On September 27, the leader of the Houthi group, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, made a significant announcement, marking the commencement of "radical changes" aimed at the core institutions of power. This pronouncement arrived nine years after the Houthi armed group established itself as a de facto authority in Sanaa and various northern Yemeni governorates. Their ascent followed a coup against the internationally recognised government and their formation, in October 2016, of a "national salvation" government in partnership with the General People’s Congress, Sana'a branch. This government, however, remained unrecognised and was entrusted with interim duties, while the Houthi faction assumed effective control over the management and governance of the region.

The Houthi's proclamation of radical change occurs within the context of the most extended truce in an enduring conflict spanning 18 months. It also aligns with ongoing negotiations to end the war and growing public discontent in areas under Houthi control. This discontent is rooted in the proliferation of corruption, the abuse of power, and the systematic failure to meet the daily needs of citizens. Furthermore, disputes within the Houthi group have escalated, and internal alliances have been strained.

The objective of this paper is twofold: to delve into the aims and motivations underlying the Houthi's radical changes and to evaluate whether the outcomes of these changes will reinforce their hegemony over power by excluding their partners, notably the General People’s Congress (Sanaa wing). * Alternatively, do these changes indicate the group's inclination towards reform to strengthen cohesion within their ranks and unify the domestic front? This would potentially involve broadening participation in governance and addressing the deteriorating quality of life in their administrative areas.

First: The Essence of Radical Transformation

Regarding references, it is crucial to note that the group does not operate by the provisions of the Yemeni Constitution 1990, devoid of any established constitutional or legal regulations delineating the duties and powers of those in positions of authority. Instead, they rely on a unique hierarchy of superhuman references that govern their authority:

1. The Qur'anic Text: The Houthis derive their perceived authority from an idealised, divinely sanctioned order rooted in the lineage of Ali bin Abi Talib. As is customary among armed political Islamist groups, the Houthi movement grounds its governance in the Qur'anic text, interpreted through Twelver Shiite Islam.

2. The Influence of Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi: Beyond their adherence to Shiite figures, the writings of the group's founder, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, hold a pivotal role in shaping the Houthi ideology. These writings serve as a supplementary reference, elucidating and expounding upon the Qur'anic text.

3. The Position of the "Imam": Within Houthi and Shiite doctrinal perspectives, the concept of the "imam" occupies a central and revered position. Throughout the years of warfare, the Houthi group has strategically sought to centralise authority in the hands of their youthful leader, an individual they've endeavoured to deify. This learned Imam is not only the revolution leader but also a descendant of the Prophet. His actions remain above scrutiny and accountability, establishing him as a third authority within the group.

These references collectively underpin the Houthi group's understanding of authority and power, forming the bedrock upon which their governance stands, and are pivotal in comprehending the nature of the radical changes they are implementing.

At the policy level, the Houthi group has refrained from divulging a comprehensive plan delineating the precise nature of the radical changes they intend to implement. Instead, they have signalled that these changes will transpire over several stages, with the details closely guarded within the Houthi leader's office. Nevertheless, they have indicated their transformative agenda's fundamental pillars and starting points, grounded in faith identity and a unifying vision built around shared commonalities. [1]

Based on this framework, the first phase was initiated with the dismissal of the Bin Habtoor government. Reports suggest that this preliminary stage encompasses revisions in long-standing public policies, regulations across government bodies, judicial and public systems, and economic policies. [2]

It is aptly described as the "preliminary" phase. [3] This phase can be characterised as follows:

Formation of a New Government: The underlying objective appears to be consolidating power within the hands of the most loyal associates. This new government, coupled with the Supreme Political Council (a body akin to the republic's presidency) and their partners in the "Sanaa Conference," aims to wrest control over post-war reconstruction funds. [4] Evidently, the Houthi group is unsatisfied with the Sanaa Conference allies, whom they consistently view as "followers of the previous regime" or a "fifth column."

