As US airstrikes targeting al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen intensify, questions are swirling about the organisation's future, which has long stood as one of the region’s most formidable security threats. Between January and March 2025, al-Qaeda confirmed the deaths of several high-ranking figures, including Abu Ali al-Disi, Abu Saleh al-Dayouli, Abu Yusuf al-Muhammadi, the Saudi Abu Muhammad al-Makki, and Ayoub al-Lahji. This spate of losses has led some analysts to foresee a weakening of the group's influence. Nevertheless, others caution that al-Qaeda may retaliate with more brutal revenge attacks or recalibrate its alliances to make up for its setbacks.

Targets:

On January 21, 2025, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a statement mourning the deaths of senior leader Abu Ali al-Hadrami, known as Abu Ali al-Disi, and Commander Abu Saleh al-Dayouli. The statement hailed them as “heroic martyrs who sacrificed themselves in defence of Islam and support of Muslims.” Laden with religious and impassioned language, the statement drew on Quranic verses and hadiths to reinforce the two figures' status and bolster the morale of the organisation’s followers.

According to private sources, the assassination of al-Disi marks the most significant blow to al-Qaeda leadership since the killing of the organisation's former emir, Qasim al-Raymi. al-Disi was regarded as a pivotal figure, having fought in Iraq and Syria before returning to Yemen, where he assumed senior roles, most notably as the military commander and head of advocacy for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. He had previously been imprisoned under former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Still, he broke out in (2011) alongside (63) other leaders and members of the organisation, allowing him to expand his jihadist activities in a more structured and influential way.

Just days after al-Disi’s obituary, an explosive device detonated in Ma’rib Governorate, targeting the organisation’s prominent military and religious leader, Abu Yusuf al-Muhammadi. The group later confirmed his death in an official statement released on February 09, 2025.

On January 22, al-Qaeda in Yemen announced the deaths of Ayoub al-Lahji and Abu Muhammad al-Makki, who were killed in two separate US airstrikes in Shabwa and Abyan.

Nature of Airstrikes and Target Tracking Mechanisms

According to available information, the airstrikes focused on:

• The movements of the organisation’s elements, tracking their activities and the smuggling routes they use;
• Influential field leaders, as all the targets appeared to have mobile phones or digital IDs on the “Telegram” application, suggesting that the strikes may have been executed through digital signal tracking; and
• Gathering points and sensitive sites, with heightened air surveillance over the organisation’s strongholds in Abyan and Shabwa.

In response, the organisation’s leadership imposed strict security measures, including the confiscation of mobile phones from field personnel and setting up dedicated security sites in areas under their control. These steps aimed to cut down the risk of electronic tracking or detection through aerial reconnaissance.

Resurgence of Military Escalation and Targeting of the Organisation’s Leaders

Early 2025 witnessed a sharp uptick in airstrikes targeting al-Qaeda elements in Yemen, signaling a renewed surge in military operations against the organisation, primarily by American drones. These strikes were a direct response to the organisation’s heightened activities, particularly in Abyan and Shabwa governorates, where al-Qaeda intensified its drone attacks against UAE-aligned forces.

Information suggests that local forces called for air support to counter al-Qaeda, prompting a direct response from the US Air Force.

This military escalation coincided with internal changes within the organisation. Initially, the appointment of Sa'ad al-Awlaki as the group’s leader was expected to curb its operations, yet the opposite transpired. Attacks against local forces surged, compelling the latter to embrace a more aggressive strategy, including intensifying airstrikes and precisely targeting the organisation’s leaders.

Security Challenges Facing the Organisation after the Strikes

According to sources within the organisation, the recent airstrikes have severely curtailed the movement of its members and forced a shift in fieldwork strategies. Measures include reducing public gatherings and bolstering internal security to mitigate risks of tracking and espionage. Preventive steps have also been implemented, such as banning mobile phones and seizing them from field operatives, particularly in Abyan and Shabwa, to minimise the risk of electronic tracking through phone signals or digital accounts.

The most critical setback to the organisation was targeting Abu Ali al-Disi, the architect of its military campaigns, who had an in-depth knowledge of its operational plans and movements. His death triggered significant confusion within the organisation, leading to a decline in the coherence of its military operations and spreading fear among field operatives about potential further targeting.

Al-Qaeda’s Response: Escalation or Repositioning?

In light of these developments, the organisation is expected to pursue retaliatory operations against Yemeni or coalition forces in response to the killing of its prominent leaders. Sources close to the organisation suggest that it may escalate its attacks, whether through bombings or drone strikes, to demonstrate its resilience and ability to strike back.

The organisation is also likely to restructure its leadership, with al-Awlaki potentially promoting more audacious figures, such as Abu al-Haija al-Hadidi. Known for his boldness in executing surprise operations, al-Hadidi could spearhead costly but aggressive actions that align with the organisation's retaliatory escalation strategy in such circumstances.

Conclusion: Are We Facing a New Phase of Conflict?

The recent airstrikes have placed al-Qaeda on the defensive, forcing it to prioritise survival and security over large-scale attacks. However, it is unlikely to cease its military operations altogether. Instead, the organisation may escalate its activities to project strength, particularly as military support continues in its favour.

The evolving situation presents a race between the organisation's attempts to escalate its operations and the sustained air campaign to dismantle its leadership and infrastructure. Should the strikes maintain their intensity, a significant shift in al-Qaeda’s strategies could unfold, both in its geographical positioning and combat tactics, which would inevitably influence the future trajectory of the conflict with the organisat