



مركز اليمن والخليج للدراسات
YEMEN & GULF CENTER FOR STUDIES

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Developments in the Yemeni scene

Prepared by the Yemen & Gulf Centre for Studies



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Yemen report

The Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, through its monthly specialized publication «Yemeni Scene Developments,» addresses the most significant political, security, and economic developments in the Yemeni file over the month, as well as the external interactions with them. This publication is part of the centre's research activities, offering deeper approaches to engage with the Yemeni file. It provides policymakers, researchers, and journalists involved with the Yemeni file with a comprehensive and intensive resource that can be utilised to keep up with developments and guide policymaking processes, alongside other research publications produced by the centre.

The monthly report of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center focuses on a combination of monitoring and analysis approaches when dealing with the developments in the Yemeni scene over the month. It highlights the key political, security, economic, and external developments that have occurred in the Yemeni file during the month, then analyses these developments within their temporal contexts and interactions. Prominent developments may be covered in more depth through the centre's other research outputs, including analyses, reports, and situational assessments.

Executive Summary

In June 2025, Yemen witnessed a series of diverse and multifaceted developments that clearly reflected the current trajectory of the Yemeni crisis. Politically, there was significant momentum, particularly with the official commencement of the new Yemeni Prime Minister, Salem bin Breik, in his duties from the temporary capital, Aden, following his return from Riyadh. Additionally, there was a relative shift in some of the unresolved issues in Yemen, alongside the ongoing political polarisation between the legitimacy camp and the Houthis.

On the security front, there was a significant escalation, particularly regarding the Houthi-Israeli confrontation, with Israel shifting to relying on naval forces in its attacks against the militia, as well as signs of a minor intelligence breach within the organisation.

Economically, Yemen's socio-economic conditions continued to decline, with numerous additional negative indicators emerging. This came in light of the continued lack of solutions or breakthroughs for the political crises that have persisted for years, further exacerbated by Yemen's vulnerability to regional instability.


Externally, Yemen saw several key developments, particularly regarding Washington's strategy of «maximum pressure» against the Houthis, as well as ongoing debates concerning China's relations with the Houthis. Additionally, the crises related to illegal immigration to Yemen continued to escalate.

The main trends observed in the Yemeni political scene in June 2025 can be summarised as follows:

Relative progress in addressing some unresolved issues: 1

In early June 2025, for the first time in years, vehicles began to traverse the Al-Dhalea road, which connects Sana'a to the southern city of Aden. This development was part of an agreement between the conflicting parties to open vital corridors. The agreement came between the Houthis and the Southern Transitional Council, the main partner of the internationally recognised Yemeni government, to open key passages that had been closed for nearly a decade.

The significance of this step is tied to a set of key factors and considerations, particularly as the opening of the vital Al-Dhalea road is an essential step in alleviating the suffering of civilians. It greatly facilitates travel through Aden airport after the closure of Sana'a airport, which



has been out of service. It also enables the movement of commercial goods, particularly in cases of urgency or unforeseen events that necessitate the redirection of maritime traffic and commercial shipping from the Port of Hudaydah to the Port of Aden.

In the context of other files that have seen some relative movement, on June 2025 ,8, Houthi leader Abdul Qader al-Murtada, responsible for the prisoners' file, called on the legitimate government, in celebration of Eid al-Adha, to «carry out a full exchange of all prisoners from all parties, both Yemeni and non-Yemeni, without exception.» According to the Houthi leader's claims, his group is ready for a comprehensive deal «as soon as possible.»

Despite these Houthi statements, several considerations present significant challenges to resolving this issue. First, the group's behaviour in previous rounds of negotiations suggests that the Houthis may return to using this file for political manoeuvring. Second, there is an assumption that the Houthis may not be serious, as these shifts in position may be a tactical manoeuvre in response to the pressures the group is facing. Third, the legitimate Yemeni government had previously conditioned the resolution of the issue of forcibly disappeared persons before finalising the prisoners' file.



2 Continued Exaggeration of Houthi Capabilities:

In June 2025, the Houthi militia continued to promote narratives aimed primarily at self-aggrandisement. This was evident in statements by Houthi Supreme Political Council leader, Mahdi al-Mashat, in early June 2025, where he claimed that his group's forces would be able to handle Israeli hostile aircraft without any impact on air and maritime navigation. In reassuring the group's followers, the Houthi leader spoke of «good news» soon to come regarding the Israeli aircraft used in strikes.

