The past two years have witnessed a significant increase in the operational activity of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. The organisation’s operations have primarily focused on areas under the control of the legitimate regions in the country's south, particularly the provinces of Abyan and Shabwah. Recently, the organisation has also attempted to resume its qualitative operations through its jihadist cells in the provinces of Aden, Taiz, and Hadhramaut.

This operational activity of Al-Qaeda is part of a broader and more profound transformation the organisation is undergoing in terms of its vision and direction. Under the leadership of Khalid Batarfi, the Emir of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, the organisation has re-prioritised its strategic objectives on two main axes. First, balancing local operations within Yemen with external operations that threaten international interests. Second, the organisation is re-evaluating its alliances and enmities in light of the evolving conflict dynamics and the interests of the jihadist leadership.

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive background for understanding the motivations and circumstances surrounding Al-Qaeda. It seeks to shed light on the factors that have contributed to the profound shift in the organisation's strategic priorities, leading to adjustments in its ideological discourse and operational activities.

This paper will further delineate the current strategy features under Al-Qaeda leader Khalid Batarfi. Notably, the analysis emphasises how this strategy is expected to direct the organisation's operational activities throughout 2024. Furthermore, the paper identifies the names of the new leadership elite at the top of the organisation’s hierarchy who are charged with implementing this strategy.

This study relied on two types of sources: first, published materials from studies, reports, and publications related to the organisation. Second, private sources from within Al-Qaeda or from the Yemeni security forces.

General Background: Al-Qaeda Formation .. Internal and External Controversy

In the late 1990s, after Osama bin Laden had completed building the organisational structure of Al-Qaeda and his reunion with former comrades from the "jihad against communism," he developed his grand strategy for global jihad against the West. At the heart of this strategy lay Yemen, revolving around three key pillars:

First, drawing US forces into the Middle East by targeting vital US interests in the region, such as the bombing of the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden in 2000 and subsequently targeting the US homeland security with historic operations that cannot be ignored, Such as the events of September 11, 2001.

Second, the relocation of al-Qaeda's leadership to Yemen: In 2001, Osama bin Laden was finalising plans for his relocation to Yemen, and he sent a select group of his close associates to pave the way for a haven within Yemen.

Third, waging a long-term war of attrition from Yemen, thus repeating the scenario of the Soviet-Afghan war, but this time targeting the West. However, this plan failed because the US succeeded in besieging him in the mountains of Afghanistan before he could execute his intended move to Yemen's coasts ⁽¹⁾. Nonetheless, the failure of Bin Laden's plan to move personally did not mean that his strategic bet on Yemen had failed, which subsequent developments proved correct.

In 2006, the Yemeni jihadist movement experienced a rebirth after Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Qasim al-Raymi successfully escaped from prison. The Yemeni Branch of al-Qaeda experienced an organisational boom that transformed it into a regional command centre. It began its terrorist activity with remarkable effectiveness and, in a short time, carried out the most dangerous external operations of the jihadist movement (targeting the US embassy in Yemen, the operation of the young Umar Farouk, the operation of the booby-trapped parcels, and the attempted assassination of Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, the former Saudi Minister of Interior) ⁽²⁾.

All of this led the US Intelligence Community (IC) in 2010 to classify the Yemeni Branch of al-Qaeda as the most dangerous jihadist group in the world, meaning that Al-Qaeda in Yemen was even more dangerous than the main command centre of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan ⁽³⁾.

With the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, Al-Qaeda in Yemen experienced what can be called its "golden period" from 2011 to 2016. It transformed from a cross-border jihadist organisation into a sovereign entity controlling vast geographic areas and possessing significant self-generated resources. However, this expansion came at the expense of its international activity. During this period, Al-Qaeda in Yemen carried out only one cross-border operation, the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2014.

However, Al-Qaeda never gave up its jihadist agenda of targeting Western interests. The organisation continued accumulating experience and capabilities, awaiting the opportune moment to resume operations.

