The return of Donald Trump to the White House has marked a decisive shift in U.S. policy toward the Houthis, signalling a departure from the previous administration’s approach to the Iranian-backed group. Washington has moved beyond a strategy of limited deterrence—characterised by selective tactical strikes—toward a broader framework of comprehensive deterrence aimed at systematically degrading the Houthis' military capabilities and leadership structure.

This strategic pivot has manifested in a series of escalating measures: the redesignation of the Houthis as a terrorist organisation, the imposition of tighter sanctions on their leadership, and the expansion of military operations to target critical infrastructure and command centres essential to their operational sustainability.

These moves underscore a recalibration of U.S. objectives in Yemen, raising fundamental questions about Washington's policy's ultimate scope and intent. Is the Trump administration’s goal confined to neutralising the Houthi threat to international shipping lanes and safeguarding U.S. interests in the region? Or does Washington seek a more profound transformation of Yemen’s political and military landscape by systematically weakening the Houthis as a dominant force?

Furthermore, how effectively can the U.S. achieve these strategic objectives through the existing airstrikes and economic sanctions toolkit? Would Washington escalate its involvement further—potentially through direct ground intervention or increased military assistance to Yemeni factions opposed to the Houthis—to decisively alter the balance of power on the ground?

Military Strikes and Target Bank

The US strikes against the Houthis have relied extensively on high-precision weaponry, demonstrating clear intelligence and technological superiority in targeting the group’s critical infrastructure. These operations have employed a combination of cruise missiles, smart bombs, and attack drones, ensuring precise hits while minimising collateral damage.

The strikes covered a broad geographical range, including Sana'a, Hodeidah, Sa'dah, Dhamar, Al-Jawf, Marib, and Al-Bayda. Targets included command and control centres, weapons depots, air defence systems, and logistical hubs supporting Houthi combat operations. In Sana'a, strikes focused on key sites such as the Al-Jarraf neighbourhood, a central Houthi stronghold, while in Hodeidah, attacks targeted weapons and missile depots used to threaten international shipping. In Sa’dah and Dhamar, the focus was on drone and ballistic missile launchers, significantly degrading the group’s ability to strike commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea.

Militarily, these strikes have constrained the Houthis’ ability to launch naval and missile attacks, particularly following the destruction of radar systems and launch platforms, impairing their targeting precision. The targeting of command and communications centres has further disrupted field coordination among Houthi units, diminishing the effectiveness of their military responses. However, the Houthis retain the capacity to manoeuvre and redeploy, with continued logistical and armament support through informal channels enabling them to rebuild. Sustained military pressure remains essential to undermining their influence in the long term.

Houthi Reactions: Between Appeasement and Escalation

The Houthis' responses to U.S. strikes have ranged from military escalation to media statements combining defiance with tactical attempts at de-escalation. On the media front, the group has sought to downplay the impact of the strikes, emphasising its continued ability to target international shipping while insisting that its operations are directed against Israeli, not American, vessels—an apparent effort to avoid further escalation with Washington.

Militarily, the Houthis’ responses have been limited and improvised compared to the scale of the strikes they have endured. They have yet to execute a significant attack demonstrating their deterrence capabilities, instead resorting to attempts to target ships in the Red Sea using drones and ballistic missiles—efforts that U.S. and international forces have swiftly thwarted. Moreover, they have been unable to inflict strategic damage that could shift the confrontation’s dynamics, reflecting their vulnerability to the recent strikes, which have weakened their military and logistical infrastructure.

The Houthis face a dual challenge: maintaining their military prestige among their supporters while avoiding direct confrontation with the United States, which could trigger a more severe escalation. They will likely attempt to rebuild their offensive capabilities through enhanced Iranian support and the adoption of new tactics, such as targeting more sensitive assets, including U.S. bases in the region, or intensifying attritional attacks against the aircraft carrier USS Truman. However, sustained U.S. military pressure may force them to reconsider their options, particularly if they continue to suffer significant losses.

