The pro-Tehran Houthi group in Yemen has emerged as a focal point of intense international scrutiny, given its escalating threat to global navigation. This situation warrants an in-depth examination of the sources and mechanisms of its armament despite the constraints imposed by the UN arms embargo.

This paper seeks to track the most significant developments in arms smuggling operations targeting the Houthi militias in Yemen and interpret their broader implications within the volatile regional context.

Weaponising the Houthis

The deteriorating situation of Iranian arms across the Middle East, exacerbated by the Gaza war, has led areas under Houthi control to become a strategic conduit for Iran’s weapons shipments. Tehran appears intent on bolstering the Houthis’ internal power dynamics in Yemen while reinforcing their destabilising external activities. Despite the relative calm ushered in by the UN-brokered truce in April 2022, which has unofficially persisted, the Houthi militias have consistently stockpiled weapons and maintained offensive operations. Over the past fourteen months, these efforts have intensified, with the group claiming to mobilise forces in support of Gaza.

While Riyadh has adopted a strategy focused on reducing regional tensions—seeking to resolve outstanding disputes through direct dialogue aimed at establishing a regional safety net—(1)Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has continued to funnel arms to the Houthis. Notably, this has persisted even after the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation facilitated by China on March 10, 2023.

A recent report issued by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, titled “Seized at Sea: Iranian Weapons Smuggled to Houthis,” sheds light on this ongoing issue. The report meticulously documents Tehran’s provision of weaponry to the Houthis, underscoring the striking similarities between Iranian-made arms and components intercepted en route to Yemen on January 11 and 28, 2024. Among the seized items were various missile components that align with known Iranian designs. Furthermore, the United States and its allies have intercepted at least 20 Iranian vessels attempting to smuggle arms to the Houthis. These shipments included drones and an array of missile components. (2)

 This activity violates the arms embargoes mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015) and reinforced by Resolution 2624 (2022) under Chapter VII. The latter explicitly designates the Houthis as a “terrorist group” and imposes stringent restrictions on arms transfers. (3)

According to UN experts, the Houthis lack the capacity to independently produce advanced weapons systems, such as ballistic missiles and drones, without substantial external support. The complexity of these systems underscores the critical role played by external actors in enhancing the Houthis’ military capabilities. (4)

UN experts, in their comprehensive 537-page report submitted to the Security Council, have characterised the scale and scope of the Houthis’ acquisition of military equipment and technology as unprecedented. The report highlights the Houthis’ transformation from a localised armed faction with constrained capabilities into a formidable military force. This evolution has been facilitated by arms smuggling operations and training programs orchestrated by the IRGC’s Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iraqi technicians.

Arms Smuggling Routes

Under the direction of the Quds Force, Iran employs a multi-pronged approach to smuggle weapons into Yemen. Alongside direct shipments from Iranian territory to the Houthis via circuitous routes, the Organized Crime and Money Laundering Tracking Platform in Yemen has documented the involvement of third-party intermediaries. These intermediaries act as smuggling platforms, intentionally obscuring Tehran’s direct links to the illicit shipments.

Smuggling Routes from Iran to Yemen

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards leverage diverse methods and sophisticated techniques to facilitate arms transfers from Iran to Yemen. Two primary departure points serve as hubs for these operations: Bandar Abbas Port on the southern Arabian Gulf and Jask Port in the Sea of Oman. Notably, shipments are frequently handed off approximately 20 miles from Iran’s Larak Island, strategically situated within the Strait of Hormuz. At this critical juncture, Yemeni operatives affiliated with the Houthis take possession of the cargo, which typically comprises tons of weapons and ammunition components. The smuggling operations generally follow one of three main routes:

The Al-Mahrah Waters Route: Shipments are transported through the waters off Al-Mahrah Governorate in eastern Yemen. At sea near the Somali coastal region of Zeila, the cargo is transferred to smaller boats for further transport.

The Al Hallaniyyat Island Route: In this path, shipments are delivered near Oman’s Al Hallaniyyat Island before being redirected to smaller vessels.

Direct Deliveries to Al-Mahrah: Occasionally, smaller shipments bypass intermediary stops and are delivered directly to Al-Mahrah’s coast.

Once the shipments reach Al-Mahrah, professional smuggling networks handle overland transportation to Houthi-controlled areas, ensuring seamless delivery to the militias.

Smuggling Routes through Third-Party Intermediate Destinations

To circumvent international and local tracking mechanisms, arms shipments are routed through intermediary countries bordering the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. These countries serve as critical transit points where smugglers receive, assemble, and prepare the shipments for delivery to the port of Hodeidah, which remains under Houthi control.