Local Decline and External Activity:

In 2017, Al-Qaeda experienced a decline for two primary reasons. Firstly, the organisation suffered a significant setback with the assassination of its founding leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi. As the second most prominent figure in the global jihadist movement after Osama bin Laden, al-Wuhayshi's leadership was pivotal. He was also the primary candidate to succeed Ayman al-Zawahiri as the organisation's leader. His assassination dealt a severe blow to Al-Qaeda and marked the onset of a broader decline for the jihadist movement.

Secondly, the geographical territory controlled by the organisation has significantly diminished, particularly in the southern Yemeni provinces along the coastline. This decline occurred due to escalated military operations conducted by the US and the UAE in collaboration with local allies. Vital cities, notably Aden and Mukalla, along with rural areas in Abyan, Lahij, Hadhramaut, and Shabwah, have been cleared of Al-Qaeda influence ⁽⁴⁾.

Indeed, the irony lies in the fact that despite suffering setbacks in its local strongholds, Al-Qaeda became more determined to resume its foreign operations targeting Western interests. Between 2018 and 2020, the organisation initiated a series of qualitative operations, achieving success in some instances while facing last-minute failures in others. Among the most significant operations during this period were:

1. In December 2019, the Yemeni Branch of al-Qaeda recruited the Saudi citizen Mohammed Al Shamrani to carry out a lone wolf attack against US recruits at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Florida;
2. In May 2020, media reports circulated about the targeting of a British ship off the coast of Hadhramaut. Despite the lack of an official claim of responsibility for the incident, a senior military official in Al-Qaeda in Yemen confirmed that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was behind the operation. The official stated that AQAP aimed to draw more foreign troops into the Mahra and Hadhramaut regions and open a front of attrition against them;
3. Following the Hadhramaut operation, AQAP began preparing a group of trained sleeper cells within the Mahra Governorate to carry out an operation involving more than 15 suicide bombers targeting the Western and Saudi presence in the governorate as well as maritime trade routes. However, government forces, supported by Saudi and US forces, carried out a pre-emptive operation in October 2020 and attacked the hideouts of the jihadist cells, leading to fierce clashes that resulted in the deaths and injuries of dozens on both sides and
4. In December 2020, the same scenario was repeated in the city of Al-Shihr on the coast of Hadhramaut, where security forces managed to arrest an affiliated- AQAP cell that was monitoring international shipping lanes.

Comprehensive Jihadi Transformation

In 2020, the jihadi arena witnessed two significant changes: Firstly, the killing of Qasim al-Raymi marked the end of an era, as he was the last prominent Yemeni leader from the first generation of jihadists trained by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Following his demise, Khalid Batarfi was appointed as the new leader of Al-Qaeda.

Despite Al-Qaeda's loss of its leader, it managed to maintain its unity and capitalised greatly on the conditions of war and the contradictions of the conflict in Yemen. These circumstances afforded the organisation a strategic latitude for manoeuvring and survival.

It continued to plan external operations, albeit with declining effectiveness due to its internal problems, including reduced funding and escalating organisational disputes.

Secondly, the shift of the organisation’s command centre from Afghanistan to Iran with the rise of the Iran-based Egyptian leader, Saif al-Adel, AKA Muhammed Salah al-Din Zaidan, who became the de facto leader of al-Qaeda. During Khalid Batarfi's tenure, Saif al-Adel managed to extend his influence and control over al-Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, where he sent his son to become the main communication channel for transmitting information and instructions. ⁽⁶⁾

Saif al-Adel succeeded in convincing Khalid Batarfi to freeze the internal battles on the Yemeni fronts, particularly against the Houthis, as they were draining the organisation's resources. He also advised him to devote himself to working on targeting Western interests because that would bring the organisation several gains, the most important of which are:

First, this step contributes to the reunification of the organisation in a way that can help it overcome its internal crises. It gives it special momentum among the ranks of the global jihadist movement, thereby restoring its leadership position.