By proclaiming these radical changes and the government's ousting, the Houthi leader portrays himself as a high-ranking official vested with authority equivalent to that of the "presidency of the republic." Herein, he exercises executive authority, formulates public policies, and assumes a position reminiscent of the supreme leader in Iran. [5] This shift underscores the substantial reconfiguration of power dynamics within the Houthi group.

Transformation in Governance and Judiciary: A Sectarian Evolution

The Houthi group perceives the reconfiguration of judicial institutions as pivotal, as they aim to embed their sectarian doctrines within the legal framework while asserting tighter control. To consolidate power and mitigate the potential influence of other movements within the Zaidi sect, the Houthi leader has directed the inclusion of Islamic Sharia[6] scholars within the judicial system.

Economic Restructuring: Shaping a War Economy

Throughout the years of conflict, the Houthi faction has endeavoured to construct a war economy distinct from the conventional economic model. Their approach involved the creation of a rentier class from within their ranks, vying with the national capital. Additionally, they established revenue streams and imposed numerous taxes, the allocation of which remained concealed and undisclosed. Annual budgets (2015-2039) were not disclosed, and spending mechanisms were shrouded in secrecy.

The motivation behind these changes seemingly revolves around fortifying their revenue collection system. Introducing the "hums law," which reserves one-fifth or 20% of land income for the "Hashemites," is a prominent policy shift. Furthermore, the alterations to "usurious transactions" effectively dismantle the free market economy. Following the announcement of radical changes, the group modified three significant laws: "Taxes, Customs, and Public Finance." This empowers the Supreme Political Council president to issue decisions imposing new taxes or increasing customs, thereby contradicting the Constitution. [7]

Policy Redefinition and Administrative Control: A Quest to Imitate Iran

Reshaping public policies and administrative regulations is traditionally within the purview of the government and the presidency, subject to the approval of the House of Representatives and founded on constitutional principles. Yet, the Houthi leader's office seeks to emulate the Iranian regime by altering public policies, thereby endeavouring to remodel administrative regulations in state institutions in line with their ideology. Notably, the imposition of the "Code of Employment Conduct" [8] violates public freedoms. It infringes upon the religious beliefs upheld by the Houthis, with scant regard for the beliefs and affiliations of employees. This transformation underscores the ideological shift within the group's governance approach.

Second: Transformation and Societal Challenges: The Fragility of Houthi Leadership

The mechanisms guiding decision-making within the Houthi leadership remain veiled in secrecy. However, one certainty prevails—the group's internal state post-war has become notably fragile and weakened, prompting the Houthi leader and his inner circle to enact profound changes. We shed light on a spectrum of challenges and their intersections with these radical changes:

Erosion of the Group: Typically, revenues stemming from illicit economic activities tend to fuel the avarice of rebel leaders, amplifying their wealth at the expense of their nation. [9] The Houthis are no exception in this regard, as the leaders have accumulated immense riches while their supporters, their families, and the broader Yemeni populace grapple with impoverishment.

This wealth disparity has precipitated schisms within the group on two primary fronts:

First, The extended truce has awakened the realisation among many fighters and their immediate commanders that they were the cannon fodder of war. In contrast, others basked in the spoils, with bullets being their sole compensation. [10] As numerous fighters returned to their homes, they were struck by the affluence the group's leaders enjoyed and their multiple privileges. Consequently, they approached the group's leader with demands for either integration into state institutions for themselves and their members or a refusal to return to the battlefield. This indicates a significant erosion of trust among the group's supporters and fighters regarding the conduct of their leadership.

Second: Pursuing power and wealth has bred intense competition and conflicts among first- and second-tier leaders. A noteworthy feud has unfolded between two major factions: the first represented by "Ahmed Hamed" (known as Abu Mahfouz), director of the office of Mahdi Al-Mashat (head of the Supreme Political Council), and the second faction helmed by Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi (Abu Ahmed), a member of the Supreme Political Council and former leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee. Abu Mahfouz has concentrated revenue institutions and public offices under his purview, with Customs alone yielding an annual revenue of $1.8 billion. Meanwhile, Abu Ahmed's faction wields lesser influence within state institutions and controls some new revenue streams and financial centres. The former has been actively working to purge state institutions of individuals loyal to the latter.