These statements and the Houthis' narrative convey several key messages and implications. First, the group, amid the recent strikes it has faced, seeks to convey its ability to adapt to these attacks and remain unaffected by them, to maintain the morale of its supporters. Second, the group adheres to a fundamental principle it continuously seeks to promote, which is that its actions, which it refers to as «struggle,» are not limited to local concerns, in line with the persistent Houthi slogan: «God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse upon the Jews, Victory for Islam.»

In a more realistic context, reports on June 2025 ,7, indicated that the Houthis forced dozens of prisoners in Al-Hajja Governorate to participate in military parades and field demonstrations, as part of concluding the so-called summer activities for the current year. These activities also served as preparation for their inclusion in the so-called «Battalions of the Debtors.» Reliable sources in Hajja (northwestern Yemen) reported that the group subjected around 120 detainees at the «Criminal Investigations» prison in the governorate centre, and other districts, to intensive military training and ideological lessons for 30 days. This development reflects the Houthis' attempt to bolster their human resources and represents a move in anticipation of any potential local escalation.



Ongoing Houthi Escalation Against Israel: 3



In addition to the previously mentioned statements regarding the Houthi response to Israeli attacks, on June 2025 ,11, the Houthi group called on all foreign companies investing in Israel and operating in Yemen to take their warning seriously and leave immediately, as the

environment was deemed unsafe, according to a statement issued by the Houthis a few days prior. The group, through its Supreme Political Council leader, Mahdi al-Mashat, warned against continuing operations in the Israeli-occupied state, stating that companies would face significant risks if they ignored the warning. It further emphasised that these companies would bear the consequences of their persistence and take responsibility for any losses incurred.

These statements and Houthi positions reflect the group's continued alignment with what is referred to as the «unity of the fronts,» aiming to exploit this engagement in the escalation against Israel pragmatically. This strategy is intended to bolster domestic and Arab public support, given the centrality of the Palestinian cause and the widespread anger toward Israel. Moreover, it serves the Houthis' objective of strengthening their negotiating position within the broader Yemeni equation by leveraging this escalation.



4 Solidarity with Iran Against Israeli Attacks:

Late on June 14, Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi expressed support for Iran in the face of Israeli attacks, stating that his group fully supports Iran's response and is «partnered with Iran in the stance to the fullest extent possible.» He regarded the Israeli aggression against the Islamic Republic as part of a Western plot, viewing Iran as an independent model that supports the Palestinian cause. Al-Houthi described the Israeli aggression on Iran as «blatant, crude, and brazen, with no regard for any considerations,» labelling it an «unjust and criminal attack that targeted Iranian military leaders, nuclear scientists, and the Iranian people.»

In a related development, on June 2025 ,21, the Houthis threatened to target American ships and warships in the Red Sea if the United States launched an attack in support of Israel against Iran. A statement by Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree declared that «if the U.S. administration gets involved in an attack on Iran alongside the Israeli enemy, their ships and warships in the Red Sea will be targeted.» The statement also emphasised Yemen's «fundamental and consistent stance in rejecting the Zionist aggression against our brothers in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and any Arab or Islamic country subjected to Zionist attacks.»



Generally, the Houthi response to the recent Israeli-Iranian escalation can be characterised by several key features. First, the solidarity with Iran has been more politically and media-driven than active involvement in operations against Israel. Second, the Houthis' expression of solidarity with Iran came



Rallying the Legitimacy Camp Against the Houthis: 5

The Yemeni legitimacy camp has sought to rally both local and international efforts against the Houthis militia, based on a central assumption that many regional and international parties have come to the conclusion that the group now represents a threat to regional security as a whole, not just to Yemen.

This drive from the legitimacy camp manifested in a series of key indicators. First, on June 2025 ,23, Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council President Rashad al-Alimi emphasised the need to unify the national front and «eliminate differences» between political factions to address the mounting challenges. Second, on June 2025 ,26, the internationally recognised Yemeni government issued warnings regarding Iran's efforts to localise parts of its military industries, particularly the manufacturing and development of missiles and drones, in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, specifically in Saada, Hajja, and the outskirts of Sana'a. Third, on June 2025 ,30, the Yemeni leadership called on the international community to take firmer stances against the rising threat posed by the Iran-backed Houthis, stressing that the resumption of any political process hinges on the elimination of this threat and the stabilisation of the country's economic and living conditions.

