The dynamics of political settlement in Yemen diverge significantly from the processes associated with peacebuilding. This distinction arises primarily from the fact that political settlement hinges on the outcomes of the conflict, particularly in terms of the power balance among the conflicting parties.

On the other hand, peacebuilding constitutes a comprehensive and interconnected process aimed at achieving stability. It encompasses various dimensions, including addressing the aftermath of conflict, preventing its resurgence, reconstructing and strengthening state institutions, and facilitating the rehabilitation of communities affected by the conflict to foster peaceful coexistence, among other factors.

Within this context, several critical factors set apart the processes of settlement and peacebuilding. These distinctions can vary depending on the specific stages at which peacebuilding initiatives are initiated. The case of Yemen, which this paper examines as an illustrative model for approaching settlement and peacebuilding, presents a formidable complexity within this context. With its intricate local, regional, and international dimensions and interactions, the Yemeni crisis adds significant layers of intricacy.

Upon examining the available data concerning the Yemeni situation, it becomes evident that the current stage does not qualify as a settlement phase capable of laying the foundation for a subsequent peace-building process. Concurrently, it is exceedingly challenging to envision the possibility of embarking on a peace-building initiative in the absence of a prior settlement.Consequently, the current stage can be best characterised as a phase dedicated to reshaping the political landscape in Yemen. This involves considering the dynamics of power balance, the agendas pursued by local and regional actors, and the influence exerted by international stakeholders. 

Multiple Theoretical Approaches

There are multiple theoretical approaches to settlement and peacebuilding, with varying perspectives among institutions experienced in this field. Notable among these are the following trends:

The first approach, endorsed by the United Nations, emphasises the comprehensive and long-term nature of the peacebuilding process compared to settlement or other political processes. This approach underscores the distinctiveness of peacebuilding in its objectives, aiming to address the root causes of conflicts to prevent their recurrence. It involves the rehabilitation of societies towards peaceful coexistence, involving the active participation of all conflicting parties and those affected by the conflict. Furthermore, it emphasises the empowerment of non-governmental organisations, institutions, and international bodies. In addition, it includes the critical task of rebuilding various state institutions, enabling them to fulfil their functional roles following the cessation of coercive power's influence and control[1].

The second approach is recognised by many non-governmental organisations, which argue that the peacebuilding process need not commence only after a ceasefire and the initiation of settlement procedures. These organisations emphasise their role in conflict zones, including activities such as early warning and response mechanisms, violence prevention, civil and military peacekeeping, military interventions aligned with the principle of responsibility to protect, humanitarian assistance, support for ceasefire agreements, and the establishment of peace zones. Additionally, they provide crucial support for women and children and the rehabilitation of humanitarian and peace-focused groups[2].

The third approach represents a theoretical perspective that some conflict literature highlights, suggesting the presence of an intermediary stage that acts as a bridge between the political settlement process and peacebuilding. This intermediate stage, particularly relevant in intractable conflicts, involves complex dimensions such as identity crises, economic and social dilemmas, external interventions, and multiple forms of warfare within a single conflict, including hybrid and proxy wars. This stage, often called political transition, is pivotal in addressing these complexities before embarking on full-scale peacebuilding efforts[3].  

The fourth approach underscores the significance of preventing the recurrence of conflict, aligning with the objectives outlined by the "Peacebuilding Initiative," which emphasises the necessity of averting the initial eruption of conflict. Nevertheless, it is imperative to implement peacebuilding programs to prevent relapses and a return to conflict. The initiative highlights a concerning statistic, indicating that roughly one-third to half of conflicts experience relapse, with renewed armed violence occurring within approximately five years. To establish a sustainable and enduring peace process, five essential criteria must be met: ensuring security and public order, establishing a robust and enduring political and institutional framework, addressing transitional justice and upholding the rule of law, implementing programs for social rehabilitation and psychological recovery, and laying the social and economic foundations for sustainable peace[4].  

Specific segments of conflict literature draw distinctions among peace-building programs across different eras. For instance, in the post-Cold War period, there was a notable emphasis on liberal peace-building initiatives, predominantly implemented in European societies. However, these programs may not align with the current stage of development and might not be suitable for other societies. The process of peace-building in conflict-affected societies, especially those embroiled in prolonged conflicts, necessitates a nuanced approach. It should take into consideration the unique cultural context and social dynamics, as seen in the case of conflicts in the Middle East. These conflicts present significant challenges when it comes to democratisation and require specialised strategies.

