These statements reflect several key implications, particularly regarding the delayed activation of the Houthi “card” during the current escalation. This delay appears consistent with Iran’s prevailing strategy, which may be described as “calibrated and incremental deployment of pressure instruments.” These instruments include a network of aligned armed groups across the region, foremost among them the Houthis. In this context, Iran appears to be deliberately withholding the activation of such proxies to preserve them for use in subsequent phases of the confrontation.

3. Israel’s Attempt to Assassinate the Houthis’ Chief of Staff:
   One of the most prominent manifestations of the Iranian-Israeli escalation with relevance to the Yemeni front surfaced when Hebrew-language media reported that the Israeli Air Force had conducted an assassination operation in Yemen (8). Israel’s public broadcaster cited an official source stating that, if successful, the operation would carry significant strategic implications. Additional reports quoted Israeli officials as confirming that the target of the operation was the Chief of Staff of the Houthi armed forces, Mohammed Abdul Karim al-Ghamari. Notably, the Israeli airstrikes in Yemen coincided with parallel strikes carried out inside Iran.

The significance of this operation rests on several key considerations. First, it marked Israel’s initial direct military action against the Houthis since the onset of the current Iranian-Israeli escalation. Second, it constituted Israel’s first known attempt to assassinate a senior Houthi military figure. Third, the operation appears to have been designed to achieve one of two objectives: either Israel had acquired actionable intelligence regarding the whereabouts of senior Houthi leadership and sought to capitalise on this window of opportunity, or it intended—through the strike—to provoke a retaliatory escalation by the Houthis in concert with Iran, thereby increasing pressure on the United States to intervene more decisively in the ongoing confrontation.

Second: Determinants Shaping the Houthis’ Position

As of the time of writing, the Houthi movement has adopted a largely cautious posture regarding the ongoing escalation between Israel and Iran. This stance is informed by a series of key considerations and underlying determinants, which can be summarised as follows:

1. Iran’s State of Disarray:
   The recent Israeli attack carried a significant element of surprise, with most assessments suggesting that Iran was strategically deceived. This led, most notably, to the assassination of several senior Iranian military commanders. It appears that the Houthi group has not yet received new directives regarding the anticipated escalation—whether in the form of intensifying missile and drone attacks or resuming operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This delay also appears to be linked to the wave of assassinations targeting high-ranking Iranian military figures, particularly those responsible for managing Iran’s external networks and regional proxies. Most notable among them was Major General Hossein Salami, the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
    
2. Iran’s Approach to the Israeli Escalation:
   The Houthis’ restrained stance toward the current escalation cannot be separated from Tehran’s broader strategy in managing the latest Israeli strikes. Available indicators suggest that Iran is relying on three core pillars. First, it is continuing its policy of “strategic patience” combined with a gradual and calibrated escalation designed to minimise the costs of confrontation while avoiding—for the time being—an all-out conflict that would cross established red lines. Second, like other Iranian proxies in the region, the Houthis operate strictly within the boundaries of Iranian directives, which means the group is effectively awaiting updated instructions from Tehran. Third, Iran appears determined to retain specific pressure tools and qualitative assets for use in later stages of the confrontation, indicating a deliberate decision to delay the activation of regional proxies at this phase.
3. Considerations Related to the US Factor:
   The Houthis’ continued caution is closely tied to the American factor on multiple levels. Most notably, the group seems unwilling—for now—to violate the informal agreement reached with the U.S. administration through Omani mediation, particularly through any uncalculated actions in the Red Sea. Furthermore, any renewed Houthi escalation in the Red Sea or direct targeting of American interests would almost certainly prompt a resumption of US strikes—potentially more forceful than previous responses—against Houthi positions.

4. Fear of Intelligence Exposure:
   In light of Israel’s apparent deep intelligence penetration of Iran—demonstrated by the recent Israeli operations and accompanying targeted assassinations—as well as Hezbollah’s experience with similar breaches, the Houthis appear increasingly concerned about the risk of “intelligence exposure” to Israel. Such a scenario would place both senior and mid-level leadership under a serious threat of assassination. These concerns are reflected in the group’s reluctance to engage more actively in the current escalation and have prompted the adoption of heightened precautionary and security measures to protect its leadership.

Overall, the extent of Houthi involvement in the ongoing escalation between Iran and Israel is likely to remain contingent upon several key factors—chief among them the degree of direct US engagement in the conflict and Iran’s capacity to absorb pressure without resorting to the full mobilisation of its regional assets, foremost among which are the Houthis. What remains certain, however, is that should Iran reach a critical threshold of pressure and attrition, it is likely to activate all of its proxies and instruments, perceiving the conflict at that stage as an existential struggle for the survival of the regime in Tehran.