In a landmark move, unprecedented since the outbreak of the Yemeni conflict in 2014, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia played host to a negotiating delegation comprising ten members from the Houthi "Ansar Allah" movement. On September 15, 2023, this visit marked the first officially announced visit by the Houthi representatives to Saudi Arabia. It occurred in the presence of five officials from the Sultanate of Oman, serving as the primary mediator in the Yemeni crisis.

The visit was a response to an invitation extended by the Kingdom on September 14 to Sana'a to build upon the sessions and discussions initiated by the official Saudi delegation in Sana'a. The Saudi delegation, led by the Kingdom's ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al Jaber, conducted these talks between April 8 and April 13, 2023. These diplomatic efforts were part of Saudi Arabia's initiative, launched in March 2021, to negotiate a lasting and comprehensive ceasefire in Yemen and to facilitate a political resolution acceptable to all Yemeni parties involved in the conflict.

The visit's agenda centred on discussions surrounding several pivotal issues, encompassing humanitarian, economic, and political dimensions. The key focal points included:

1-     Resolving Salary Disbursement: Ensuring the regular payment of salaries to public sector employees nationwide.

2-     Reopening Ports and Airports: Facilitating the reopening of ports and airports, along with the availability of airspace for new air destinations, including Jordan and Egypt, at Sanaa Airport.

3-     Oil and Gas Exports: Restarting the export of oil and gas from Yemen and depositing taxes and customs revenues from Hodeidah Port ships into a joint account at the Central Bank of Yemen in Hodeidah, in compliance with the Stockholm Agreement.

4-     Currency Crisis Resolution: Addressing the dual currency crisis between Houthi-controlled areas, which use the old currency, and areas under the Yemeni government's control, which utilise the newly printed money.

5-     Prisoner Release: Working towards the release of all prisoners and detainees.

While the idea of shifting the dialogue between the warring factions in Yemen to Saudi Arabia has been discussed since 2015 and repeatedly suggested throughout the crisis, the Houthi movement consistently rejected it. Their recent response to this call carries numerous connotations and indicators, among the most prominent of which are:

Mutual Recognition: On one hand, the invitation extended by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Oman to the Houthi delegation for tripartite discussions in Riyadh, without the official presence of the internationally recognised Yemeni government, signifies official recognition by regional actors of the Houthi group's role within the Yemeni political landscape. On the other hand, the Houthi acceptance to engage in official discussions and negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the Yemeni crisis, both during the Riyadh discussions and the prior visit of the official Saudi delegation to Sana'a, suggests a willingness to recognise Saudi Arabia as a mediator between internal parties striving to end the war. This also implies a reduced direct role for the Kingdom as a principal party in the conflict.

Shifting the Balance Toward Diplomacy: This visit can be seen as one of the outcomes of the recent agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the primary supporter and financier of the Houthis in Yemen, in March 2023, mediated by China. For Riyadh and Tehran, the war may have proven detrimental to their respective interests within Yemen and their broader regional rivalry. Resolving the crisis diplomatically and aligning with their agendas could be more advantageous, particularly from an economic perspective. On the Houthi side, the recent rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran has likely heightened their concerns about diminishing Iranian support. Consequently, they may feel compelled to make concessions and adopt a more constructive stance in negotiations, seeking common ground that preserves some political and economic gains in the coming phase.

Escalating Public Pressure on the Houthis: In the midst of what the head of the de facto authority appointed by the Houthis, Mahdi Al-Mashat, referred to as a "lurking fifth column,"^[1] the areas under Houthi control have witnessed a notable upswing in popular discontent and counter-protests in recent times. These protests have been fuelled by Houthi leaders' corruption, deteriorating living conditions, rampant security chaos, and demands for regular salary payments without constraints or requirements. The populace also voices concerns about ending gross human rights violations, rampant looting, theft, and unauthorised levies.

These developments have posed a significant challenge to the Houthi group's authority within its areas of influence. It has raised doubts about its capacity to quell these disturbances, particularly as internal conditions deteriorate. The escalating demands for a comprehensive strike, coupled with growing internal disputes at the leadership level, compelled the Houthi movement to embrace Omani mediation. Subsequently, it initiated substantive discussions with Saudi Arabia, marking the first instance of such engagement. These talks aim to formulate a consensus-based resolution to the crisis and explore strategies to address mounting public discontent and restore domestic stability.