Continued Human Rights Violations by the Houthi Militia: 6

June 2025 saw indicators of escalating human rights violations committed by the Houthi militia, which were manifested in a series of key incidents. The first occurred on June 2025 ,3, when a Yemeni human rights report revealed over 15,400 human rights violations committed by the Houthis in Dhamar Governorate throughout eight and a half years. The Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms issued a report documenting 15,413 violations in Dhamar from January 2018 to the end of May 2025, including killings, injuries, abductions, forced disappearances, torture, and the bombing of homes and buildings.

The second indicator was on June 2025 ,25, when judges under Houthi control in Yemen complained about the seizure of their lands in the Asr area of the Ma'in district, west of the capital Sana'a. This coincided with the group's ongoing control over the remaining mountainous regions surrounding the city, specifically to the west, intending to use them for military purposes.

The third development occurred on June 2025 ,26, when the Houthis launched a wave of arrests, targeting dozens of Yemenis in Ibb Governorate, located 193 kilometres south of Sana'a. The arrests focused on members of the «General People's Congress» and «Yemeni Islah Party,» social media activists, and community figures believed to be linked to the group's fears of a popular uprising in the governorate, which had become a centre of opposition to their rule.



The key security trends in Yemen during June 2025 can be summarised as follows:

1 Ongoing Houthi Operations Against Israel:



June 2025 saw a continuation of the Houthi militia's operational escalation against Israel, in line with the «unity of the fronts» strategy adopted by the group since November 2023. On June 2025 ,1, the Houthis announced they had targeted Israel's Ben Gurion Airport with a hypersonic ballistic missile, as well as three critical

Israeli targets in the areas of Jaffa, Ashdod, and Eilat. On June 2025 ,5, the Houthis claimed to have targeted Ben Gurion Airport again with two «Ya'fa» model drones. On June 2025 ,6, the group stated it had targeted the same airport with a ballistic missile, model (Palestine 2). On June 2025 ,10, the Houthis reported executing a military operation that targeted Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv with two ballistic missiles, one being a hypersonic «Palestine 2» and the other a «Zulfiqar» model. On June 2025 ,28, sirens were heard in several regions of Israel due to the detection of a missile launch from Yemen.

Several key considerations emerge from the above data. First, the group's ability to target Israeli territory has significantly increased. Second, the Houthis have maintained a regular and low-cost operational pattern, ensuring that their weapon stockpiles are not depleted, particularly in light of the increasing pressure on their economy and weapon supplies from Iran. Third, the frequency of Houthi operations against Israel has noticeably decreased following the escalation between Israel and Iran, for the reasons previously mentioned.



Major Israeli Operation Against the Houthis

2

On June 2025 ,9, the Israeli military issued orders to evacuate three Yemeni ports. These evacuation orders targeted the ports of Ras Isa, Hudaydah, and Salif, which had previously been struck by Israeli attacks. On June 2025 ,10, the Israeli military announced in a statement that Israeli naval warships had struck Houthi targets at the Hudaydah port in Yemen. The Israeli military claimed that these strikes were carried out to prevent the port from being used for military purposes, alleging that the Hudaydah port was being used for weapons transfers.

Analysing the specifics of this Israeli operation and the content provided by the Israeli media, it is evident that «Shayetet 3,» a naval commando unit, carried out the attack using advanced military ships of the «Sa'ar 6» class, along with other vessels operating in the northern Red Sea. This marked Israel's first use of naval forces against the Houthis, a significant shift that appears to be related to the operational advantage of naval forces, which have a faster operational range than the air force, which requires three hours to reach Yemen, plus the return time. Additionally, the naval forces can remain in the Red Sea for extended periods, offering continuous response capabilities and operational flexibility.

However, the most significant Israeli escalation against the Houthis occurred on June 2025 ,15, when Israeli media reported an Israeli attempt to assassinate a senior Houthi figure in Yemen as part of synchronised operations that also included Iranian territory. The Israeli Broadcasting Authority stated that «the Israeli air force carried out a military operation in Yemen targeting a Houthi official,» adding that «the results of the operation are currently being assessed.» U.S. news site Axios reported that a senior Israeli official revealed, «The operation targeted the Houthi Chief of Staff, Muhammad al-Ghamari.»

The specifics and results of this operation have not yet been disclosed. Still, the operation itself represents a significant turning point in the escalation between the two sides for several reasons. First, this was the first Israeli operation against the Houthis since the onset of the Israeli-Iranian escalation. Second, this operation marked the first time Israel specifically targeted Houthi leadership. Third, the operation aimed to achieve one of two objectives: either Israel received intelligence about Houthi leaders and sought to seize the opportunity, or Israel intended, through the operation, to provoke the Houthis into escalating alongside Iran, thereby pushing the U.S. administration toward intervention in the ongoing escalation.