The dismissal of the government through the National Defense Council (Houthi), rather than the Supreme Political Council, tilted in favour of the "Houthi Office" and Abu Mahfouz's faction while sidelining Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi's faction. Simultaneously, the initial phase of radical changes appears to have responded to the discontent among field commanders returning from the battlefronts. As per one leader, employment orders have been centralised within the group leader's office, rendering the government a mere "caretaker." [11]

Leader's Legitimacy: Historically, the position of the "Imamate" within Zaidiyyah has frequently sparked conflicts among the political figures of the Hashemites during the rule of the Imams in Yemen.[12] Notably, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi is acknowledged as having less scholarly and jurisprudential knowledge. Consequently, he endeavours to capitalise on religious occasions to validate his governance legitimacy, following imams' footsteps preceding 1962 AD. Hence, the announcement of the radical changes coinciding with the celebration of the Prophet's birthday is by no means arbitrary.

This synchronisation underscores the Houthi leader's apprehensions regarding potential contenders for his position. It highlights his imperative to solidify the legitimacy of his leadership, which also carries the title of imam. This is particularly pertinent in light of the escalating popularity of Mohamed Abd al-Azim al-Houthi, one of his cousins—reports even suggest his arrest just days before the announcement of these changes. [13] Furthermore, the burgeoning influence of the " Mohammed Ali al-Houthi" movement adds to the complex landscape.

By investing his decisions with an air of sanctity, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi aims to quell any form of disobedience and mitigate the impact of the protracted war on the group. This strategic move is rooted in the fear of potential fractures that could undermine the group's cohesion and stability.

Governance Shortcoming: Since their takeover of Sanaa in 2014, the Houthis have orchestrated a bifurcation in governance. This division comprises two interconnected components: official government and parallel institutions, which ultimately answer to the Houthi leader. A standout development within this framework has been the introduction of the "supervisors’ system," meticulously integrated into every institution throughout the country. This gave rise to competing channels of institutional authority, effectively placing Abdul-Malik al-Houthi at the helm of state institutions.[14] Simultaneously, Houthi leaders find themselves vying with one another for influence, which ultimately distances them from any opportunities to challenge his leadership collectively.

This intricate system has cast a shadow on state institutions, rendering them seemingly under the control of "hidden forces." These radical changes do not appear to directly address this issue, despite its profound impact on the lives of Yemenis within territories under Houthi control. The ramifications extend to the nation's economy, further complicated by the Houthi political control, the establishment of new financial centres, their management of black markets, and the appropriation of state revenues. Their actions have disrupted the natural financial cycle by withholding government employees' salaries, enforcing an erroneous valuation of the riyal, and levying taxes. This has only exacerbated the stranglehold of the new financial centres over national capital, prompting a mass exodus of national capital or stagnation within the country. The Houthi group has established dominance by asserting control over the Chamber of Commerce in Sanaa.

Alliance Erosion: Since 2014, the Houthi group managed to gain access to Sanaa and exert control over their territories through a network of alliances encompassing political, economic, socio-tribal, and military entities. However, as the years of conflict unfolded, the Houthis became increasingly isolated, with most of these alliances unravelling. Even their supposed traditional support networks within the Hashemite families, tribal sheikhs, and merchants began to distance themselves.

The Houthi faction's failure in governance and belligerent treatment of former allies were significant catalysts for this shift. This discontent resonated among Yemenis living in areas under Houthi control and among members of parliament who were once loyal to the group. In some instances, rare demonstrations emerged within their territories, denouncing the Houthis' rule and vehemently opposing the resurgence of the Imamate system.

Among the notable losers was the Sanaa Conference party, which had lent the Houthi group political cover in controlling Sanaa. In the lead-up to the announcement of radical changes, the party's leader, Sadiq Amin Aburas, voiced his frustration over the conduct of his erstwhile allies. He criticised Al-Mashat and urged them to allocate public sector employees' salaries from state revenues and cease targeting party supporters. [15] These differences intensified, fuelled by the Houthis' refusal to facilitate the rotation of the presidency of the Supreme Political Council, as well as the party's inability to engage in peace negotiations. [16]

The Houthi National Defense Council's decision to dismiss the government, even though it had been initially formed under the auspices of the Supreme Political Council, marks the announcement of a new phase in which the Sana'a Conference is no longer seen as a partner. This move sends an unmistakable message to opposing factions: any future governance partnership with the Houthis will be under their unchallenged dominion.