Motives for US Escalation: Multiple Dimensions

Behind this strategic shift lie complex U.S. motives that extend beyond the immediate military dimension.

Domestically, the Trump administration seeks to assert a more aggressive stance against Iranian threats and their regional proxies, marking a clear break from previous administrations accused of leniency toward Tehran.

Economically, Washington recognises the strategic imperative of securing international shipping lanes in the Red Sea, a vital artery for global trade and the U.S. economy. Any disruption to these routes directly threatens global supply chains, potentially driving up shipping costs and consumer prices, with adverse economic repercussions both domestically and internationally.

Regionally, the United States aims to restore confidence among its Gulf allies, particularly following criticism during the Biden administration over Washington’s perceived hesitancy in responding to the Abqaiq oil attacks. The escalation against the Houthis also serves to counter Iranian influence in Yemen—one of Tehran’s last remaining strategic footholds in the region following its declining leverage in Lebanon and Syria amid ongoing Israeli confrontations with Hezbollah and Hamas.

Determinants of the Effectiveness of the US Strategy

Assessing the effectiveness of the current U.S. escalation hinges on several key determinants. The first is the extent to which U.S. intelligence has successfully penetrated the Houthi leadership structure, explicitly targeting key figures within the group's command hierarchy. The Houthis' resilience in the face of previous military campaigns, such as Operations Decisive Storm and Guardian of Prosperity, has been primarily attributed to their robust intelligence security and ability to shield their leadership from external infiltration. Without a significant breakthrough in this area, the distinction between Biden’s and Trump’s escalation policies will remain more quantitative than qualitative, with limited impact on long-term strategic outcomes.

The second determinant concerns the nature and scope of military operations. The conflicts in Gaza and southern Lebanon have underscored a critical lesson: defeating paramilitary organisations requires not only practical intelligence but also a ground intervention component. While airstrikes—no matter how precise—serve as a crucial tactical tool, they are insufficient on their own to secure decisive and lasting results. This presents a fundamental challenge to the U.S. strategy. Washington remains unwilling to commit to direct ground intervention in Yemen due to the high political and human costs such an operation would entail.

The third factor is the political and diplomatic dimension. Weakening the Houthis’ military capabilities requires an integrated political process, including the formation of a broad international coalition providing logistical and military support to anti-Houthi Yemeni forces. Additionally, crafting a clear political vision for Yemen’s future—one that accounts for all Yemeni stakeholders—is essential for ensuring long-term stability. Without such a framework, U.S. strikes may degrade Houthi capabilities temporarily but fail to achieve a lasting transformation of Yemen’s political and military landscape.

In conclusion, The United States remains committed to maintaining military and economic pressure on the Houthis while minimising political and strategic risks. However, experience highlights the Houthis’ ability to absorb airstrikes and reorganise, leveraging rugged terrain, a resilient organisational structure, and regional support networks. Without a broader strategy that integrates military, political, and intelligence efforts, the long-term impact of the U.S. escalation may remain limited.

The success of the American strategy to shift the balance of power will not be possible through airstrikes alone. Instead, it will require a multi-dimensional approach that includes intensifying intelligence operations to sever Iranian supply lines across the Arabian Sea and Oman; forging high-level alliances and coordination among key regional capitals (Washington, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh); strengthening military and political support for the Yemeni anti-Houthi forces led by the Presidential Council; and imposing diplomatic and economic isolation that prevents the Houthis from leveraging international financial and military support channels, whether through Iran or illicit smuggling networks.

Conversely, the Houthis are likely to escalate their retaliatory attacks, potentially targeting U.S. and Western vessels in the Red Sea or launching broader strikes against Washington’s regional allies to pressure the U.S. into reconsidering its strategy. Continued Iranian support—whether through advanced missile and drone technology or unconventional supply routes—could prolong the confrontation, increasing the likelihood of a drawn-out war of attrition unless the strategic calculus shifts dramatically.