3

Multi-Level Domestic Escalation:

The Houthi militia has adopted several patterns of operational escalation on the domestic front, alongside field movements from the internationally recognised government forces. This dynamic has been reflected in a series of developments. In early June 2025, a Yemeni soldier was killed and another was injured in an artillery strike launched by the Houthis on military positions in northern Marib Governorate, in northeastern Yemen.

A second development involved the Yemeni government's deployment of substantial military reinforcements and equipment to several governorates and coastal areas in the east, south, and west of the country—an action undertaken with support from the Saudi-led coalition. This manoeuvre appears to have aimed at securing Yemen's coasts, monitoring maritime access points, and shutting down smuggling routes previously exploited by the Houthis and other groups.

A third indicator, reported by Yemeni media in the first week of June 2025, stated that a Yemeni child was injured by sniper fire from Houthi forces in southern Taiz Governorate, located in the southwest of the country. The incident coincided with random shelling by the group targeting residential neighbourhoods in the northern part of the city.




These developments reflect Yemen's positioning within a state of "no war, no peace," wherein the de-escalation agreement between the internationally recognised government and the Houthis remains fragile and susceptible to collapse at any

moment. This volatility is exacerbated by the ongoing mobilisation efforts of the Houthis group and its continued violations on the ground. At the same time, the internationally recognised government appears to be seeking to capitalise on the Houthis' growing international isolation to garner support for a potential military operation against the group.



Disruption of Terror Cells by the Internationally Recognised Government:

4



June 2025 witnessed a significant counterterrorism development, as the internationally recognised government announced a high-level security operation within the framework of its efforts to combat terrorism. On June 2025 ,29, the Yemeni Supreme Security Committee revealed the dismantling of terrorist cells linked to the Houthis, as well as to al-Qaeda and ISIS. These cells were reportedly responsible for several incidents in recent months. The committee emphasised the need for national unity and the protection of the internal front.

The announcement came during a committee meeting held in the interim capital, Aden, chaired by Rashad Al-Alimi, President of the Presidential Leadership Council, and attended by Prime Minister Salem bin Buraik, as well as ministers, military commanders, senior security officials, and the governors of Aden and Taiz. According to official media, the meeting reviewed reports on the performance of security and military agencies, as well as efforts to enhance stability in Aden and several other governorates. It also highlighted achievements in the fight against terrorism, including the apprehension of several cells affiliated with the Houthis and cooperating terrorist organisations, as well as the thwarting of their subversive plots.



Alongside the intense political and security developments Yemen experienced in June 2025, the country also witnessed a series of significant economic developments — many of which were directly influenced by, or reflective of, the dynamics mentioned above. These developments may be addressed as follows:

1 Ongoing Hardship in Houthi-Controlled Areas:

June 2025 saw further indicators of the worsening humanitarian conditions faced by Yemeni citizens living under Houthi control. In early June, reports emerged of residents in Al-Hudaydah Governorate complaining of a power outage that had lasted approximately ten days, amid an intense heatwave in the coastal city in the west of the country. During the first week of June, the Houthi militia carried out widespread tax collection campaigns targeting all categories of traders and livestock market owners across three governorates under its control. Additionally, the group's use of damaged and non-circulating currency to pay half-salaries to public sector employees in areas under its authority contributed to citizens' inability to purchase basic Eid al-Adha necessities. This coincided with the U.S.-based Centre for Justice designating the deprivation of salaries in Yemen as a crime against humanity.

2 Economic Escalation by the Houthis:

Throughout June 2025, the Houthis adopted a series of escalatory economic measures. The most notable of these occurred on June 2, when the Houthi-run Ministries of Finance and Economy announced their first joint resolution targeting the investment sector and small-scale producers. The resolution aimed to protect and promote local production in Yemen, in line with the "localisation of industry" policy declared by the Sanaa-based government. However, these measures are expected to exacerbate the suffering of citizens and contribute to shortages of various essential goods.

Further escalation was seen on June 25, when the Houthi-controlled Central Bank in Sanaa decided to suspend dealings with Al-Kuraimi Bank—one of Yemen's most prominent and widely accessible financial institutions. This decision is likely to have far-reaching consequences, particularly given the fragile state of the banking sector in Yemen.



