The Red Sea region, notably the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea from the south, holds a pivotal role as the gateway between Asia and Africa. Its unique strategic characteristics have turned it into a theatre of regional and international competition and conflict.
Recognising the immense significance of the Red Sea, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been implementing a multifaceted approach aimed at enhancing its influence and expanding its role in the region for several years. This strategic undertaking is driven by the belief that it will secure Iran's interests, bolster its economic prospects, increase its geopolitical leverage, and exert pressure on both regional and international rivals.
Nevertheless, Iran's strategy in the Red Sea maritime corridor has given rise to a series of growing challenges that present urgent threats to regional security. These complexities necessitate a comprehensive understanding of the dimensions of Iran's strategy, its principal objectives, and the challenges it has brought forth.
Iran's Approach in the Red Sea Region: Key Dimensions
Iran's strategic interest in the Red Sea is deeply rooted in the historical context and its advantageous geopolitical location. The Red Sea serves as a vital juncture connecting Iran to the Arabian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Ocean, and Africa, making it a central point of reference in Iran's overarching strategy towards the Arab region and the African continent. Strengthening its influence in this strategic strait aligns with several key objectives, including bolstering ties with African nations, countering the regional influence of competing states, establishing alternative mechanisms to circumvent Western sanctions and blockades, and acquiring leverage in negotiations with Arab and Western countries. Furthermore, Iran's strategy seeks to advance its economic interests, given the Red Sea's pivotal role in international trade routes.
Within this strategic framework, Iran has adopted a multi-dimensional approach to achieve these goals:
1- Utilizing Proxies: Iran has employed a strategy of relying on proxies within certain countries bordering the Red Sea to enhance its presence in this critical maritime strait and safeguard its interests. A prominent example of this is the Houthi militia in Yemen, whose formation dates back to 1983-1984 with direct Iranian support and oversight.
Iran's focus on Yemen is due to its strategic location as the southern gateway to the Red Sea, affording Iran potential control over the strait. Yemen boasts over ten vital maritime ports and islands, including Sokotra, Great Hanish, Little Hanish, Kamaran, and Mayun. These geographical factors have significantly elevated Yemen's importance within Iran's Red Sea strategy.
It's important to note that while the Houthis are affiliated with the Zaydi sect in Yemen, they have adopted the Twelver Shiite doctrine, which is the prevailing doctrine in Iran. This alignment extends to their extensive religious and political ties. Following the Houthi coup in Yemen and their capture of Sana'a in 2014, Iran openly threw its support behind the Houthis. This support aimed to bolster their military capabilities, armament, and negotiation prowess within the broader Yemeni political landscape.
Nevertheless, the most concerning aspect of Iran's overt backing for the Houthis lies in the potential threat it poses to maritime navigation through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This concern is further compounded by the Houthi's control over significant portions of Yemen's western coastline. Evidence supporting this hypothesis includes Houthi attacks on the U.S. Navy ship "USS Mason" in October 2016, a similar Houthi assault on a Saudi oil tanker in April 2018, and yet another attack on two Saudi oil tankers west of the port of Hodeidah in July 2018."
2- Development of Iran's Maritime Strategy
In recent years, Iran has undertaken significant developments in its maritime strategy as part of its response to evolving regional and international dynamics. Notably, the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its various branches, along with possessing a naval force that is a substantial counterpart to the regular navy, exemplify this shift. The IRGC's involvement in specific tasks related to Iranian actions in the Red Sea has become a prominent feature of Iran's maritime strategy. These tasks include active participation in the "tanker war," the placement of marine mines, and the targeting of both civilian and military vessels.
The IRGC has conducted a series of operations in the Red Sea, underlining the crucial role of its naval force in Iran's strategy for the region. For instance, earlier this year, the IRGC captured a Panamanian-flagged oil tanker using 12 fast attack boats. [1] In July, they seized a commercial ship suspected of involvement in smuggling off the coast of Oman [2].   The IRGC Navy's seizure of two U.S. military ships in September 2022 further underscores its assertive role in the region. [3]
The motivation behind Iran's concerted effort to enhance its maritime strategy, particularly its reliance on fast naval vessels, some of which are configured as suicide attack vessels, likely includes the aim of strengthening Iran's influence and strategic weight in the Red Sea. Additionally, the IRGC's extensive use of naval mines in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb, along with the deployment of ballistic missiles, submarines, and drones, reveals the breadth of its military capabilities.
Numerous operations conducted in the Red Sea have reaffirmed Iran's growing reliance on these weapons systems. For instance, in 2019, the U.S. Central Command disclosed details of an attack on the Japanese oil tanker "Koka Karid Gas," attributing it to an Iranian Limpet mine. [4]  Furthermore, international coalition forces in Yemen have reported the removal of dozens of mines placed by Houthi militias in the Red Sea, underscoring the widespread use of naval mines in the region.
3- Establishment of Military Bases: For years, Iran has been diligently working to secure a permanent military presence along the shores of the Red Sea. This strategic imperative has driven efforts to establish military bases in some countries bordering the Red Sea. Notably, in 2008, Iran entered into a comprehensive security and military agreement with Eritrea, which included provisions for establishing a naval base overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Eritrean port of Assab. Iran went a step further, fortifying this base with dozens of medium- and long-range missile batteries, as well as anti-aircraft and anti-ship missile systems.
Recent developments have hinted at Iran's intentions to expand its military presence in the Red Sea region. In September 2022, the Houthi movement conducted a military parade for its forces at the port of Hodeidah, raising concerns about the potential establishment of a new Iranian military base in the area. [5]  Additionally, similar speculations and reports indicate ongoing discussions between Iranian and Sudanese officials regarding establishing an Iranian base along the Red Sea from Sudan's vantage point.
These dimensions and patterns elucidate the contours of Iran's strategy in the Red Sea and its operational framework. They represent the tools through which Iran seeks to strengthen its influence and extend its network of interests in the Red Sea region. However, these activities also pose a significant threat to maritime security. It is worth noting that Iran often disavows responsibility for incidents targeting ships and cargo passing through the Red Sea. This tactic is reflective of Iran's reluctance to bear the political and legal ramifications of its actions and its penchant for pursuing a strategy of "shadow wars" instead.

