The Security Council has taken note of credible reports and emerging speculations that point to coordination between the Houthi group and the Somali-based terrorist movement, Al-Shabaab. These reports have shed light on ongoing negotiations where the Houthis are allegedly facilitating the smuggling of advanced weaponry, including drones and surface-to-air missiles, to Al-Shabaab. Additionally, arrangements reportedly involve the transfer of Al-Shabaab fighters to Yemen for training on deploying these weapons. This development signals a marked shift in the strategic calculus of jihadist groups and underscores the growing regional influence of the Houthi network. The group’s expanded communications and operational networks have drawn significant attention, particularly as their activities in the Red Sea align with their overt support for Gaza, amplifying their global visibility.

Common Factors
The Security Council report on Yemen, issued on October 11, 2024, highlighted the deepening relationship between the Houthi group and the Al-Shabaab movement, with notable developments since the start of 2024. This report aligns with findings released by US Intelligence in June 2024, which indicated that the Houthis have been actively working to bolster their influence in Somalia. They have done so by leveraging alliances with local actors, including the Al-Shabaab movement and Somali pirate networks, particularly in the Puntland and Bari regions. (1)

In examining the connection between these groups, it becomes evident that despite their doctrinal and ideological differences, both have opted to set aside sectarian divides. The Houthi group adheres to the Zaydi Shi’a doctrine (Jarudiyya). At the same time, Al-Shabaab is classified as a Salafi jihadist movement committed to the principle of rejecting cooperation with non-Sunni Muslims. Moreover, Al-Shabaab declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012. However, shared interests and aligned strategic objectives have paved the way for a genuine willingness on both sides to strengthen their ties.

Both groups share a pronounced hostility toward the United States and Israel, which serves as a unifying factor. Al-Shabaab openly celebrated the October 07 attack and urged Muslims to rally behind the leaders responsible for striking Israel and its allies. The group capitalised on this event to propagate its ideology as an Islamic movement targeted by the West. Drawing parallels between the plights of Palestinian civilians subjected to Israeli airstrikes and Somali civilians enduring the impact of American airstrikes, Al-Shabaab sought to garner broader sympathy and support. This narrative aligns closely with the Houthis’ stance on the ongoing war in Gaza. Al-Shabaab has taken a more proactive approach by launching direct attacks on Israeli territory, further positioning themselves as key actors in the broader regional dynamics. Meanwhile, they continue to face sustained strikes from American forces as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian.

The Houthi group distinguishes itself from other local factions through its comparatively accommodating stance toward Al-Qaeda, which has facilitated its collaboration with the Al-Shabaab movement. According to a report published by the Daily Telegraph in May 2024, the relationship between the Houthis and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has evolved into military and intelligence cooperation since 2022. The report further revealed that in 2023, the Houthis supplied Al-Qaeda with attack drones. The United Nations corroborated this dynamic, noting that the two groups had reached an internal war cessation agreement and have been coordinating joint operations against the Yemeni government since early 2024. (2)

The territories under Houthi control have become a safe haven for Al-Qaeda leaders. Key governorates such as Sana’a, Ibb, and Dhamar have served as destinations for Al-Qaeda members and their families to access treatment and medical services. Furthermore, the two groups have engaged in multiple prisoner exchange agreements, underscoring their tactical collaboration. This relationship not only enables the Houthis to consolidate control over additional territories in Yemen but also grants them strategic access to the Arabian Sea and the western Indian Ocean. In exchange, Al-Qaeda benefits from an expanded capacity to reclaim influence in southern Yemen, challenging the dominance of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). (3)

Objectives Driving Houthi-Al-Shabaab Cooperation
Despite the intellectual and organisational differences between the two groups, a set of strategic objectives has facilitated collaboration:

The Houthis’ Positioning as a Cross-Border Group:
The Houthis’ intervention in support of Gaza has elevated the group’s regional and global significance. This is underpinned by its growing influence and capacity to threaten maritime security in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, directly challenging the efforts of the US-led coalition. The October 07 war provided the Houthis a platform to redefine their international image. Leveraging a robust network of political alliances, military suppliers, and financial conduits, including strategic ties with Russia and access to Chinese technology for weapon manufacturing, the Houthis have expanded their ambitions beyond Yemen’s borders.

The group’s cooperation with the Somali Al-Shabaab movement aligns with its aspiration to project influence across the Red Sea and extend its geopolitical alliances to the Horn of Africa. The UN Security Council has raised concerns about the Houthis’ operational ambitions, which now transcend their controlled territories and are supported by alliances with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Shabaab.

Maximising Houthi Gains
Between November 2023 and mid-December 2024, the Houthis executed over 100 attacks on commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait. As per Lloyd's List Intelligence, this campaign significantly disrupted maritime traffic, reducing the number of passing ships from approximately 2,068 in November 2023 to 877 in October 2024. This disruption allowed the Houthis to impose a de facto naval blockade on one of the world’s critical trade corridors, in addition to the strategic and political gains achieved by the Houthis as a result of its threat to trade and the passage of ships, generating an estimated $180 million monthly in illicit passage fees paid by shipping agents to ensure safe transit across the Red Sea without being attacked. (4)

Strategic alliances with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Shabaab further amplify the Houthi threat to global shipping chokepoints, enhancing their capacity for maritime aggression. According to the UN Panel of Experts, the Houthis finance their operations through an intricate web of individuals and entities based in Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Yemen. These networks utilise banks, shell companies, money exchanges, and intermediaries to sustain their activities.