The Sanaa Conference was not the sole target; the Houthis also aimed their efforts at traditional tribal leadership structures. They created parallel tribal institutions and appointed tribal "supervisors," with the majority hailing from the "Hashimite" community, which traditionally held adversarial roles to the tribal sheikhs. Pressure campaigns were initiated to compel these tribal leaders to align with the Houthi group, under the threat of being replaced if they did not conform. [17] The tribal sheikhs perceived this as retribution for their role in ending the imamate system and establishing the republican system. This development could have far-reaching implications for the future of the Houthi group.

The announcement of these radical changes by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi seemingly aims to alleviate the mounting anger within and outside the group stemming from allegations of corruption and governance failures. The blame is deflected towards the structures and laws within state institutions, offering his supporters the hope of realising their ambitions for public office. Meanwhile, it is designed to mollify the discontent among his allies and the disillusionment of citizens residing in areas under his control, fostering optimism for potential improvements. Nonetheless, this is a transient measure, as simmering dissatisfactions and resentments will inevitably resurface, heralding a return to heightened tensions.

Third: Repercussions

The radical changes instigated by the Houthi leader hold numerous implications, including:

1. Leadership Supremacy: The primary aim seems to be consolidating the Houthi leader's authority as an ultimate supervisor in any prospective peace agreement with opponents, endowing him with powers akin to the Supreme Leader in Iran. In early October 2023, the Iranian regime publicly declared its willingness to offer political expertise to the Houthi group in the forthcoming phases. This development lessens the prospects of reaching a comprehensive Yemeni agreement with the Houthis and heightens the likelihood of further divisions within the country. [18]

2. Emphasis on Faith Identity: The radical changes emphasise the centrality of faith identity, implying the formulation of legislation and administrative regulations based on the group's doctrine. Consolidating the group's leader as a "supreme guide" effectively cements the notion that he is an "imam" to be obeyed, sidelining potential rivals and imposing decisions to maintain group cohesion. However, this approach might trigger internal disputes within the group over the "Imamate" and escalate discontent among public sector employees and tribes, even within Zaidi regions. Additionally, it may elicit resistance from the Shafi'i governorates, further isolating the armed group and its rule.

3. Elusive Governance: Despite the radical changes, actual governance remains elusive as "hidden forces" wield authority. Even if the Houthi leader manages to resolve internal conflicts over wealth and power, creating a functioning system capable of appeasing those disgruntled with his supporters in public office will prove challenging. This could strain the state's administrative apparatus, replacing competent staff with incapable employees, perpetuating general dissatisfaction and discontent, and hindering economic progress.

Finally, It's essential to acknowledge that the Houthis, despite presenting the radical changes as the dawn of a new regime and authority, are, in essence, an armed rebel group. After years of conflict, they share the same afflictions as other rebel groups worldwide: the dual challenge of rebellion and avarice. As a result, they may struggle to govern effectively, particularly in a society that has endured years of war and harbours significant mistrust. Over time, these radical changes may transition from a solution to a predicament, potentially undermining the Houthi's dominance as they bear the "seeds of their demise."