Multiple Objectives
Iran's pursuit of a sustained presence and an expanded influence in the Red Sea region, particularly through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is underpinned by several overarching objectives. These objectives transcend conventional narratives that attempt to link Iran's actions to ideological considerations that have historically shaped its foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution. The multifaceted goals driving Iran's approach can be summarised as follows:
1- Adapting to Regional and International Dynamics: In recent years, the international stance towards the Iranian regime has exhibited fluctuating patterns, responding to specific local, regional, and global contexts. These fluctuations range from relative openness in certain periods to the application of maximum pressure in others. Nevertheless, Iran's strategy in the Red Sea region remains strategically consistent and is independent of these fluctuations or political shifts. Iran seizes moments of relative openness to bolster its influence in the Red Sea, reinforcing its regional agenda. Conversely, it views its presence in the Red Sea as an absolute necessity during times of tension, employing it as a tool to counter "maximum pressure" tactics.
2- Reacting to Targeted Actions: Iran's strategy to enhance its influence in the Red Sea, coupled with the targeting of civilian and military vessels from certain international powers, serves a significant goal. It aims to convey potent political messages that underscore its possession of formidable pressure cards impacting international navigation. Iran aims to demonstrate that any country targeting its oil exports in violation of sanctions will incur a substantial cost. For instance, Iran's targeting of the British-flagged oil tanker "Stena Impero" and its crew in 2019 symbolised this approach. While Iran publicly justified the attack on environmental grounds, alleging deviations from the legal course or the need to investigate a collision with an Iranian fishing boat, some Iranian sources acknowledged that the operation was a response to the seizure of the Iranian oil tanker "Grace 1" by Britain in the Strait of Gibraltar. The Iranian vessel was detained on grounds of supplying oil to the Assad regime in violation of international sanctions.
3- Mitigating the Impact of Western Sanctions: The economic factor significantly influences Iran's strategy to enhance its influence in the Red Sea, particularly in the face of Western sanctions and the economic blockade imposed on it. Within this context, the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait offer Iran an avenue to access African markets, yielding strategic benefits. This includes strengthening trade relations between Iran and African nations and bolstering Iran's presence on the African continent, with associated economic and strategic advantages.
4- Weapons Export to Allies: A dimension of Iran's commitment to expanding its presence in the Red Sea relates to its capacity to provide support and assistance to its allies, including militias, armed groups, or even certain ruling regimes. For example, reports have indicated that the Ethiopian government of Abiy Ahmed deployed Iranian-made drones in its conflict with Tigray forces. [6]  In a related context, the "Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)" [7] published a study in November 2021 revealing that Iranian weapons destined for the Houthi rebels are systematically smuggled through the Gulf of Aden to Somalia. The organisation's report, compiled over eight months, documented more than 400 weapons in 13 locations across Somalia, alongside the interception of weapons shipments from 13 boats by military vessels, highlighting Iran's role in supplying weaponry to its regional allies.
In conclusion, it can be affirmed that Iran has diligently pursued a multi-faceted and versatile strategy over the years, with the primary goal of establishing a sustainable presence in the Red Sea, particularly via the Bab el-Mandeb gateway. This presence serves to leverage Iran's strategic and geopolitical interests, in addition to providing economic advantages that enable it to navigate Western sanctions and explore alternative avenues.
However, within the framework of this strategy, Iran has evolved into a significant source of threats to both maritime and regional security, notably due to its increasing inclination towards the 'militarisation' of its engagements within the Red Sea. These developments bear adverse implications extending beyond the realm of maritime navigation, spilling over into the destabilisation of security in several countries.

 
 [1] الحرس الثوري يحتجز ناقلة نفط ترفع علم بنما، الحرة، 2 مايو 2023، متاح على:
https://cutt.us/QRdHU

 [2] البحرية الأمريكية: الحرس الثوري الإيراني احتجز سفينة تجارية في المياه الدولية في الخليج، فرانس 24، 6 يوليو 2023، متاح على:
https://cutt.us/MH4gY

 [3] مرة أخرى.. إيران تحتجز سفينة استكشاف أمريكية مسيرة وتفرج عنها، إيران انترناشيونال، 22 سبتمبر 2022، متاح على:
https://www.iranintl.com/ar/202209021523

[4] البنتاجون يعتمد على فيديو في اتهام إيران بوقوفها وراء الهجوم على ناقلة نفط، فرانس 24، 15 يونيو 2019، متاح على:
https://cutt.us/AaknL

 [5] مصادر يمنية: قاعدة عسكرية للحرس الثوري على البحر الأحمر، جسور، 7 سبتمبر 2022، متاح على:
https://cutt.us/TMeyI

 [6] مركز أبحاث: إثيوبيا تستخدم طائرات مسيرة إيرانية الصنع، الشرق الأوسط، 18 أغسطس 2021، متاح على:
https://cutt.us/l3Xnq    

  [7] شروق صابر، علاقات شائكة ... أهداف ودلالات التعاون بين إيران وحركة الشباب الصومالية، مركز الأهرام للدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية، 1 ديسمبر 2021، متاح على:
https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/17336.aspx