Worsening Economic and Social Crises in Parts of Yemen:

3

June ٢٠٢٠ witnessed several developments that underscored the deepening hardship faced by the Yemeni population. On June ٢, the World Bank issued a warning over the continued deterioration of Yemen's economic and social conditions amid the protracted conflict, worsening institutional fragmentation, and declining international support. Meanwhile, reports highlighted an unprecedented water crisis affecting residents of Taiz in southwestern Yemen. The limited availability of water has driven prices to record levels, making it difficult for families to meet their needs for drinking and household use. The cost of a ٦,٠٠٠-litre water truck reportedly reached ٧٠,٠٠٠ Yemeni rials (approximately ٣٠ U.S. dollars).

Also coinciding with Eid al-Adha, meat prices in Yemen continued to rise, reaching record levels in cities such as Aden, despite widespread living and service-related crises and the collapse of purchasing power, of which meat consumption has been one of the most visible casualties. In a related context, Yemeni traders and importers have voiced complaints over new surcharges imposed by shipping companies on cargo arriving at the Port of Al-Hudaydah, labelled as "risk fees." The commercial private sector considers these fees illegal and unjustifiable. Additionally, on June ٢٠٢٠, ٢٢, the Yemeni rial recorded a new decline, reaching its lowest value in the country's history against foreign currencies in areas controlled by the internationally recognised government. This development comes amid a deepening financial crisis that continues to escalate in parallel with regional geopolitical tensions.



4 Yemen Impacted by the Repercussions of the Israel-Iran War:

Yemen has not remained insulated from the economic repercussions of the recent Israel-Iran war. On June 2025 ,16, amid the ongoing conflict and its impact on global energy markets—as well as on Yemen’s own oil and energy sector—the authorities of the internationally recognised government in Aden introduced a new fuel pricing scheme. Under the new pricing, the cost



of a -20litre gasoline canister rose from 34,000 Yemeni rials to 35,900 rials (approximately 30 U.S. dollars). In comparison, the price of a -20litre diesel canister increased from 33,500 rials to 34,000 rials.

This marks the fourth fuel price hike in 2025 alone. Such price

adjustments are regularly imposed in Aden and other areas administered by the internationally recognised government, not only in response to local or regional emergencies but also in reaction to every new decline in the value of the local currency.



New Economic Measures by the Internationally Recognised Government:

4



In June 2025, the internationally recognised government of Yemen adopted several measures aimed at addressing the country's ongoing economic challenges. On June 24, reports indicated that the government was preparing to open the aviation sector to private investment companies, allowing them to operate flights as soon as possible to ease pressure on passenger demand, particularly for patients

and students. Currently, three private investment airlines operate in Aden: Fly Aden, Hadramout Airlines, and Balqis Airlines. These operate alongside Yemen Airways, which is under considerable strain after losing half of its fleet during the Israeli airstrike on Sanaa Airport in May 2025. Additionally, on June 30, the internationally recognised government formally requested support from the Paris Club to assist Yemen in gathering the necessary data required to complete its debt database and integrate it into the Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS).



The following outlines the key trends shaping external engagement with Yemen during June P.O:

1 Continued U.S. Pressure on the Houthis:

The United States has maintained its efforts to tighten financial and military restrictions on the Houthis, even after halting its direct military strikes against the group—reflecting Washington’s continued reliance on a “maximum pressure” strategy. In this context, in early June 2025, the United States reiterated its warning to commercial vessels delivering or offloading refined fuel to the Houthis, designated as a terrorist organisation, that they could face “severe sanctions.” A statement issued by the U.S. Department of State affirmed that Ansar Allah (the Houthis) remains officially designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, and that vessels delivering or offloading refined fuel after April 2025 ,4, may be subject to harsh penalties. The statement also noted that such actions expose vessels and their crews to the risk of Houthi attacks or hostage-taking.

In a related development, on June 2025 ,20, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed new sanctions on four individuals, twelve entities, and two vessels for their involvement in an international smuggling network used to finance the activities of the Houthis in Yemen. In its official statement, the Treasury Department noted that «the designated entities and individuals are engaged in illicit activities, including oil and commodity smuggling, generating significant revenue for the militia through Yemen’s black market, in addition to illegal shipments passing through ports under Houthi control, in clear violation of U.S. sanctions.»



Yemen's Growing Inhospitability Toward International Organisations:**2**

The United Nations has condemned the current conditions in Yemen, which are increasingly rendering the country an inhospitable environment for the operations of international organisations.