Second, the Western forces and the foreign interests in Yemen now serve as a connecting point between Sunni jihadists, led by al-Qaeda, and Shiite jihadists, led by Iran and its ally in Yemen. ⁽⁷⁾

Additional Incentives Towards Strategic Transformation:

Over the past two years, several subjective factors relating to the jihadist movement emerged, in addition to several objective factors related to the dynamics of the Yemeni conflict in general, fuelled Batarfi’s pursuit of a comprehensive strategic transformation. These incentives can be summarised as follows:

On the jihadist level:

1. It has become clear that Saif al-Adel’s growing influence in al-Qaeda has led to an ideological and strategic change, aligning the organisation more closely with shared objectives with the "Axis of Resistance," spearheaded by Iran.

Presently, a significant number of the organisation's leaders express dissatisfaction with the dominance of Saif al-Adel's affiliated faction, led by Ibrahim al-Banna, the organisation's security official, and "Ibn al-Madani," Saif al-Adel's son who holds a prominent leadership role within the organisation's Yemeni branch, over the decisions of Khalid Batarfi.

This trend towards alignment has accelerated in response to recent regional upheavals triggered by the Israeli military war on Gaza. ⁽⁸⁾

2. Escalating internal crises has become increasingly prominent, notably marked by intensifying leadership disputes among three key factions. These factions include the Egyptian group, spearheaded by Al-Banna and Ibn Al-Madani; the Saudi contingent, represented by Khalid Batarfi and his cohorts; and the Yemeni faction, led by Saad Al-Awlaki. Criticism from the Yemeni faction towards Batarfi is particularly vehement, attributed to his alignment with the Iranian agenda and allegations of financial corruption. Consequently, a considerable number of leaders have distanced themselves and forsaken traditional jihadi endeavours. ⁽⁹⁾

On the Yemeni level:

The pivotal events of 2022, marked by the establishment of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, significantly impacted al-Qaeda's agenda in two key aspects:

1. The organisation strategically considered the forces of former President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Islah Party as potential tactical allies, whose temporary neutralisation could enable al-Qaeda to target the UAE and its allies. Leveraging the armed conflicts in southern Yemen between government forces and the Southern Transitional Council, al-Qaeda successfully reorganised its ranks in deployment areas such as Shabwa and Abyan. However, forming the Presidential Command Council in early 2022 curtailed the organisation's manoeuvrability. The cessation of military conflicts in the south and the withdrawal of anticipated allies from the Yemeni political landscape constrained al-Qaeda's operational flexibility.
2. With the leadership of Yemen's legitimacy concentrated in the hands of two politicians deeply involved in counterterrorism efforts, namely President Rashad Al-Alimi and his deputy Aidarus Al-Zubaidi, al-Qaeda adjusted its approach. The organisation opted to reduce its engagement with the Houthi faction while escalating activities within areas under the legitimate government's control, regardless of affiliation.

The New Strategy and its Leadership Elite

In 2019, Qasim al-Raymi and Saif al-Adel agreed to implement several incremental adjustments to al-Qaeda's strategy aimed at adapting to the evolving Yemeni conflict landscape. Following al-Raymi's demise, Khalid Batarfi remained steadfast in adhering to his predecessor's strategic framework. This approach hinges on two fundamental principles: locally de-escalating conflict with the Houthis and resuming targeted international operations.

Two years into his leadership tenure, Batarfi embarked on an ambitious initiative to overhaul al-Qaeda's jihadist doctrine, transcending mere adaptive adjustments to initiate a comprehensive transformation. Crafting his strategy for 2022-2023, Batarfi anchored it on four foundational pillars: ⁽¹⁰⁾

1. Negotiating a temporary truce with the Houthi group, elevating coordination and cooperation to mitigate hostilities. Consequently, the Houthis ceased their security and military operations against al-Qaeda, reciprocated by the latter. This understanding facilitated the release of detained al-Qaeda members in Sana’a and secured vital logistical support, notably in explosives, bombs, and drone techniques.

