Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared on December 26, 2023, that since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, his country has been engaged in six out of seven fronts. The identified fronts are Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran. The analysis of Gallant's statements not only reveals the deferred front that Israel has yet to address but also clarifies the Israeli vision of the multifront comprehensive war being waged. This can be outlined as follows:

1. Fronts that Israel operates on alone and without overt assistance from the United States in combat operations, including Gaza, the West Bank, and southern Lebanon.
2. Fronts that Israel collaborates on with the United States due to their transformation into a shared threat. The U.S. maintains military bases in Syria and Iraq, where Iranian-backed groups operate and target these bases amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. These groups interpret their increased attacks on U.S. bases as participation in the Gaza war, following the principle of "unity of the battlefields" adopted by the so-called "Axis of Resistance." Israel is concerned that these Iranian-backed groups in Syria and Iraq could enter the war against it directly at any moment rather than just striking U.S. bases. Hence, Gallant's statement about Israeli engagement or response on these fronts lacks details on the nature of such reactions.
3. Fronts that do not involve direct clashes but rather special operations and intelligence efforts - this pertains to the Iranian front, where Israel has been engaged in a fight without direct combat involvement for over a decade and a half.
4. Deferred fronts - this refers to a single front led by the Houthi group in Yemen.

Israel's perspective on the Houthi front

Israel's perspective on the Houthi front has evolved over time. Since the outbreak of the Yemeni crisis in 2011 and the conflict between the Houthi group and the Yemeni state, Israel has closely followed developments. The interest heightened when Saudi Arabia formed an Arab coalition against the Houthi group, which posed a significant threat to Gulf Cooperation Council states. This was seen as part of Iran's consistent policy of destabilising the region and exporting its revolutionary ideals.

In the 1960s, during the first Yemeni civil war following the overthrow of the monarchy, Zaydi-affiliated royalists had favourable relations with Israel. This alignment was a strategic move in Israel's foreign policy, which sought to establish ties with religious and ethnic minorities in the Arab world to counteract the boycott imposed by Arab states. However, after Israel's significant gains in the 1967 June war, the importance of "Hashemite politics" diminished.

Despite this historical connection, the Houthi group, aligned with Iran, gradually accepted its role as part of Iran's regional influence. This alignment theoretically places them, like other Iranian proxies in the region, such as Hezbollah, armed groups in Syria and Iraq, and the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements, in a position of confrontation with Israel. The Houthi group's acceptance of tasks from Iran in exchange for political, military, and economic support has contributed to this dynamic.

Houthi Attacks as a Card in Israel's Favour:

The Houthi takeover, particularly their control of the Yemeni port of Hodeidah in 2014, has drawn renewed attention from Israel mere months before the onset of the war. Despite the potential threat posed by the Houthi-Iran alliance, Israel initially took minimal action against this, even as the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah played a role in restricting Israeli ships during the current Gaza war.

Several factors explain Israel's delayed response to the Houthi threat in the Red Sea region:

1. The considerable distance of nearly two thousand kilometres between Israel and Yemen made it seem unlikely for Iran to mobilise the Houthis to launch significant missile or drone attacks. Even if such attacks occurred, their impact would likely be limited.
2. Recognising that the Houthi threat to Israeli ships in the Red Sea would also affect all regional shipping, Israel anticipated that this common interest could act as a deterrent, placing constraints on the Houthis concerning all nations with vital Red Sea interests.
3. Observing Saudi Arabia's challenges in its conflict with the Houthis, Israel anticipated that the shared threat could lead to increased willingness on Saudi Arabia's part to normalise relations. This could encourage other Red Sea-bordering Arab states to form a defence alliance to safeguard mutual interests. With its military strength and strategic ties with the United States, Israel would likely assume a leading role in this alliance—an initiative also sought by the U.S. for regional stability under its leadership.

Israel's Perspective on US and Western Policies Regarding the Houthis

When the United States exercised its veto power multiple times to block the UN Security Council from passing a ceasefire resolution between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, Tel Aviv expressed gratitude for Washington's assistance in preventing international condemnation. However, Israel did not reciprocate this gratitude when US Navy forces in the Red Sea intercepted missiles and drones launched by the Houthis toward Israel.

