The Al-Aqsa Flood has starkly revealed the structural weaknesses of the region. On one side, we have rogue states driven by illusions of hegemony and expansion (Israel and Iran).

On the other side, we see fragile states where armed militias have stolen decision-making from institutions and ignited wars, leaving their people to pay the bills of the conflict—economically and even with their lives (Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya).

After a year of conflict that began in Gaza and spread like dominoes across the region, five key lessons can be drawn:

1. In any case, any imbalance in the strategic balance of power in the region threatens Arab interests, regardless of the direction it tilts. Israel's military superiority has shifted its focus from defending the Jewish state to ambitions of "Judaizing" the state, and the consequent, which entails expanding its borders to include Gaza, the West Bank, and southern Lebanon.

Conversely, the previous expansion of Iran’s regional influence has further deepened the fragility of crisis-ridden Arab states. Now, as Iran’s influence wanes and it suffers defeats at the hands of Israel, it hints at targeting stable Arab states.

Tehran has played a vital role in arming the Palestinian Resistance, showing military solidarity with Gaza’s war. However, this solidarity has largely been a show of force with no real impact on changing the course of events.

2. Over the past year, events have demonstrated that the official Arab regime—often criticised by the mouthpieces of the so-called "Resistance Axis"—remains the true guarantor of the Palestinian Cause’s survival, preventing its liquidation:
   • Egypt and Jordan block scenarios of forced displacement.
   • Saudi Arabia uses its international influence to uphold the two-state solution and maintains the Arab Peace Initiative as a condition for normalisation.
   • Qatar hosts resistance leaders and secures their lives, which becomes jeopardized when they move to Tehran, as in the case of martyr Ismail Haniyeh.

Despite this Arab guardianship of the Palestinian cause, it largely goes unnoticed by Arab public opinion, which is swayed by propaganda or explosions. Iran, on the other hand, doesn’t shy away from risking the Palestinian cause, even if it leads to the Palestinian cause's liquidation, its people, and its military across the region, ultimately serving Israeli interests.

3. Armed militias and sectarian groups can never lead a national liberation movement capable of undermining Israel, even if they achieve symbolic tactical victories (Houthi, 2023) or temporary strategic success (Lebanon War, 2006). They consistently remain incapable of building an inclusive national political model and converting their military power into political dividends.

4. Furthermore, while the U.S. presence in the region offers unconditional support to Israel, it also serves as a safeguard for Iran’s national interests by maintaining "rules of engagement." The U.S. administration’s efforts to persuade Netanyahu to respond modestly to Iran’s missile attack are a clear example.

However, the U.S. role remains crucial in restraining both Tel Aviv and Tehran, which is critical to halting the wars on Gaza and Lebanon today. But in the future, it will not be enough to push forward a two-state solution, which is why Saudi Arabia has announced an international alliance to establish a Palestinian state.

5. Lastly, the regional upheaval sparked by the Al-Aqsa Flood has realistically underscored the practical need for Arab unity—not as a political slogan or moral goal but as a geopolitical necessity to play a future role in reshaping the region's power balance.

The time is ripe for the formation of an Arab axis, potentially including Turkey, to achieve a two-state solution, prevent hostile hegemony projects, aid fragile states in overcoming their crises, and foster development and stability.