2. Resuming military operations in areas under the legitimate government's control, particularly in the governorates of Abyan and Shabwa in southern Yemen. Simultaneously, the ideological discourse underwent realignment, refraining from appeasement towards Yemeni legitimacy and denouncing it as "disbelieving." The UAE and its allies were redefined as the jihadist movement's "existential enemy.”

3. Targeting the interests of Western countries or their allies in Yemen, pursued through various means:

• Kidnapping or assassinating international employees, exemplified by incidents such as the abduction of a UN employee in Abyan and the assassination of a Jordanian employee in Taiz.
• Targeting Saudi and Emirati forces affiliated with the Arab coalition in Yemen, evidenced by attacks with projectiles or drones in Shabwa and the presence of jihadist cells in Aden and Al-Mahra targeting Saudi forces.
• Continued planning to target Western interests at sea directly, facilitated by the formation of a dedicated committee led by Saudi leader Hamad Al-Tamimi, whose demise in a March 2023 airstrike marked a setback.

4. Addressing internal organisational challenges through proactive management, employing a strategy of forward momentum. Batarfi navigated internal dynamics between Egyptian and Yemeni elements to consolidate his leadership position effectively.

The new leadership elite in al-Qaeda:

In early 2023, Khaled Batarfi convened an extraordinary meeting in a remote area between the governorates of Shabwa and Ma’rib, gathering all the organisation's leaders. He reiterated his commitment to advancing a new military strategy and appointed a quartet committee to spearhead its implementation. The committee comprises: ⁽¹¹⁾

1. Abu al-Hayja al-Hadidi: tasked with overseeing military operations in Abyan and Shabwa.

2. Abu Ali al-Disi: responsible for mobilisation efforts and specific internal operations within legitimate territories, particularly Aden and Mukalla.

3. Osama Al-Dayani: tasked with liaising with the Houthis and overseeing the drone programme.

4. Ibn al-Madani, son of Saif al-Adel: entrusted with orchestrating foreign operations targeting Western interests and the Arab coalition. Notably, Saif al-Adel has historically overseen al-Qaeda's external operations, a role now assumed by his son in Yemen, leveraging his father's expertise and experience.

1. عودة إلى الأرشيف: اليمن في عيون أسامة بن لادن، سوث 24، 13-9-2021، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://2u.pw/AJhRMAz
2. https://marebpress.net/articles.php?id=5804
3. Laura Smith-Spark, What is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?, CNN, 14-5-2015, available at; https://2u.pw/KHIvUMt
4. حسام ردمان، حصاد الجهاد اليمني: 2017.. عام إعادة البناء، مركز للدراسات الاستراتيجية، 28-1-2018، متاح على الرابط التالي:https://2u.pw/GoY4TD8
5. حسام ردمان وعاصم الصبري، القيادة من طهران: كيف استطاع سيف العدل التحكم في فرع القاعدة في اليمن؟، مركز صنعاء للدراسات الاستراتيجية، 28-2-2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://2u.pw/Ednv5co
6.  ابن سيف العدل.. مصادر خاصة لأخبار الآن تكشف هوية مسؤول الاتصالات بين باطرفي وطهران، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://2u.pw/29Azv3Y
7. مصدر خاص.
8. عاصم الصبري، حرب غزة: كيف لها أن تفتح باب التحالف بين إيران وفرع تنظيم القاعدة في اليمن، مركز صنعاء للدراسات الاستراتيجية، 12-12-2023، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://2u.pw/w80acyb
9. تم بلورة ملامح استراتجية باطرفي بناء على تحليل سلوك القاعدة، وكذلك بناء على مقابلات مع مصادر خاصة.
10. مقابلة خاصة أجراها الباحث مع مسؤول أمني رفيع، في أكتوبر ٢٠٢٣.
11. مقابلة خاصة أجراها الباحث مع مسؤولان أمنيان في الحكومة الشرعية، في ديسمبر ٢٠٢٣.