* في بقية هذه الورقة يشار لحزب المؤتمر الشعبي العام (جناح صنعاء) باختصار "مؤتمر صنعاء".
[1] السيد عبد الملك الحوثي يكشف موعد بدء التغييرات الجذرية باليمن، (الكوثر) نشر في 21/9/2023م وشوهد في 7/10/2023 على الرابط: https://www.alkawthartv.ir/news/326761 
[2] الحداد، رشيد، الانفراج السياسي يفتح باب الإصلاح في صنعاء: حكومة جديدة لقيادة إعادة الإعمار (الأخبار اللبنانية)، نشر في 30/9/2023 وشوهد في 7/10/2023 على الرابط: https://al-akhbar.com/Yemen/370428 
[3] المحرر السياسي لوكالة سبأ (الحوثية) التغيير الجذري ومرحلة التمهيد له في خطاب قائد الثورة، نشر في 30/8/2023 وشوهد في 7/10/2023 على الرابط: https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3260910.htm
[4] المحرر السياسي لوكالة سبأ، المصدر السابق.
[5] المادة (110) من الدستور الإيراني، واجبات وصلاحيات القائد الصادر عام  1979 (المعدل 1989)
قانون اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران مصوب ۱۳۵۸/۸/۲۴ با اصلاحات ۱۳۶۸/۵/۶ https://tinyurl.com/yvsqw9o5 
[6] (نص+ فيديو) كلمة السيد عبدالملك بدر الدين الحوثي في ذكرى المولد النبوي الشريف 1445 هـ، (أنصار الله)، نشر في 27/9/2023 وشوهد في 7/10/2023 على الرابط https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/630449 
[7] ناصر، محمد: انقلابيو اليمن يشرعنون جبايات جديدة... ويتجاهلون مطالب المعلمين (الشرق الأوسط) نشر في 12/10/2023 وشوهد في 13/10/2023 على الرابط: https://tinyurl.com/yscofhtu 
[8] نص مدونة السلوك الوظيفي 
https://www.saba.ye//storage/files/blog/1667842489_pTyQTA.pdf 
[9] Collier P, Elliott VL, Hegre H, et al. (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.p75 Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[10] لماذا تقاوم جماعة الحوثي السلام وتهرب إلى الحرب؟ (مركز أبعاد للدراسات والبحوث) نشر في 21/7/2023 وشوهد في 14/10/2023 على الرابط: https://abaadstudies.org/news-59963.html 
[11] مسؤول في جماعة الحوثي يعمل في "رئاسة الجمهورية" تحدث لباحث مركز اليمن والخليج في جلسة مقيل يوم 10/10/2023م.
[12] يمكن الاطلاع على كتاب البتول، عبدالفتاح، خيوط الظلام عصر الإمامة الزيدية في اليمن (284-1382هـ)، طبعة 2007 (مركز نشوان الحميري للدراسات والنشر) صنعاء.
[13] اعتقال عبدالعظيم الحوثي بتهمة التأمر مع السعودية، (الحديدة نيوز)، نشر في 3/9/2023، وشوهد في 10/10/2023 على الرابط: https://tinyurl.com/ykcsf9u9 
[14]D. Johnsen, Gregory: From the Mountains, Into the Palace: The Houthis Won the War but Might Lose What Comes Next (AGSIW) 04/01/0023 See: 10/10/2023 Link: https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Johnsen_Houthis_final.pdf
[15] لمعرفة تعقيدات الرواتب يمكن الاطلاع على: تعقيدات ملف الرواتب في اليمن (مركز اليمن والخليج) نشر في 22/9/2023 وشوهد في 13/10/2023 
https://ygcs.center/ar/cat/estimates/article30.html 
[16] (انفراد) صراع الحلفاء المتشاكسين… هل يسقط مؤتمر صنعاء “مهدي المشاط” من رئاسة المجلس الأعلى؟ (يمن مونيتور) نشر في 2/9/2023 وشوهد في 13/10/2023 على الرابط: https://www.yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/96150 
[17] القيري، محمد، رسام: القبائل ستبدأ تنفيذ العزل الاجتماعي على الخونة والعملاء (الثورة نت- الصادر من صنعاء) نشر في  17/3/2016 وشوهد في 10/10/2023 على الرابط http://althawrah.ye/archives/383067
[18] خرازي يؤكد على استمرار دعم إيران للشعب اليمني " تأکید خرازی بر تداوم حمایت ایران از ملت مظلوم یمن" (قدس آنلاين) نشر في 1/10/2023 وشوهد في 13/10/2023 على الرابط: https://tinyurl.com/ypmarfm2