On June 2025 ,4, the UN and several international organisations renewed their call for the immediate and unconditional release of dozens of their staff members detained by the Houthis in northern Yemen for over a year. During the first week of June, UN agencies operating in Yemen reported significant difficulties in processing cash payments to their partners across the country, amid a deepening humanitarian crisis and a sharp decline in international funding and aid. That same week, UN Women highlighted the impact of the renewed conflict earlier this year on Yemeni women and girls, urging the international community to take swift action to protect them and ensure their access to vital services. The agency stressed in a recent report that the destruction of critical infrastructure—such as the Port of Al-Hudaydah and Sanaa Airport—has severely disrupted food supply chains. On June ,12 2025, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, called on Ansar Allah (the Houthis) to release all detained UN and international organisation personnel immediately and unconditionally. He underscored the importance of a negotiated settlement as the only path toward resolving the Yemeni crisis during his regular briefing to the UN Security Council in New York. Collectively, these developments reflect Yemen's gradual transformation into an environment increasingly unfit for the operations of international organisations, due to the security situation, the practices of the Houthis, and the broader economic and operational challenges confronting these organisations across various parts of the country.



3

Ongoing Debate Over China's Ties with the Houthis:

On June 2025 ,4, **Al-Araby Al-Jadeed** published a report citing exclusive statements from Western diplomats and officials, indicating that Chinese influence in the Yemeni conflict has been rising—whether directly or indirectly—particularly about the enhancement of Houthi capabilities. This growing influence is reflected in the increasingly advanced weaponry the Houthis are deploying in their fight against the internationally recognised government and the Saudi-led coalition supporting it, as well as in recent confrontations with the United States. These confrontations revealed the Houthis' use of Chinese-made weapons, technologies, and military software—unlike in the past, when they primarily relied on Russian and Iranian arms. Yemeni military sources told **Al-Araby Al-Jadeed** that forces aligned with the internationally recognised government, along with coalition forces, had on multiple occasions intercepted arms shipments and spare parts used by the Houthis to bolster their military capabilities. Some of the seized equipment originated from Iran, while others came from East Asian countries—including China. The sources confirmed that hundreds of Houthi drones shot down by the Yemeni military and its allied forces, along with the Arab coalition, contained components and equipment sourced either from Iran or China, with Chinese parts increasingly prominent in recent years.

Overall, China's approach to dealing with the Houthis appears consistent with its broader strategy in the Middle East—one that seeks to maintain regional balance, engage with all actors, and manage relations pragmatically. This relationship cannot be viewed in isolation from Beijing's efforts to strike a strategic balance in its dealings with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Moreover, China's engagement with the Houthis also reflects a broader pattern of geopolitical manoeuvring aimed at counterbalancing the influence of the United States in the Middle East.



Surge in Irregular Migration Toward Yemen: **4**

The issue of irregular migration into Yemen witnessed significant momentum during June 2025, manifesting on two main levels. The first relates to reports documenting that Yemen's coasts received hundreds of irregular migrants during the first week of the month, while authorities managed to rescue over 183 individuals from human traffickers. This came amid complaints about the government's inability to shelter these numbers or curb their movement toward border areas. Informed sources told "**Middle East**" that, despite ongoing governmental efforts to confront the influx of irregular migrants and limit this phenomenon, the dire economic conditions—exacerbated by the ongoing confrontation with the Houthis—have contributed to the expansion of smuggling activities by sea and land alike. According to the same sources, traffickers have shifted their departure points from the Somali coast to Yemen's eastern shores, instead of the Djiboutian coast, which had long served as the main smuggling route to the country's western seaboard.

On 24 June 2025, reports citing official Yemeni sources stated that the Director of Security of Yemen's interim capital, Aden, Major General Mutahar Al-Shuaibi, met with Mohammad Rafiq Nasri, Head of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Aden. The meeting addressed the situation of refugees and irregular migrants arriving from the Horn of Africa, and the growing challenges posed by their increasing influx into the southern governorates of the country, particularly the city of Aden. The discussions also reviewed the security and humanitarian risks associated with displacement and irregular migration, as well as the mounting pressure on security and public service agencies resulting from the large number of undocumented refugees and migrants. This has created serious challenges in terms of security, stability, and the provision of essential services.





مركز اليمن والخليج للدراسات

YEMEN & GULF CENTER FOR STUDIES

The Yemen & Gulf Centre for Studies (YGCS) is an independent institution established in 2023 in Aden under license No. (456) from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.

Our mission is to contribute pioneering knowledge that upholds scientific rigour and rationality, particularly emphasising Yemen and its neighbouring regions. We aim to play a key role in shaping public policies, rationalising decision-making processes, and enhancing awareness of the issues we study among the elite and the general public.



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