In Djibouti, smuggled arms shipments are often brought in under the cover of fictitious companies. Upon arrival at the port, containers are unloaded in coordination with local smugglers who manage the transfer and subsequent shipping to the Yemeni coast.

On some occasions, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards dispatch weapons to East or South Asian countries before rerouting them to Yemen. This approach exploits the lack of stringent scrutiny on goods from these regions, allowing shipments to pass through Yemeni ports without raising suspicion.

Within each of these transit countries, networks of operatives affiliated with the Houthis facilitate the movement of arms. In Eritrea, for instance, Yemeni fishermen stationed on Eritrean islands ostensibly engage in fishing but are covertly involved in smuggling operations. They manage the transport of weapons both to and from these islands, effectively bridging the gap between Iranian shipments and Houthi-controlled areas.

Once shipments approach the Yemeni coast, Houthi-aligned elements within the naval forces and coast guard play a pivotal role in ensuring their safe passage. These operatives meticulously chart secure maritime routes, allowing smugglers to sail undetected from the Eritrean islands to the port of Hodeidah.

Houthi Movements in Hodeidah and Their Connection to Arms Smuggling Routes

Faced with mounting pressure and recognizing their precarious position in Hodeidah Governorate, the Houthi militias have intensified their efforts to entrench their forces in the region. This strategic move underscores the critical importance of maintaining control over Hodeidah and the West Coast, which serve as lifelines for smuggling Iranian weapons and sustaining the group's broader military objectives.

Hodeidah’s port functions as the Houthis’ primary gateway to the outside world, making it indispensable to their operations. Fully aware of this, the militias have escalated fortification measures, including the widespread planting of minefields, particularly in response to growing speculation about a potential military campaign targeting their stronghold.

The Houthis face a hostile environment on the West Coast, where the local population remains largely opposed to their presence. To counter this resistance, the group has established new military positions in southern Hodeidah. This expansion has been accompanied by widespread displacement, as the militias forcibly evict residents, seizing homes and agricultural lands and leaving large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in their wake.

The Houthis’ intensified militarisation must be viewed within the broader regional context, where Tehran’s allies face unprecedented setbacks. Hezbollah has suffered significant losses in Lebanon, with key strongholds destroyed, while Iran-aligned militias in Syria have seen years of influence dismantled in a matter of days. Against this backdrop, the Houthis, under Iranian supervision, are doubling down on consolidating their presence on the West Coast. This calculated strategy is driven by fears of an imminent military offensive to cut off their coastal supply routes. Should such an operation succeed, the Houthis would be confined to inland areas, severely undermining their ability to receive arms shipments and external support from Tehran.

In conclusion, Iran continues to channel advanced weaponry to the Houthi group in Yemen, driven by its strategic calculation to bolster the group as a pivotal military proxy in the southern Red Sea. This region holds immense strategic significance within Tehran's foreign policy agenda, particularly as Iran increasingly shifts its focus to the Houthis in the wake of setbacks to its other proxies in Lebanon and Syria.

This ongoing support underscores a pattern of calculated pragmatism rather than a genuine commitment to diplomatic resolutions or political initiatives. Tehran’s actions appear aimed at gaining time and adapting to the current geopolitical dynamics rather than signalling any fundamental shift in the ideology or operational trajectory of the Houthi militias. Consequently, these realities necessitate implementing more robust measures to constrain the group's capabilities and hold its leadership accountable, as mere reliance on diplomatic engagement may prove insufficient to address the destabilising threat they pose.

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(١)  حسن المصطفى، مسعى لفهم مسار العلاقات السعودية ــ الإيرانية!، الشرق الأوسط، 14 نوفمبر 2024، على الرابط:

https://aawsat.news/b4dk7

  (٢) DIA Report Showcases Iranian Origin of Houthi Weapons Interdicted at Sea, US embassy in Yemen, July 14, 2024, Available on:

https://ye.usembassy.gov/dia-report-showcases-iranian-origin-of-houthi-weapons-interdicted-at-sea/

  (٣) مجلس الأمن يتبنى قرارا يخضع جماعة الحوثيين ككيان لحظر السلاح، موقع الأمم المتحدة، 28 فبراير 2022، على الرابط:

https://news.un.org/ar/story/2022/02/1095132

  (٤) EDITH M. LEDERER, Iran’s help has transformed Yemen’s Houthi rebels into a potent military force, UN experts say, associated press, November 3, 2024, Available at:

https://apnews.com/article/houthis-yemen-united-nations-sanctions-2368b285b8872d08008998cbb8453a2a