These perspectives also extend to encompass the direct consequences of conflict, such as the proliferation of terrorist organisations, the resolution of displacement and asylum issues, and the cessation of war economies. Additionally, they address the indirect repercussions of conflict, including its impact on natural resources.

Second: Yemen’s Case

Throughout the duration of the Yemeni crisis, there has been a notable absence of a substantial peace process during the primary conflict period. Various initiatives aimed at achieving a political settlement failed to materialise, such as the Geneva and Kuwait initiatives, which remained incomplete, as well as the Stockholm Agreement, which was signed but not effectively implemented. The Houthi movement viewed these initiatives as a means of legitimising itself as a political entity within the crisis. Concurrently, there were initiatives involving the southern factions (Riyadh 1 and 2) that did not come into force. However, from the perspective of the Houthi movement, these initiatives were seen as a means of legitimising their political authority. In the case of the South, represented by the Southern Transitional Council, this occurred in exchange for recognition, even though this was not the original intent of the agreements. Likewise, a similar dynamic is emerging in the south, exemplified by the Hadhrami Council. These developments underscore that the prevailing trend consists of partial initiatives that have not matured. Comprehensive initiatives to resolve the multifaceted local, regional, and international conflicts remain conspicuously absent. Given the fragility of the proposed political settlement options, it becomes exceedingly challenging to envision the possibility of initiating a peace-building process in the country. In fact, it can be argued that the moment when all parties can engage in genuine multilateral settlement processes may be years away, possibly surpassing the duration of the conflict itself.

• Reevaluating the Yemeni Crisis:

In light of the increasing calls from various stakeholders involved in the Yemeni crisis to initiate a political settlement process, particularly capitalising on the relative calm between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, it is imperative to undertake a gradual reevaluation of the crisis. It should be acknowledged as a multifaceted or multilateral crisis rather than confined to a single dimension.

Furthermore, framing the resolution of the crisis solely through the lens of power-sharing oversimplifies the potential political solutions. This approach disregards the existence of alternative projects that challenge the reconfiguration of the political system into a federal structure, notably the secessionist proposal. One of the most challenging aspects is reconstructing a unified military force, as each political faction maintains its own military support base.

In light of the aforementioned considerations, the core dilemma of the Yemeni crisis lies in prioritising rebuilding the national state instead of merely restructuring the political system. In contrast to the vision of a "national state," each political faction espouses its idea, diverging from Yemen's traditional state model established in the 1960s. This vision presents inherent challenges, as the concept of a national state has not fully matured within the Yemeni context.

During that earlier period, pre-state components such as tribal structures remained influential players. Moreover, the legacy of hostility was exacerbated by the six wars between the former regime and the Houthis (2004-2011), compounded by the effects of "coercive integration" in the post-unification era following the conflict of the 1990s.

While there has been significant discussion surrounding China's successful efforts to foster closer ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March-April 2023, leading to talks of a "comprehensive peace process" in Yemen, it remains premature to conclude that the ongoing international, regional, and local initiatives will swiftly result in a well-defined "road map" for a political transition in Yemen, ultimately restoring the situation to its pre-Houthi coup state against the recognised government in Yemen in September 2014.

Several indicators suggest ongoing efforts to expand the ceasefire that had been agreed upon nearly a year prior to the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation. An illustrative example of these efforts is the discussions held by the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al Jaber, during his initial meeting with the Houthis on April 9, 2023. The Houthi militia confirmed that the objective of these talks was to address unresolved issues related to salary transfers and the lifting of the siege on Sana'a airport and ports. Saudi Arabia, on its part, has not made any formal announcements in response to these developments, except for mentioning mediation efforts aimed at ending the Yemeni conflict.

Consequently, it is essential to recognise that the Yemeni settlement process cannot be perceived as a conventional peace process. Instead, it may be better understood as a complex settlement model shaped by the dynamics involving local, regional, and international actors.

Considering the intricacies surrounding the settlement process, it is plausible to envision a pathway towards settlement involving the Houthis and Saudi Arabia as part of a broader set of pathways. These include, among others, a potential settlement between the Houthis and the recognised Yemeni government and, subsequently, a comprehensive settlement encompassing all Yemeni factions, including the Southern Transitional Council. The latter received assurances from Saudi Arabia regarding the inclusion of southern issues in any national dialogue aimed at resolving the Yemeni crisis.