Anticipated Challenges

With the significant turn of events in the Saudi-Houthi negotiations, anticipation now pervades a broad spectrum of Yemeni society regarding the country's future in the forthcoming stage. This heightened anticipation is primarily attributed to the protracted nature of the conflict, which has given rise to many challenges that pose hindrances to the successful implementation of negotiations to resolve the crisis and achieve a comprehensive political settlement among all involved parties. Among these prominent challenges, we can identify:

1-     Exclusion of the Legitimate Government: The Houthis' steadfast refusal to negotiate with the internationally recognised government and their insistence on conducting discussions exclusively with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Omani mediator has led to excluding the legitimate government from these negotiations. This exclusion poses a considerable obstacle to the effectiveness of these talks and the realisation of the sought-after positive progress.

Despite the legitimate government and the House of Representatives' welcoming and supportive stance toward the Riyadh talks and their endorsement of an open approach to all initiatives to facilitate comprehensive peace in Yemen, their support is contingent on these negotiations adhering to the "three terms of reference."

These "three terms of reference" encompass the outcomes of the National Conference conducted between March 2013 and January 2014. Among its key provisions is establishing a federal state comprising six regions. The terms include UN Security Council Resolution 2216 and the Gulf Initiative of 2011, which outlined a specific timeline for orchestrating the transfer of power in Yemen. The Houthi group rejects these terms, arguing that the outcomes of the Gulf Initiative are no longer applicable in the current context due to the altered timeframe and circumstances that govern the political landscape ^[2].

2- Apprehensions Regarding Houthi Veto: Despite a mixture of welcome and anticipation, Yemeni sentiments and those harbouring doubts about the feasibility of the Riyadh talks have been influenced by the Houthis' well-established track record of vetoing and undermining previous agreements. There is a prevailing scepticism about the Houthis' genuine intentions to establish a lasting state of peace and to translate this intention into concrete, practical steps. This scepticism is compounded by the Houthis' historical tendency to avoid peaceful settlements.

This scepticism finds ample support in previous instances, notably the Houthis' frustration with efforts to renew the armistice agreement in October 2022, brokered by the United Nations following the Yemeni government's approval of salary disbursements. The Houthi group responded to this situation with military escalation, targeting crude oil export ports in eastern Yemen and launching drone attacks aimed at halting exports. These actions precipitated a financial crisis for the Yemeni government ^[3].

Considering the factors above, there are apprehensions that the Houthis' demand for the complete withdrawal of coalition forces could allow the group to expand its influence into new territories. This expansion would grant them additional leverage and strength to exert pressure on and impose their terms on other right-wing political factions, mainly because the Houthi group stands apart from other political forces and components. It operates as an armed entity with a preference for militarism.

Furthermore, any peaceful resolution of the crisis will necessitate the active participation of all Yemeni parties in government structures and the organisation of elections. However, the Houthis, viewed as an unpopular minority, will likely encounter significant challenges in upcoming political processes or elections. This vulnerability puts them at risk of losing their existing dominance, which raises questions about their genuine commitment to peaceful solutions for crisis resolution.

Consequently, one of the foremost and critical priorities in the forthcoming stage must be the disarmament of the Houthis. This imperative should be prominently featured on the negotiation table before accepting any peace initiative or settlement that leads to the withdrawal of coalition forces from the country.

3- Division Among Yemeni Legitimate Forces: The ongoing division and discord between the Southern Transitional Council, which represents the most prominent and active faction within the Presidential Council and the Executive Government, and the other legitimate forces are expected to pose significant obstacles to any potential political resolution between the Yemeni government and the Houthis. Southern leaders view the Southern question as pivotal and fundamental in resolving the conflict and establishing stability in Yemen. This perspective is underscored by the Southern Transitional Council's commitment to assembling a negotiation delegation for participation in the impending talks with the Houthis as part of the discussions facilitated by Saudi Arabia and Oman.

Consequently, any agreements or understandings that elude the Southern Transitional Council will likely face rejection from all Southern political entities. Such settlements would be perceived as disregarding the southern issue and running counter to the interests of the Transitional Council and its overarching political objectives ^[4].