This divergent response in both situations illustrates Israel's perception of Washington's actions toward the Houthi group. Israel views these actions as a natural response by Washington to safeguard its interests in the Middle East. While Israel may benefit from this policy, it does not feel the same level of indebtedness to Washington as it does for using the veto power in the Security Council to shield it from specific condemnation.

This Israeli belief is deduced from analyses published in Israeli newspapers rather than official statements from Israeli officials. The majority of these analyses concentrate on the punitive political and military actions taken by the United States against the Houthis, including their re-designation as a terrorist organisation and airstrikes on their positions in Yemen and boats in the Red Sea. These analyses suggest that the United States has specific reasons related to its policy and interests in the Middle East, including:

1. The U.S. has maintained a firm stance since the outbreak of the war between Israel and Hamas, aiming to prevent the expansion of fighting fronts and the spread of the war in a direction that could lead to a wide-scale regional conflict that would be difficult to control.
2. The primary commercial and economic interests of the United States and its European allies compel them to defend these interests, as seen in previous responses to Iran's attacks on commercial ships and oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf during the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s. They also took similar measures when forming an international coalition to combat piracy by armed Somali groups in the southern entrance to the Red Sea against commercial ships a decade ago.
3. Israel could have perceived the benefit of U.S. military intervention for its security if Washington had directed its military force against Iran, which supports the Houthis with resources. This aligns with the logic behind the policy of "cutting off the head of the octopus" (Iran) rather than its arms, as advocated by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett.
4. The United States did not invite Israel to participate in the so-called "Operation Prosperity Guardian" coalition despite Israeli ships being the sole target of Houthi attacks. Israel did not appear on the list of twelve countries that the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon) announced as participating in the coalition out of the twenty countries it said were participating. Some of these countries chose not to explicitly announce their participation due to concerns about sensitivities affecting their security interests. It appears that Israel is not one of these eight countries that refrained from announcing their involvement in the coalition, despite doubts raised by some international reports about this specific point.

Indeed, the primary Israeli interest lies in avoiding a confrontation with the Houthis. This approach allows Israel to either focus on existing open fronts in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria or to let the United States and certain European countries shoulder the burden alone. Israel hopes that the international community recognises not only the gravity of the Houthis' actions, posing a threat to international navigation in the Red Sea, but, more crucially, the peril of showing leniency toward Iran. From Israel's perspective, Iran is the financial supporter of all "terrorist movements" in the Middle East. Consequently, Israel advocates for a decisive confrontation with Iran to eliminate this threat once and for all.

5. The United States did not extend invitations to countries along the Red Sea despite them being more significantly affected by Houthi attacks than Israel. For instance, Egypt bears a substantial threat from Houthi attacks impacting Red Sea navigation, directly impacting its revenue from ships passing through the Suez Canal. Jordan also faces repercussions, witnessing increased prices of essential goods due to damage to supply chains. Moreover, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a major oil exporter through the Red Sea, has a vested interest in the region's stability. Lastly, Sudan, which signed the Abraham Accords but had to freeze normalisation procedures with Israel due to internal conflicts, has even recently sought to restore relations with Iran. This shift poses a potential threat to the perceived "achievements" of the Abraham Accords for Israel.

Hence, Israel perceives that the policy embraced by the United States and European countries not only safeguards their interests but also assumes the responsibility of confronting the Houthis on behalf of other nations. Given this perspective, Israel questions why it should willingly take on the task of defending the interests of others rather than prioritising its own if it were to engage in a direct confrontation with the Houthis.

In essence, based on this perspective, Israel will refrain from responding to Houthi attacks unless they result in casualties among its citizens or soldiers. The front between Israel and the Houthis will be the sole arena where the Hebrew state avoids direct engagement with Iran's regional proxies. Nevertheless, it is assured that Israeli intelligence, committed to pursuing those responsible for attacks on Israel, will consider Houthi leaders among its targets. Additionally, Israel will collaborate with various regional countries to cut off the sources of their funding and armament in the future.