Furthermore, the process of resolving the Yemeni crisis itself is anticipated to require an extended timeframe, given its multifaceted nature and the numerous stages and milestones necessary to develop a comprehensive political transition roadmap.

Several critical aspects of the settlement process must be meticulously addressed, including identifying both the domestic and international stakeholders who will partake in the process and formulating a clear agenda. Subsequently, the mechanisms for implementing these agendas must be determined, a task that adds to the complexity of the overall process.

This complexity stems from various factors, notably the intricate nature of the conflict's underlying issues. These encompass challenges related to identity and the imperative to address the sectarian dimensions of the crisis. Additionally, regionalisation plays a pivotal role within the broader framework, presenting dilemmas regarding centralisation versus the surge in decentralisation—a matter that the National Dialogue had initially attempted to tackle during the first transitional phase following the ousting of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime in February 2011. However, this effort faltered due to the subsequent Houthi coup. Further complicating matters is the question of arms beyond the purview of the state, as well as the feasibility of implementing a reintegration program and restructuring security apparatuses in the future. This task requires comprehensive deliberation among all concerned parties.

In this context, it is essential to highlight several key indicators that will play a significant role in shaping the potential trajectories of Yemen's future:

1. The Emergence of a New Yemen:

It is crucial to acknowledge that every significant transformation in Yemen's history has evolved over extended periods. A notable example is the changes that occurred in the 1960s following the overthrow of the Imamate rule. The republican system did not stabilise until the mid-1970s when the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed power. President Saleh initiated a process of reshaping the country, employing various tools, with tribal influence among the most prominent. It's worth noting that the settlement between the regional powers of that era, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, had already occurred years prior to this transformation. Furthermore, shifts in the international system following the collapse of the Soviet Union played a significant role in the unification project despite its subsequent faltering. Given this historical context, it is reasonable to anticipate that achieving stability in Yemen will be a protracted endeavour, likely spanning years, if not a decade or more. Yemen's historical patterns suggest that the country rarely returns to the exact point from which the cycle of change commenced. Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognise that the present situation differs from historical norms, potentially yielding a distorted version of events in a nation grappling with systematic fragmentation.

B - Restructuring of Local Power Dynamics:

In addition to the aforementioned factors, it is crucial to comprehend the dynamics of local power dynamics within Yemen. For instance, within the context of calm or a comprehensive ceasefire, the Presidential Council has hinted at the possibility of excluding the southern issue from the broader settlement initiative, aiming to incorporate the Southern Transitional Council under the umbrella of the legitimate authority. The Transitional Council swiftly seized this opportunity by refocusing attention on the southern matter, initiating the south-south dialogue. These actions were, in part, a response to the emergence of the Hadhrami faction, which sought to become a significant player in the southern equation while aligning itself with the legitimacy umbrella. However, transforming Hadhramaut into an alternative to the temporary capital, Aden poses significant challenges. Such a move would likely weaken the legitimacy of authority further, potentially reviving discussions about the regionalisation project initially proposed during the national dialogue. It is worth considering that the realignment of local forces in this manner does not necessarily pave the way for establishing a federal political system.

C - Redefining External Influence in Yemen:

In the present moment of regional transformation, which coincides with shifts in the international system, it can be argued that Yemen serves as a testing ground for these transformations within the Middle East.

For the first time, China and the United States find themselves directly involved in a settlement process within the region. On the other side of this equation, we have Saudi Arabia and Iran as key players. Each party's actions are primarily driven by its own interests, with a shared interest in securing influence. Additionally, the geopolitical factor holds significant importance, particularly given the presence of the United States' Central Command in Yemen, which is currently strengthening its military presence. This presence serves as a crucial logistical support point for American forces in the Indo-Pacific region, notably in proximity to China. Conversely, China is strategically investing in the Belt and Road project, which traverses the Gulf and extends to the Yemeni coast, continuing to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. At the regional level, it is important to note that the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement has not yet materialised into a clear advancement of the settlement process in the region, indicating that mutual understandings between these two parties have not yet translated into tangible progress.