4- Houthi-Al-Qaeda Coordination: Amid allegations of the Houthi group collaborating and coordinating with the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda in Yemen, including the supply of drones, which have emerged as a prominent, widespread, and hazardous strategic weapon in the region, there are concerns about Al-Qaeda's role in undermining security and stability in the southern governorates not under Houthi authority in Yemen.

This situation is perceived as bolstering the Houthi group's negotiating position, enabling them to pursue more significant gains by considering Al-Qaeda as a bargaining chip. Al-Qaeda's presence is regarded as a genuine threat to the Yemeni state and its neighbouring countries, thereby enhancing the Houthi group's negotiation leverage.

These accusations are rooted in two key factors:

The first factor revolves around Iran, the primary supporter of the Houthi group, which maintains a unique relationship with Al-Qaeda. Iran continues to shelter some of Al-Qaeda's highest-ranking leaders, including an individual likely to be the organisation's emir known as "Saif al-Adl."

The second factor is based on the Yemeni government's prior submission of a report to the UN Security Council that provided evidence of Houthi cooperation with Al-Qaeda. The report included documentation of the Houthi group's release of many Al-Qaeda members and allegations of fabricating operations purportedly carried out against the organisation's members. Furthermore, it highlighted instances of Al-Qaeda vacating certain areas in favour of the Houthis, with the apparent objective of aiding them in circumventing Yemeni army forces ^[5].

5- Salary Disbursement and Dual Currency Challenge: The matter of disbursing salaries emerges as a complex issue and a significant hurdle in the settlement process between the Yemeni government and the Houthis, characterised by several complications:

First, disputes revolve around controlling revenue generated from oil, gas, and other resources and allocating salaries for civilian and military personnel.

Second, there is a fundamental disagreement regarding whether salaries should be based solely on the pre-existing payrolls from 2014 or also encompass individuals aligned with the Houthi group who joined various civilian and military sectors after that date. This includes individuals who replaced employees who either fled to government-controlled areas or refused to work under Houthi authorities without compensation.

Third, the dual currency crisis in Yemen has introduced a new challenge to the equitable distribution of salaries. In areas under the control of the legitimate Yemeni government, there is a notable depreciation in the value of the newly printed currency. In contrast, regions governed by the Houthi group, which still employ the old currency, have managed to maintain a relatively stable currency value ^[6].

In conclusion, the timing of the Riyadh talks, coinciding with occasional Houthi threats of military escalation, renewed hostilities, and targeting of vital Saudi economic infrastructure, suggests that the Houthi delegation's visit to Riyadh is likely a symbolic gesture aimed at containing and alleviating the growing unrest within the areas under the group's control. The Houthi movement faces challenges regarding its popularity and role as a significant and influential force in Yemen on the international stage.

It is worth noting that the success of such settlements hinges on the presence of a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue, bringing all parties involved in the crisis to the negotiating table to explore peaceful solutions to the ongoing conflict. Furthermore, the Houthi side must be willing to abandon the unattainable conditions it consistently presents during negotiations and translate its professed commitment to peace into concrete, actionable steps, especially considering its history of violating agreements and obstructing peace initiatives.

^[١] قيادي حوثي رفيع يحذر المطالبين بصرف المرتبات ويصفهم بـ”الطابور الخامس”، المجهر، 6 سبتمبر، 2023، https://www.almajhar.net/13321.

^[٢]  توفيق الشنواح، وفد حوثي يزور الرياض للتفاوض في شأن وقف الحرب، اندبندنت عربية، 15 سبتمبر، 2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://shorturl.ac/7bqd1.

[٣]  ياسر حميد، زيارة الحوثيين إلى السعودية.. هل تفتح الأفق لتسوية يمنية؟، صحيفة الأيام، 16 سبتمبر، 2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://shorturl.ac/7bqd7

[٤] تقرير.. اتفاق طال انتظاره!، صحيفة عدن الغد، 17 سبتمبر، 2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://shorturl.ac/7bqdf

[٥] عبد الله سلام، تقارب "الحوثيين" و"القاعدة" باليمن.. التفاف إيراني على مسعى السلام الدولي؟، منصة الحل نت الإلكترونية، 28 أغسطس، 2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://shorturl.ac/7bqcz

[٦] طريق اليمن إلى السلام: التحديات مستمرة وسط ذوبان الجليد بين إيران والسعودية، اليمن نت، 12 سبتمبر، 2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://shorturl.ac/7bqdl