with Hamas.”

In this context, it becomes apparent that the United States is navigating the unfolding events in the proximity of the Red Sea without giving sufficient attention to the security and well-being of the Arab and African countries bordering it. This approach appears likely to persist in the upcoming phase, especially following the re-listing of the Houthis as a global terrorist group. Despite regional and international warnings and concerns, the United States proceeded with three additional strikes after the initial attack. Concurrently, the Houthis' actions suggest that without a political resolution, the region will continue to serve as a battleground and a display of strength, carrying severe consequences for the entire region.

[1] US attacks Houthi anti-ship missiles, vessel hit in Red Sea, Reuters, 17 Jan 2024, available on https://t.ly/aapOO

[1]‘We know how violence ends, and the consequences,’ Somalia’s president tells Arab News,  13 Nov 2023, available on https://arab.news/nuqxs

[1] Eritrea No Longer Serves Israel's Security Interests. It's Time to Cut Ties, Haaretz, 7 Sep 2023, available on https://t.ly/AOJ--

[1] Hamas hails Djibouti’s position in support of Palestine, The Palestinian Information Center, 29 Dec 2023, available on https://t.ly/pG4ea