• Multiple Challenges in the Settlement Process:

It is conceivable that the anticipated developments in the future of the Yemeni crisis, as mentioned earlier, will manifest in various challenges within any potential settlement. These challenges include:

The Complexity of Mediation Roles: The presence of numerous mediators and their respective roles can be attributed to the diversity of actors and the perspectives of the conflicting parties. This complexity can be elucidated as follows:

UN Mediation: It is crucial to differentiate between the role of the UN envoy and that of a mediator. The UN mission is not typically seen as a mediator between the parties unless specific settlement initiatives have reached an advanced stage. Consequently, it is not the originator of the settlement process but instead appears to function more as a crisis manager, particularly focusing on tactical crisis management. Additionally, the mission's purview extends beyond purely political aspects, significantly emphasising humanitarian concerns. It strives to leverage political initiatives to create opportunities for improving the humanitarian situation, which faces considerable challenges in Yemen due to the ongoing conflict at the local level.

Saudi Mediation: An early challenge emerged regarding Riyadh's potential role as a mediator between the legitimate government and the Houthis. This development occurred against the backdrop of the first visit by a Saudi delegation to Sanaa, marking an event that took place approximately eight years after the commencement of Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015. However, the Houthi movement vehemently opposes this role and perceives Riyadh not as a mediator but as a party to the crisis, rendering it unsuitable to mediate between the two sides, namely the legitimate government and the Houthis. Some leaders within the Houthi movement have also asserted that the initial round of talks with Saudi Arabia failed due to the Kingdom's insistence on heightened demands and its alleged failure to adhere to the ceasefire terms. Furthermore, these leaders have accused the United States of obstructing the settlement process, citing its proposal to incorporate the legitimate government into the settlement equation as a primary point of contention.

Omani Mediation: Oman has effectively persuaded the Houthis to engage in negotiations on multiple occasions. However, it appears that Oman's approach may be inclined toward a tactical settlement. In essence, Oman is intervening in the dimension pertaining to the Houthis' relationship with Riyadh, with the primary aim of encouraging Riyadh's support for a regional-based settlement solution. Nonetheless, Oman's involvement does not extend to a deeper level within the context of the legitimacy-Houthi relationship, even though it may lend support in that direction when deemed necessary.

Iraqi Mediation: Baghdad has expressed its willingness to mediate in the Yemeni crisis, and its proposal primarily revolves around the possibility of addressing the crisis through an economic settlement approach. However, it is important to note that this approach lacks widespread support among local parties, including the legitimate government. During discussions of the Iraqi proposal in July 2023, Foreign Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak emphasised that the three key references constitute the primary basis for any solution. This hint essentially conveyed a rejection of the offer if it is contingent upon changing these references. It is worth mentioning that the Houthi movement has not officially stated its position on the Iraqi proposal. Nevertheless, it is possible that the campaign has not engaged with it, possibly because the proposal includes legitimacy in the equation. This may explain why some Houthi leaders have hinted at a return to the Omani diplomatic path and continued communication with Riyadh. Interestingly, the Houthi militia has adopted an economic settlement approach within its relationship with Riyadh.

The US Role in the Settlement Process: The United States' objectives for resolving the conflict in Yemen are notably centred on reinforcing the position of the legitimate government through a comprehensive settlement that incorporates all parties involved in the Yemeni conflict. However, it remains challenging to categorise the United States as a direct mediator in this crisis. The stances of Iran and the Houthi faction towards the United States underscore the difficulties in the United States playing a direct mediation role. In practical terms, US envoy Timothy Lenderking and officials from Tehran cannot engage in direct meetings with the Houthi leadership in Sanaa due to these diplomatic constraints. Nevertheless, despite not taking on a formal mediation role, the United States has demonstrated a vision to support settlement efforts and peacebuilding in Yemen. Humanitarian organisations operating in Yemen have recognised the United States as a key supporter, particularly in providing aid to Yemenis adversely affected by the ongoing conflict. However, it is important to note that while the United States can facilitate support and humanitarian aid, it may encounter challenges in mobilising all parties directly for a comprehensive settlement process. The U.S. is engaged with Saudi Arabia in joint efforts to end the Yemeni conflict and concurrently supports the recognised government. Additionally, the United States is actively involved in discussions taking place in Oman and lends support to the role of the UN mission in Yemen.