Moreover, the Houthis are reportedly exploring options to launch attacks from the Somali coastline in collaboration with Al-Shabaab. Such activities would expand their operational footprint in the Red Sea, heightening risks to maritime trade, escalating shipping costs, and ultimately maximising their financial and strategic gains.

Supporting the Al-Shabaab Movement
The terrorist group Al-Shabaab has faced significant setbacks in recent times. Since August 2022, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has initiated an all-out offensive against the group. By June 2024, Somali security forces successfully reclaimed critical villages in the Lower Juba and Middle Shabelle regions, a pivotal blow to Al-Shabaab, as these villages served as central hubs for orchestrating and coordinating attacks. The group has been unable to gain access to the Indian Ocean since early 2023 when it lost control of key coastal cities in the Galmudug region. Additionally, its military influence has diminished in the Puntland region, particularly in the strategically significant Cal Miskaad Mountains.

Figure illustrating the level of operations and the extent of field gains the Somali security forces made from August 2022 to August 2024.

While clashes between Al-Shabaab and security forces persist, the movement is actively seeking to intensify its ties with external entities, aiming to secure fresh channels of support. These efforts are directed towards obtaining advanced weaponry and acquiring new combat training to preserve its territorial gains. This is especially crucial as the African Union prepares to deploy its latest mission, AUSSOM, to counter-terrorism in the region. Consequently, unexpected cooperation between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis emerged. The Houthis, with their considerable expertise in drone manufacturing and developing surface-to-air missiles, are a valuable partner for Al-Shabaab. These technologies are of immense significance to Al-Shabaab, which believes that aligning with the Houthis will help mitigate the regional gains made by the Somali military over the past two years.

Smuggling Weapons to Al-Shabaab:

Military superiority has become a strategic tool for the Houthis to expand their foreign relations and a key means for generating trade and funding beyond domestic needs. The group has made significant strides in the arms industry, notably establishing a large-scale drone production line in 2018. As a result, the Houthis now command an extensive arsenal, which includes a range of advanced weaponry such as underwater drones, short-range ballistic missiles, mines, and anti-ship missiles. Since October 2023, the group’s tactics have evolved considerably, including integrating drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance while employing one-way explosive drones, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and land-attack missiles.

Al-Shabaab has faced challenges in accessing weapons, but the Houthis have been a key supplier. According to Tim Lenderking, the Special Envoy to Yemen, the Houthis have been providing Al-Shabaab with arms. A report by UN experts also highlights a significant increase in the smuggling of small arms and light weapons between the two groups. Notably, the weapons in question share identical models and serial numbers from the same batches, suggesting illicit transfers between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, a shared supplier, or possibly both.

Al-Shabaab gains access to advanced missiles and drones through their cooperation with the Houthis. There is also evidence indicating that the Houthis sent three engineers to Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia to assist in the manufacturing of advanced weapons and bombs. In June 2024, US intelligence revealed that discussions took place between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab regarding a deal to supply weapons to the Houthis. (5)

The Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (GITOC) confirmed in a 2020 report that some of the weapons obtained by Al-Shabaab from the Yemen and Somalia network come directly from Iranian shipments to Yemen, which were intended for the Houthis. (6)
 

Source: GITOC, 2021.

Diversifying Partnerships:
The Houthis have strategically leveraged the war between Israel and Hamas to reassert their identity as an anti-Western force. This shift has positioned them as a notable ally for regional and international actors who share animosity towards the United States and its European allies. Notably, the relationship between Russia and the Houthis has grown significantly over the course of the year. A Houthi delegation made two separate visits to Russia, where they met with Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian deputy foreign minister overseeing Middle Eastern affairs. In a further escalation of ties, Russia dispatched military personnel to Yemen in July to provide advisory support to the Houthis, as well as arming them. By November, hundreds of Yemeni fighters were observed on the frontlines alongside Russian forces, further highlighting the Houthis’ involvement in facilitating the deployment of Yemeni mercenaries to the war in Ukraine. (7)

By capitalising on the regional status the Houthis have gained through their attacks on Israeli ships and territories, the group seeks to broaden its network of smuggling and financing partners while strengthening its military alliances. In May 2024, the Houthis declared their coordination of military operations with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, further solidifying their alliances with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Quds Force) and Hezbollah. The arrangement to sell weapons to the Al-Shabaab movement serves to provide the Houthis with vital funding, helping to resolve their internal issues and cover the salaries of their supporters. This deal also creates multiple avenues for arms supplies, thereby generating new revenue streams outside of Iran to support both the ongoing war in Yemen and broader objectives.

Finally, the relationship between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis underscores the reality that jihadist and extremist organisations tailor their ideologies to align with their evolving interests and circumstances. While their partnership is still in its early stages, it presents a significant threat to the security dynamics of the Red Sea and East African nations. It could undermine Somali government forces and shift the balance of power in favour of Al-Shabaab. Additionally, the alliance poses a risk to the security of Ethiopia and Kenya while potentially reigniting piracy operations along shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Moreover, this collaboration solidifies the Houthis’ position as a key supplier of weapons to both local and jihadist groups.