Amid significant discrepancies in the narratives, the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on May 7 that an agreement had been reached between the US and the Houthi group. The deal stipulates that Washington would halt its airstrikes against the Houthis in exchange for the group’s commitment to cease targeting US vessels in the Red Sea. This notable development coincided with ongoing US-Iranian negotiations over the nuclear file, during which both sides have been striving to secure what could be perceived as symbolic victories over one another. Given that the Houthis are widely regarded as aligned with Tehran, US President Donald Trump described the agreement as a “Houthi surrender.” However, the Houthis denied the existence of any formal agreement with Washington. In what resembled a declaration of victory, a senior Houthi official asserted that the group had succeeded in “neutralising” the US from the battle against Israel, despite the Omani Foreign Ministry’s statement confirming the agreement was brokered.

In light of the lack of disclosure regarding the details of the agreement, and the apparent exclusion of Israel from its scope, as the Houthis continued to launch drones and missiles toward it, the decoupling of Tel Aviv and Washington in this specific file carries significant geopolitical implications within the context of shifting regional balances. Moreover, the agreement and how it was announced raise fundamental questions about the gains and losses for the involved parties, particularly the Houthis, who suddenly found themselves at the centre of an unexpected settlement that confines the conflict within certain boundaries. This development, however, neither addresses their declared objective of “supporting Gaza” nor prevents them from continuing their missile demonstrations simultaneously.

The Substance of the Agreement and Its Broader Context

There appears to be an apparent inclination toward safeguarding the US interests, in line with the “America First” policy, by securing US navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, without Washington explicitly addressing the broader trajectory of the conflict or the position of its key regional ally within it. The agreement deliberately avoided mentioning Israel, thus leaving the door open for the Houthis to continue their confrontational rhetoric, and even to carry out operations against Israeli targets, without technically breaching the agreement. On the other hand, Washington made no economic or political concessions to the group, neither in terms of lifting their designation as a terrorist organisation nor regarding sanctions, rendering the truce costly in terms of tangible gains for the Houthis, unless the agreement is interpreted within a broader Iranian context.

The announcement of the agreement came at an exceptionally sensitive regional moment, marked by escalating tensions between Israel and Iran, indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran over the Iranian nuclear programme, and Trump-era efforts to advance the Saudi-Israeli normalisation file, issues that currently appear to hold greater priority for Washington than the Yemeni file.

On the other hand, the conflicting statements surrounding the agreement reflect each party’s eagerness to exploit it for its interests, regardless of the underlying facts. President Trump used it as a propaganda tool to portray himself as having successfully imposed his will on a “rogue” terrorist group, at a time of mounting domestic political pressure and growing economic criticism. As for the Houthis, they adopted an ambiguous discourse, on the one hand denying the existence of the agreement, while on the other presenting it as a strategic achievement. This duality exposes the disconnect between their mobilisation rhetoric and their pragmatic calculations. It may even suggest that the group was caught off guard by the announcement, which appeared to be the outcome of negotiations between Washington and Tehran, with Omani cover for the official announcement.

Divergent Calculations

Iran appears to be the primary beneficiary of the agreement, having achieved de-escalation on equal terms while remaining behind the scenes. It successfully shielded one of its key allies from US escalation. It provided some breathing room during an agitated regional and international period, all without making any substantial concessions. Furthermore, Iran maintained the Houthis as a leverage tool for future negotiations. Additionally, Iran sent indirect reassurance messages to Israel, suggesting that the Houthi front may not be a priority at this stage, allowing Tehran to rearrange its priorities and positions accordingly.

In contrast, the Trump administration reaped immediate benefits, avoiding slipping into an open military confrontation in the Red Sea while safeguarding its maritime and strategic interests, without engaging in a costly and uncertain war. Furthermore, the agreement helped ease concerns related to energy prices and inflation, issues of significant sensitivity in the domestic US context. In this context, the agreement appears part of a broader US policy aimed at reducing direct military presence and adopting a “smart containment” approach instead of direct engagement.

As for the Houthis, although they succeeded in neutralising the US strikes, their gains were limited, with most of them being propagandistic. The agreement does not include lifting sanctions or alleviating economic pressures, nor does it reconsider their designation as a terrorist organisation. In this sense, their acceptance of a partial ceasefire with no substantial concessions raises questions about the independence of their decision-making, reinforcing the impression that they are part of a broader Iranian agenda. Domestically, the Houthis face difficulties justifying the agreement to their supporters, especially after escalating their rhetoric against Israel and the US This has led them to adopt a denialist stance, avoiding official recognition of any understanding while attempting to frame it as a US response to a Houthi threat during Trump’s visit to the region.

Israel, for its part, views the agreement with concern, seeing it as part of a broader negotiation track between Washington and Tehran, which could lead to the revival of the nuclear deal, a development it perceives as a strategic threat to its national security. At the same time, Israel was not visibly involved in the recent agreement, as if Washington had left the issue of responding to the Houthis solely to Netanyahu’s government. This represents an unprecedented shift in the positions of both parties.

Saudi Arabia, for its part, despite not being directly involved in the agreement, shares many interests with it. The deal aligns with Riyadh’s new policy of de-escalation and disengagement from conflicts, paving the way for regional arrangements focused on development and stability. However, at the same time, it strengthens the Houthis’ position as a de facto power in Yemen, weakening the standing of the internationally recognised Yemeni government. This, in turn, could complicate the internal negotiation process and prolong the Yemeni crisis.

A Different Assessment of Yemen

The agreement points to more profound strategic shifts in Washington’s approach to Middle Eastern issues, with the strategy moving towards crisis management rather than resolution. It favours temporary stability over long-term solutions. Additionally, it signals a diminishing prominence of Yemen in the priorities of international actors, as the Yemeni crisis is increasingly treated as a sub-issue within larger files: maritime security, Iranian influence, and Arab-Israeli normalisation.

Oman appears to be the silent regional beneficiary of this agreement, having once again succeeded in playing the role of a calm mediator, reinforcing its position as a reliable backchannel in complex conflicts. On the other hand, the agreement demonstrates that the Houthis are managed within the context of broader regional calculations, and that the tools of the Yemeni conflict are now being used to settle issues that have no direct connection to Yemen as a state or its people.

Given the increasing signs of parallel understandings mediated by Oman, the connection between the agreement and the Iranian nuclear file has become more apparent. It seems that Tehran, seeking to alleviate international pressure, has begun to reorder its fronts, including recalibrating the Houthis’ actions to serve its negotiation strategy with Washington.

Conclusion

The Houthis and the US agreement reflect a qualitative shift in managing regional tensions, where partial and interest-based settlements are replacing comprehensive confrontations and major political initiatives. While international and regional actors have succeeded in securing their immediate interests, they have done so at the expense of the Yemenis, who continue to suffer from Houthi terrorism and the absence of a genuine political horizon to end their intractable crisis.

Despite its apparent tactical successes, the agreement consolidates the fragmentation of the Yemeni conflict, weakens the chances for a comprehensive political solution, and affirms that the humanitarian and political issues in Yemen have become hostage to larger regional struggles. Ultimately, any de-escalation that does not stem from a comprehensive vision to address the root causes of the Yemeni crisis remains fragile and transient, temporarily silencing the noise but not extinguishing the flames of conflict.