The Chinese Role in the Settlement Process: On March 10 of this year, China achieved a significant breakthrough by mediating between Riyadh and Tehran, ending their rift. Three weeks later, on April 6, 2023, officials from both countries engaged in high-level discussions to explore the benefits of normalising relations. Within this context, the Yemeni file represents the initial litmus test for improved relations between the two parties. Several indicators of rapprochement have surfaced, with one of the most prominent being Saudi Arabia's role in evacuating diplomats and Iranian nationals from Sudan. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and the Houthi faction have conducted meetings in Sanaa and Riyadh. However, China has not yet exhibited any explicit actions or initiatives in the Yemeni crisis that would convey its specific vision for the matter. It remains uncertain whether China will be content with supporting the ongoing Saudi-Iranian rapprochement process, considering its potential to resolve the Yemeni crisis, or whether China intends to directly engage as a mediator between the various parties involved.

3 - Transactional Mindset:

This transactional mindset is prominently evident in the approaches of Yemeni power centres, each of which prioritises their own agendas over a comprehensive settlement plan. Leading the way in this regard is the Houthi movement, which favours a ceasefire predicated on an economic arrangement with Riyadh. Conversely, Riyadh is unwilling to endorse a political agreement that lacks the necessary security arrangements to quell armed escalations in Yemen. While the Houthis perceive this as tantamount to ending hostilities with Riyadh, the absence of security provisions poses a significant challenge. Additionally, establishing a ceasefire framework at the domestic level is crucial, given the economic dimension of such an arrangement. It's worth noting that the phenomenon of transactional deals within political settlements is not a novel concept. The key questions revolve around the nature of these deals and their various dimensions, which must be evaluated within the broader context of the settlement process. In accordance with this perspective, a transactional mindset may be plausible when addressing the regional dimension of the crisis concerning the Houthi movement. However, at the local level among the centres of power, the prevalence of this transactional mindset may not be as pronounced. Instead, the conflict between political agendas, coupled with competition for expansion, dominance, and influence, may take precedence. Consequently, reaching common ground between these parties, even within the framework of a transactional deal, remains challenging, as each party is generally unwilling to make substantial concessions.

4 - The Challenge of Settlement Frameworks:

Currently, the three established frameworks—the Gulf Initiative, the National Dialogue, and Resolution 2216—continue to serve as the foundational pillars to which the legitimate government and its supporters adhere. While these foundations persist in the absence of any concrete settlement initiatives, they may not necessarily align with political realism. The passage of time has not rendered them obsolete due to the evolving dynamics and outcomes of the conflict, nor has it been solely a response to Houthi claims that assert their victory in the war and their ability to dictate terms. Instead, one can consider the structural variables that have influenced the political authority, particularly the Presidential Leadership Council, upon which these frameworks are based. Furthermore, if the regionalization project is taken into account, it may provide an alternative path for the political projects of various parties. However, in practice, the parties that participated in the national dialogue hold differing interim perspectives. If a settlement initiative that includes the Houthi movement were to emerge, it would likely necessitate a new national dialogue to accommodate these shifting dynamics and perspectives effectively.

In summary, Yemen currently lacks the necessary political infrastructure or conditions for a successful political settlement process. In fact, efforts towards peace-building may even prove more challenging and distant from the prospects of a settlement. The Yemeni situation remains susceptible to temporary, partial agreements that fall short of comprehensive political initiatives capable of achieving lasting peace. The complex web of local, regional, and international interactions complicates the development of a settlement initiative that could outline a clear roadmap for resolving the Yemeni crisis. Partial solutions may introduce new dimensions to the power dynamics, potentially leading to escalations in other ongoing crises. Given the multitude of political, security, and humanitarian challenges, Yemen appears trapped in a recurring cycle of crises. The future prospects for resolving the Yemeni crisis seem grim, especially since local indicators suggest that the parties involved have not yet reached a point of military exhaustion. This stage does not appear imminent, as the parties still possess tactical and military capabilities.

Looking ahead, the prospects appear increasingly bleak, with no foreseeable path toward political, economic, and security stability that could serve as a common foundation for all parties involved and restore the credibility of state institutions, from the central bank to the army to the government. Yemen currently operates with multiple governing bodies, regardless of their legitimacy. While there is a recognised government, its authority is severely limited in scope. Moreover, prolonging the Yemeni crisis may become a new dilemma, as it seems to be exacerbated by a policy that seeks to solidify and legitimise the existing status quo.

[1] UN Security Council Presidential Statement , S/PRST/2001/5, February 20, 2001

[2] https://www.beyondintractability.org/contributors/michelle-maiese

[3] https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict-stages

[4] http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index4599.html?pageId=1765